

DEFENCE AND SECURITY JOURNAL

CORE VALUES

LEARNING

HONOUR

RESPECT

DECORUM

EXCELLENCE

INNOVATION

PUNCTUALITY

PROFESSIONALISM

MISSION COMMAND

PRISTINE ENVIRONMENT

DRIVING TENET: COMMON SENSE

DEFENCE AND SECURITY JOURNAL



DEFENCE AND SECURITY JOURNAL

December 2016

Volume 1, Issue 1

Defence Services Command and Staff College
Sri Lanka

EDITORIAL BOARD

- Chief Editors:** Prof. Amal Jayawardane
Prof. HD Karunaratne
Major General Udaya Perera
- Editorial Board:** Dr. Shirantha Heenkenda
Dr. Hiniduma Sunil Senevi
Dr. RM Vijeratne
Dr. Tisssa Raveendra Perera
Dr. Nishantha Hittiarachchi
Dr. (Mrs) Wasantha Subasinghe
Admiral (Dr) Jayanath Colombage
- Editorial Committee:** Dr. Sithara Fernando
Dr. Minna Thaheer
Ms. Apsara Karunaratne
Brigadier Nishantha Manage
Captain (I) Dammika Kumara
Group Captain Aruna Jayatilleke
Captain (ND) Suresh De Silva
Captain (E) Hasantha Dassanaike
Wing Commander Gihan Seneviratne
- Technical Committee:** Brigadier Rohitha Dharmasiri
Lieutenant Colonel Ajith Velimanne
Lieutenant Colonel Lanka Fernando
Lieutenant Colonel Prabhath Atapattu
Major Jayalal Ranasinghe

Design & Print: NEO Graphics, 44 Udahamulla Station Road, Nugegoda, Sri Lanka

Defence and Security Journal, Volume 1, Issue 1, 2016

© Defence Services Command and Staff College, Sri Lanka 2016

All Rights Reserved. No material in this publication may be reproduced without the written permission of the publisher.

ISSN 2536-8745

Disclaimer: The views expressed and the information contained in the papers included in this publication are the sole responsibility of the author/s, and do not bear any liability on the Defence Services Command and Staff College, Sri Lanka.

CONTENTS

Foreword

Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean: Contest for Power by Major Maritime Users and Non-Traditional Security Threats.....	01
Admiral Jayanath Colombage	

Understanding Separatist Networking in Sri Lanka: Ideology as a Concept in Network Analysis.....	15
Jeevanthie Senanayake	

Bytes Vs Bullets: The Changing Face of War.....	30
Wing Commander Gihan Seneviratne	

Emerging Issues in Urban Conflict.....	44
Nilanthan Niruthan	

Back to Civilian Life: Dynamics of Economic Reintegration Process of Ex- LTTE Combatants in Post-War Sri Lanka	60
Wing Commander Vajira Senadheera	

Peace Education in the Context of a Post- Intractable Conflict	75
Nirmali Wijegoonawardana	

Ideology and Ritual of Warfare in Sri Lanka.....	88
Indrakeerthi Siriweera and Sanath de Silva	

Book Review

<i>A View from the International Maritime Boundary Line: India-Sri Lanka</i> by Prasad Kariyapperuma	
Reviewed by Apsara Karunaratne.....	98

Notes on Contributors	102
------------------------------------	------------

Core Values of DSCSC	104
-----------------------------------	------------

FOREWORD



Defence and security in the recent years has evolved notably both in terms of theory and practice. One of the most overarching challenges confronting the modern defence and security environment is that it defies prediction, for the focus of modern conflict is no longer territorial expansion, but is of ideas and beliefs leading to serious security consequences. These consequences can have far-fledged impact on society in varied ways from national security to human security.

Sri Lanka's 30-year long conflict with the LTTE is considered a success test of defeating terrorism, a test not only can we be proud of, but also a precedent for others to glean lessons from. Keeping in mind that the old forces of terrorism have not entirely dissipated, it is of paramount importance that a small state like Sri Lanka starts directing its focus on both military and non-military aspects of security.

Against such a backdrop, the Defence Services Command and Staff College (DSCSC) in keeping with its core values and objectives initiated a platform to foster wider understanding on the concerns of defence and security and to enhance the need for timely research analysis.

Defence and Security Journal is one of the many endeavours undertaken by the DSCSC with a view to provide a platform for student officers and directing staff of the Staff College, academics, military personnel, and policy makers to present, debate, and explore the latest literature and the most extensive possible knowledge pertaining to the dynamics dealt in defence and security. This journal, in its best way, is expected to provide guidelines and recommendations to higher defence management to pre-frame suitable action plans. This issue includes seven papers and one book review that touch on a variety of subjects, viz. maritime security, information warfare, intelligence and national security, urban conflicts, post-war rehabilitation, and peace education.

I make this an opportunity to extend my gratitude to all those dedicated individuals without whose hard work and unfailing enthusiasm, the publication of this volume would have remained only an abstract proposal. In this connection, I would like to place my appreciation on record for the expertise extended by Prof. Amal Jayawardane, Prof. H.D. Karunaratne, and Ms. Apsara Karunaratne. I would also like to thank all the contributors who shared their knowledge and expertise through their papers included in this issue. The tremendous effort spared by the reviewers, editorial team, and the technical team is also extended due accolades. I sincerely hope that this inaugural issue would be warmly received by the readers as a humble effort of the DSCSC. I also look forward to receiving many more accomplished scholarly works for our future issues.

Major General Udaya Perera RWP RSP VSV USP USAWC psc

MSc (Ind) MSc (USA) NDU-CT (USA) psc (Ind)

Commandant

Defence Services Command and Staff College, Sri Lanka

MARITIME SECURITY IN THE INDIAN OCEAN: CONTEST FOR POWER BY MAJOR MARITIME USERS AND NON-TRADITIONAL SECURITY THREATS

Admiral Jayanath Colombage

ABSTRACT

The Indian Ocean is the third largest body of water in the world and encompasses the land masses of Asia, Africa, Australia and Antarctica. Its rim regions are occupied by one-third of the world population. It is the repository of two-thirds of world's known oil reserves required to fuel the economies of many developed and developing countries within and outside the Indian Ocean littoral. As the principal conduit of East West maritime trade, with 90% of the global trade moving by sea, the Indian Ocean is the world's busiest maritime superhighway, underlining its unarguable strategic importance. This increased focus on geo-strategic and geo-economic interests, has enhanced naval presence of many nations. Yet, great power rivalry does not seem to be an immediate security threat to the Indian Ocean. The rise of China as a dominant economic and military power is today a major strategic concern, especially for both India and the United States. There is also the possibility of spill-over effects from the power rivalries in the Western Pacific Ocean. The Indian Ocean security has become multi-faceted and dynamic. Piracy, terrorism, irregular migration by sea, IUU fishing, narcotic drugs and small arms trade are some of these new and non-traditional threats. There is a need to enhance Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) capabilities to observe shipping activity. Handling of today's complex maritime security threats can no longer be the exclusive preserve of one country. It calls for collaborative and combined efforts at regional, bi-lateral and multi-lateral levels. The security and stability of the Indian Ocean requires a rule-based maritime order. It is imperative for the prosperity and survival of not only the states in the region but for the whole world at large.

Keywords: Indian Ocean, Maritime Security, Major Power Rivalry, Energy and Trade Security

THE THEATRE: THE INDIAN OCEAN

The Indian Ocean (IO) is the third largest ocean in the world. This ocean connects four continents; Asia, Africa, Australia and Antarctic. It is home for one-third of world population. The IO contains two-thirds of the world's proven oil reserves, one third of the world's natural gas, 90% of the world's diamonds, 60% of Uranium

and 40% of the world's gold reserves. Its waters constitute the lifeline with half of the world crude oil shipment, containerized cargo¹ and one-third of bulk cargo. The IO is bound by land on three sides on the east, the west and the northern boundaries. There are three critical choke points providing access to tankers and cargo vessels across the IO from one part of the world to another. These choke points are;

Bab- el- Mandeb - Between the Horn of Africa and the Middle East. This is the strategic link between Mediterranean Sea and the IO through the red sea. This narrow point, which is 18 miles at its narrowest, is located between Yemen, Djibouti and Eritrea.

Strait of Hormuz - This is the world's most important oil checkpoint. This links the oil producing Persian Gulf with the IO and more than 85% of oil exports to markets of India, China, Japan and South Korea. According to Potgieter "the narrowest point is 21 miles apart. The narrow strait of Hormuz is the main line between the oil-rich Gulf region and the rest of the world"².

Strait of Malacca - Located between Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, this links the Indian Ocean with the Pacific Ocean. This strait is the shortest route between the Middle East and growing Asian markets. At the narrowest point, it is only 1.7 miles apart. More than 60,000 ships transit through this strait annually carrying a quarter of world trade³.

All the three critical choke points are located in potential unstable regions for different reasons. The Strait of Malacca can be named as the most stable choke points out of the three. Unstable countries such as Yemen and Somalia pose a serious threat in Bab-el-Mandeb whilst the strait of Hormuz is in close proximity to the highly volatile Middle East region. The recent incidents of firing of two missiles from rebel-held territory in Yemen, which landed near a US navy destroyer in the Red Sea and firing of rockets against UAE leased swift boat which resulted in heavy damages are clear examples of the volatile nature of this area⁴. Subsequently the US fired three tomahawk cruise missiles and reportedly destroyed three radar locations within the Houthi rebel held areas of Yemen. These incidents took place just north of Bab-el-Mandeb in the Red Sea and clearly show the volatile nature of the region.

There are 35 littoral countries and 12 land locked countries in the IO. This would indicate a total of 47 countries in the Indian Ocean Rim (IOR). There are many countries depending on the IO, mainly for energy and raw materials and to export finished products. The IO is a warm water ocean which can be used throughout the year and there are two well-established monsoons bringing in rain and cooling the climate.

The IO has played a less significant role in the 19th and 20th centuries. The world wars, the cold war and industrial economic development during the two centuries were mainly centered around Atlantic and Pacific oceans. However, the IO has played a substantial role in trade, exchange of cultures and ideas, spreading of religion be it Buddhism, Hinduism, Christianity and Islam throughout the history. Merchants and explorers within and outside the IO traversed across the vast span of the IO in sailing ships using the monsoonal winds (trade winds).

INDIAN OCEAN IN THE 21ST CENTURY: MAIN PLAYERS

In the 21st century, the IO has gained much focus and is fast becoming the key ocean reducing the importance enjoyed by the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. The IO has become an area of geo-strategic and geo-economic competition. Major naval and military powers are focusing their attention on the IO. The China's military strategy white paper underscores the security of overseas interests, and highlights that the country's armed forces will carry out escort missions in the Gulf of Aden and other sea areas as required to secure the Sea Lanes of Communication(SLOC). Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) will gradually shift its focus to offshore defense with open seas protection⁵. These are clear indications that China is focusing its attention in the IO as its interests are energy and raw material requirements on the IO. The Australian defence white paper indicates that their strategic defence and economic interests are in the Indo-Pacific region and rule-based global order which supports their interests⁶. Further this white paper talks about "strategic interests in the wider Indian Ocean through maritime south east Asia, within which most of their trade activity occurs, will be most central to their national security and economic prosperity⁷. It is also evident that Japan is focusing more on the IO. Japan has joined with US and India in conducting tri-lateral exercise 'Malabar' and focusing on technology sharing in the under-sea environment in the IO⁸. Japan has also changed its defence posture with constitutional amendments envisaging a more effective military role for Japanese Self Defence Forces. The United States maritime forces, the US Navy, US coast Guard, US Marine Corps came out with 'A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Sea Power' in March 2015 has given special focus to the IO by even dividing the former Asia-Pacific region into Indo-Asia-Pacific⁹. The USA has committed more of their maritime forces including carrier strike groups, amphibious ready group and attack submarines to the IO. The USA is committing their Navy's most advanced platforms including ballistic missile defence systems, intelligence gathering platforms to the IO. India and the US signed an agreement on sharing military logistics, in a major step forward in closer bilateral defence cooperation, though both sides clarified it will not involve setting up of military bases¹⁰. This agreement would facilitate logistics supplies, support and refuelling services during peacekeeping missions, humanitarian operations and joint exercises. There is a similar agreement between the USA and Sri Lanka as well.

The main player in the IO, India has renewed their focus not only on its immediate neighbourhood but also across the entire region. In his foreword to the Indian Maritime Strategy published in 2015, the Chief of Indian Navy Admiral Dhowan clearly indicates India's stand on maritime strategy as follows, "India finds its seas to be primary means of extending her connectivity and trade links with her neighbourhood and world at large. There seems to be little doubt that today, the 21st century will be the century of the seas for India and that the seas will remain a key enabler in her global resurgence"¹¹. The Indian Navy's vision statement 2014 indicates "strengthening itself continuously as a formidable, multi-dimensional and networked force that maintains high readiness at all times to protect India's maritime interests, safeguard her seaward frontiers and defeat all maritime threats in our area of interests"¹². This maritime strategy is indicative of India's ambition for the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and beyond. The Indian Navy has undertaken development of power projection capability across the ocean and also has shown a keen interest to enhance its Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) capabilities in partnership with other littorals in the IO. The tri-lateral MDA agreement between India, Sri Lanka and the Maldives is aimed at information sharing of merchant vessels at sea by way of Merchant Ship Information System (MSIS) and Automatic Identification System (AIS)¹³. There is a keen interest, especially by India to include Seychelles and Mauritius into an expanded initiative on MDA. India has already committed to development of infrastructure facilities in some islands in Seychelles and Mauritius, which include coastal Radar facilities and other coastal protection systems¹⁴. In addition to the countries already mentioned; ASEAN countries, South Korea and Russia have shown a keen interest in maintaining maritime security in the IO as they too depend on this ocean for energy, and to prosper with maritime commerce. These contesting interests by world super powers, regional super powers and emerging super powers seem to have led to a 'maritime Cold war' in the IO. The Indian Ocean Region (IOR) has become heavily militarized mainly as a result of piracy in the horn of Africa and the Arabian sea, which threatened maritime commerce.

However, there is no prospect of 'an immediate combat situation' despite the presence of a large number of warships from many nations. Many regional and extra regional navies were compelled to come into the IO to protect their merchant shipping from pirate attacks. Although the piracy has come down drastically, the war ships are still carrying out patrolling and protecting merchant vessels as the possibility of resurgence of piracy is still prevalent. As per Potgieter "The proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), increased Missile capabilities, rise in non-traditional threats and power projection by foreign militaries have not made the Indian Ocean safer"¹⁵.

The IO features some of the busiest and key strategic shipping routes serving as a conduit for maritime trade between Asia, the Persian Gulf, Africa, Europe and Americas. The maritime trade is increasing and as per the US cooperative strategy

for 2016, “oceans are the life blood of the interconnected global community, where sea borne trade is expected to double over the next 15 years”¹⁶. Many nations depend on the IO for transportation of their energy requirements, which is essential for their economic sustenance. The warm waters in the IO mean a rich diversity of fisheries resources. The IO possesses some of the world’s largest fishing grounds, providing approximately 15% of earth’s known catch¹⁷. The richness of maritime trade and energy routes beckon major powers from afar.

GREAT POWER RIVALRY IN THE IO AND THE 21ST CENTURY MARITIME SILK ROUTE PROJECT

Great power rivalry does not seem to be an immediate security threat in the IO. However, the potential for great power competition prevails in the IO. The increasing maritime rivalry between India and China and USA partnering with India in order to counter Chinese influence add tension to the region. The situation flared up after 2009, when Chinese war ships were compelled to protect merchant ships in counter piracy operations in the IO. China maintains a continuous presence in the region like many other nations. The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) was operating without any bases in the region. PLAN established a logistics facility in Djibouti like Japan to support their counter piracy operations. China’s economic and defence assistance to countries like Bangladesh, Pakistan, Myanmar, Maldives, Sri Lanka are seen as military expansionist ambitions by India and USA. Chinese investment and construction of seaports is also seen as building prospective naval facilities for PLAN. Chinese shipping companies and commercial port operators are active in the IO. In this backdrop, the Chinese 21st century Maritime Silk Route (MSR) project is also looked with suspicion, especially by India as an attempt to isolate its influence in the region. This suspicion is hampering the efforts of developing countries such as Sri Lanka who is waiting to benefit from the MSR initiative capitalizing on the geo-strategic location and deep-water ports available and the objective of becoming the maritime hub of the region. This situation has also led to a naval capability build up by China and India and increased US presence with a stated objective of maintaining freedom of navigation. However, all the navies in the IO are abiding by internationally accepted norms and procedures and have not hampered the rule-based regional maritime order.

Another possible security threat for the IO region is spillover effects from great power rivalry in the Pacific Ocean, especially in the South and East China seas. The spheres of strategic interests in the Pacific Ocean for USA and China overlap in the South and East China seas. The US maintains a significant military presence in Japan and South Korea. There is tension between China and Japan over disputed territorial claims.

The situation between the border of India and Pakistan, in Jammu and Cashmere, both with nuclear capability, is another hot spot in the IO. Many fears that the tension and cross border skirmishes between these two countries could lead to a dangerous situation. Also, the situation in Afghanistan is worrisome for the IO as well.

NON-TRADITIONAL MARITIME SECURITY THREATS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN

Maritime security in the IO has now become a multifaceted and dynamic concept. Due to diverse nature of both internal and external players, nature of threats in the maritime domain have also become diverse. Threats in the IO are not only from the states, but mostly from non-state actors (NSA). Although the chances of a large-scale war are minimal, threats of NSAs are predominant and can impact the rule-based maritime order. The NSAs, who are influencing maritime security in the IO could be linked to national security of some individual countries but could have ramifications for the entire region. The IO is a region of conflict. However, most of these conflicts are internal and remain localized. But these conflicts can lead to regional or global impacts. Weak or failed states, levels of poverty, absence of democracy in some states, corruption, competition for scarce resources, interference by foreign powers, and turbulence in the Islamic world due to extremism are impacting on the maritime security in the IO. Weak government structures and limited capability to control maritime domain has resulted in various forms of illegal activities in this ocean and that has led to increased militarization by regional as well as extra-regional powers. There is concern for traditional as well as non-traditional security threats in the IO. There is concern about trade and energy security. Some of these non-traditional maritime security threats in the IO are as follows;

MARITIME PIRACY

Piracy in the Horn of Africa, which threatened the global shipping industry with hijacking, demanding ransom and use of violence, was a real menace to the international shipping and trade. The pirates were NSAs who originated from Somalia. Lack of maritime security around Horn of Africa made international shipping vulnerable to pirate attacks and it was not limited to the coastal areas of Somalia. The reach of pirates extended even closer to Maldives and a High-Risk Area (HRA) was declared, which included all of Arabian sea and extended closer to Sri Lanka. The waters off Somalia became a piracy hotspot and concentrated efforts by regional and international navies, shipping industry, United Nations and international agencies were needed to curb this threat. The Somali pirates at times used mother ships with one or two skiffs on tow, in order to enhance their range, long distances away from Somali coast or Horn of Africa. Piracy also prevails in

Malacca strait. Here the target is mainly product tankers of refined oil, unlike in the case of Somali pirates, where the interest is ransom for the crew and the ship. They are interested only in forcefully acquiring the cargo and sell it in black markets. The Somali pirates are well armed with machine guns, rocket propelled grenades and Malacca strait pirates use small arms and knives. Piracy is a crime of opportunity and could involve many different crimes such as hijacking, kidnapping, threatening or use of force, aggravated assault, murder, torturing victims, extortion and money laundering, unlawful detention and illegal arms trafficking and usage, which are criminal offences under the international law. However, taking legal action against captured pirates is a difficult task as there are issues such as jurisdiction and sovereignty, evidence gathering and presenting, disposition of pirates and repatriation and responsibility for trial and imprisonment.

It is a well-established fact that the deployment of Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel (PCASP) on board merchant vessels, to protect international shipping at sea is a success story and contributed effectively to the decline of piracy in the IO. However, presence of armed security personnel on board merchant vessels can be problematic and could lead to severe security implications, if not properly regulated. It is accepted that the responsibility of protecting merchant vessels at sea is on the flag state. However, flag states are not in a position to protect all of its commercial vessels engaged in international voyages. Therefore, the flag states normally allow ship owners to hire PCASPs to protect their vessels, crew and cargo, especially when transiting through High Risk Area (HRA). There are reportedly more than 140 companies providing armed protection to merchant vessels employing a minimum of 2,700-armed guards¹⁸. There are both state as well as non-state players involved in providing maritime security and this situation could lead to conflicting issues in jurisdiction, Rules for Using Force (RUF) and accountability for human right violations. The employment of large number of PCASPs without proper training and accountability processes could lead to proliferation of small arms, misuse of end user certificate, unhealthy practices of storing and transferring of small arms. This situation could lead to accidental firing of weapons and misidentification of targets. There had been instances of untrained PCASPs shooting indiscriminately even before verifying the threat. As the ocean is vast and not properly regulated many of these unintended and indiscriminate actions may not even come to light. Actions taken by PCASPs at sea could also result in more violence being used by the pirates and armed robbers, thereby endangering the lives of the ship's crew. There are recommendations for flag states regarding the use of PCASPs on board ships in HRA by International Maritime Organization (IMO) Maritime Safety Committee circulars (i.e. MSC. 1/ CIRC 1406/ REV 3) and Best Management practices to regulate the effective and maintain safety of these deployments. However, these are recommended guidelines and not strict regulations and it is up to the discretion of individual flag states and shipping companies and agencies providing facilities to implement these measures.

Poverty and lack of livelihood opportunities and the lawlessness in Somalia were the main reasons for piracy in the Horn of Africa region. The piracy in the IO has resulted in increased costs for shipping industry by way of paying ransom, higher war risk insurance premiums and additional measures to increase speed beyond economical range and harden merchant vessels against possible pirate attacks. Further, there are huge costs to employ armed security guards on board ships. Costs associated with naval deployments and for escorting by various task forces and individual countries is phenomenal. There are also large amounts of money transfers taking place through informal systems, which is outside the accepted international banking procedures. This could lead to money laundering. Also, the ransom money could be used for financing terrorism. Once the ransom money is transferred, there is no way of following that money as there is no mechanism to identify the source of destination of these funds. This can lead to finance fraud at the international level.

MARITIME TERRORISM

Maritime terrorism is not a new phenomenon. Terrorists have used the ocean for various activities. The hijacking of the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro, on 7th October 1985, was a significant maritime terrorist act. Following that incident, IMO adopted resolution A.584(14) on measures to prevent unlawful acts which threaten the safety of ships and the security of their passengers and crews¹⁹. The other noteworthy terrorist attacks at sea were; the attack on the USS Cole (US Navy ship) in the port of Aden in Yemen in 2000, the attack on the SS Limburg (Very Large Crude Carrier) in the Gulf of Aden, off the coast of Yemen in 2002 and the attack on the Super Ferry 14, in the Philippines in 2004. These attacks exposed the vulnerability of war ships and merchant/passenger ships in harbours or territorial waters. The Mumbai attack in March 2008 carried out by members of Lashkar-e-Taiba is a case of terrorists using a maritime landing to carry out specific attacks against key land installations.

The LTTE pioneered and developed the suicide boat, underwater suicide saboteurs and Underwater Improvised Explosive Devices (UIED). They operated an assortment of craft such as attack craft, logistics craft, suicide craft and submersibles and were able to carry out maritime operations throughout the full spectrum of the maritime environment; surface, sub-surface and air. They were engaged in large scale terrorist financing and money laundering and gun running by using 12-15 merchant vessels which operated in the international maritime logistics system. They were engaged in large-scale criminal activities such as piracy, hostage taking, human smuggling, narcotic trade and arms smuggling. The activities of the LTTE raise two important questions. How was it possible for the LTTE to raise funds, purchase large quantities of weapons and ammunition, and stockpile in their ships in ports and shipping lanes in international waters? If a small terrorist outfit like

LTTE could do this, what about other much bigger terrorist organizations doing the same or even better? This is a clear indication of lack of maritime security in the IO.

Presently, the activities of the ISIS who are exerting influence in the Middle Eastern region are not far from the IO. Further, the situation in Yemen is also posing a threat to international shipping. The biggest worry in maritime terrorism is the possibility of a terrorist group taking a commercial ship and carrying a Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) under their control and exploding in a commercial port of a developed country. So far terrorists have used commercial aircrafts, service boats, trucks and small vehicles to create destruction and mayhem in the world. Their next method could be to use a ship.

IRREGULAR MIGRATION BY SEA: HUMAN SMUGGLING

According to United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) report on 'Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2015', there are 65.3 million individuals forcibly displaced worldwide as a result of persecution, conflict, generalized violence, or human right violations. This is 5.8 million more than 2014²⁰. The same report also indicates that more than 54% of all refugees came from just three countries; Syrian Republic, Afghanistan and Somalia. It can be seen that the three countries mentioned are either in or close to the IO. Whilst some of these displaced people have genuine concerns for safety of their lives, a majority of them can be considered as 'economic refugees'. Earlier due to the prolonged conflict, Sri Lanka was considered as a 'source country' for irregular migrants by sea. The conflict in Sri Lanka forced large numbers of Tamil population to flee the country and they were accepted mostly by western countries. This community then became the most significant source of financial and political support for the LTTE. The LTTE also carried out a planned forced migration as a revenue generating method and also to enhance the size of diaspora population, who were forced to support their fight against government forces. Even after the war ended in May 2009, the LTTE used their international criminal network to smuggle people across the ocean. One of the key destinations at this point of time was Australia. Due to the close cooperation, shared intelligence and awareness of the problem, the movements could be curbed to near zero. These irregular migrations can be linked to organized trans-national crime, terrorist financing and money laundering, whilst endangering the lives at sea.

ILLEGAL, UNREPORTED, UNREGULATED (IUU) FISHING

According to the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing²¹:

Illegal fishing refers to activities: Conducted by national or foreign vessels in waters under the jurisdiction of a state, without the permission of that state, or in contravention of its laws and regulations;

Unreported fishing refers to fishing activities: Which have not been reported, or have been misreported, to the relevant national authority, in contravention of national laws and regulations; or

Unregulated fishing refers to fishing activities: In areas or for fish stocks in relation to which there are no applicable conservation or management measures and where such fishing activities are conducted in a manner inconsistent with state responsibilities for the conservation of living marine resources under international law.

IUU fishing is another maritime security threat in the IO. IUU fishing activities can take place in EEZ or territorial waters. According to Gunasekera “Article 19.2 (i) of the UNCLOS makes provision for any ‘fishing activities’ by foreign vessels to be regarded as an act of prejudice towards peace, good order or security of the coastal state thereby confirming that such passage is not innocent”²². These could include poaching, use of destructive fishing methods, use of banned fishing nets, not declaring the catch locations and details and even stealing of the catch. IUU fishing can impact on traditional military security and human security as fishing is one of the main livelihood activities of the coastal areas of IO littorals.

The LTTE exploited the Indian fishing trawler fleet, which were engaged in IUU fishing in the northern waters of Sri Lanka to ferry their cadres, fuel, explosives, detonators and other war-fighting materials, mainly from the southern Indian coast to northern, north-western and north-eastern coasts of Sri Lanka. IUU fishing can also be linked to transnational maritime crime syndicates, money laundering and have links to illegal trafficking of drugs. Fish piracy is also a common occurrence in some parts of the IO. Bay of Bengal has seen attacks by fishing vessels in order to steal the fish. This crime too can have economic impact on the countries relying heavily on the fishing industry for their economic sustenance.

The United Nations (UN) Development Summit in September 2015 came up with UN resolution 70/1, “Transforming our world: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development”. The basis for this resolution was the understanding that the global resources in the oceans should be carefully managed for a sustainable future as the oceans are key in making the earth habitable for humankind. The main objective of Goal 14 of this agenda, ‘Life Below Water’ is to “conserve and sustainably use oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development”. The main thrust of this Goal 14 is “sustainable marine economic activities that meet the needs of current and future generation and to create ocean foundations to foster and formulate the new blue economy”²³. The IO countries need to take firm action against fishermen engaged in IUU fishing and the spirit of this agenda should be

used to curb this menace, which is a serious threat to traditional as well as human surety of coastal states in the IO.

Associated with IUU fishing is another possible maritime security threat, that is the possibility of a state using these fishing vessels to act as a maritime militia. A rogue state could decide to employ their paramilitary forces disguised as fishermen as a force multiplier and deploy these vessels for the purpose of gathering intelligence and reporting of activities of warships. These fishing vessels could be equipped with advance electronic equipment and communication systems. The distinction between bona fide fishing vessels and such vessels operated by maritime militia will be difficult due to the large number of fishing vessels operating in the ocean.

ILLEGAL NARCOTIC DRUGS AND SMALL ARMS TRADE BY SEA

The LTTE with its international shipping network can be easily named as the organization, which benefited from drugs and arms trafficking in the IO most. The LTTE was the most effective terrorist organization thus far in terrorist financing and money laundering. The money raised by these illegal means was used to purchase not only small arms, ammunition but artillery guns, mortars and ammunition for the same. They exploited the weakness in international system and was able to acquire these war-fighting equipment from different sources at different times. These areas included Afghanistan, Ukraine, Lebanon, East African countries and North Korea. They were able to purchase, stockpile and transport these items on board their ships to Sri Lankan coast, which was under their control²⁴. Often these operations were combined with trafficking of illegal narcotic substances. These operations were carried out successfully for few decades and thereby they were able to continue the fight against the government forces inflicting heavy damages at most of the time. This is another indication about lack of maritime security in the IO.

CONCLUSION AND WAY FORWARD IN ENHANCING MARITIME SECURITY IN THE IO

The IO is fast becoming one of the most important oceans in the 21st century. The IO remains largely free from territorial disputes. However, there are potential hot spots in the region, which can lead to mistrust and military action by states. The geo-strategic and geo-economic competition has resulted in major power rivalry and concerns about energy and trade security. The presence of choke points at main entrances to the IO increases vulnerability. Transnational maritime crime has the potential to destabilize the region, which could affect most of the countries and their economies. Fundamentalism and religious extremism are two factors prevailing in the region. Many leading terrorist groups are interested in the IO for their activities. There is a need for enhanced MDA in the IO. Although the international navies operating in the IO have abided by international conventions

and regulations, there are many other stake holders, such as merchant ships and fishing vessels, which may be involved in various nefarious activities. Hence MDA will play a critical role in the security architecture of the IO.

There is a need for carrying out risk and vulnerability assessments of potential security threats at sea. The IO is a dynamic ocean and changes are taking place at all times. Sharing of maritime intelligence, especially on merchant shipping is important for sustainable security in the region. Measures such as Automatic Identification System (AIS) and shore based long range radar can be employed for this. Maritime air surveillance by long range air craft and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) together with networking capabilities will be an economical way in this regard. It is also necessary to use all platforms and agencies at sea for collection of ocean data as 'Eyes at Sea'. International and regional cooperation to deal with maritime crime such as piracy, terrorism, illegal small arms and narcotic substances and illegal exploitation of marine resources are essential in maintaining the law and order in the IO. Increased security depends on coordinated security awareness and broader collaboration in response to maritime threats. To achieve this, some of the functions currently managed by individual nations will have to be undertaken by organizations which should provide more efficient and effective implementation. These approaches will be very useful in maintaining a 'Rule-Based Maritime Order' and stability of the most important ocean in the 21st century.

In the absence of an all-encompassing security architecture in the IO, it may be necessary to consider formulation of a Code of Conduct (COC) for Major Maritime Users (MMU) with the objective of enhancing regional as well as extra-regional maritime cooperation and a stable maritime environment, which can contribute to peace, good order and continuous prosperity throughout the Indian Ocean. A COC could help the development of a regional framework for information sharing and operational coordination, development and strengthening of domestic laws and regulations, as appropriate, to implement relevant international agreements addressing maritime security. Further, it can help the development of domestic laws and regulations, where such laws are not in place, to criminalize maritime crimes, develop and adopt effective and practical measures to counter piracy and to develop and build existing national/regional and extra- regional initiatives. Areas of cooperation for such an initiative could lead to enhanced international cooperation at, regional, sub-regional, and bilateral levels in combating threats to maritime security in accordance with international law. It can also facilitate mutual assistance among Major Maritime Users in maintaining the peace and stability of the IO for the benefit of the MMUs as well as the entire world.

NOTES

1. Raman, S. (2016). India Must Seriously Take up Its Role in Indian Ocean Region. *India Foundation Journal*. 4(4) pp.3-10

2. Potgieter, T. (2012). Maritime security in the Indian Ocean: Strategic setting and Features, Institute of Security Studies,[online] Paper no 236, Available at: <https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Paper236.pdf>. [Accessed: 08 Oct. 2016].
3. Raman, op.cit.,
4. Gambrell, J. (2016). Missiles fired from Rebel-held Yemen land near US Destroyer, Associated Press,[online] Available at: <http://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/missiles-fired-from-rebel-held-yemen-land-near-us-destroyer/ar-BBxdKrp?li=BBnb7>. [Accessed: 10 Oct. 2016].
5. China's Military Strategy. (2015). *China Daily*, [online] Available at: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2015-05/26/content_20820628.htm. [Accessed: 28 Sep. 2016].
6. Department of Defence Australia. (2016). Defence white Paper of Australia, [online] Available at <http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/Docs/2016-Defence-White-Paper.pdf>. [Accessed: 28 Sep. 2016].
7. ibid.
8. Daniels, J. (2016). Expanding US-Japan-India Cooperation. *The Diplomat*, [online] Available at: <http://thediplomat.com/2016/04/expanding-us-japan-india-cooperation-in-the-indian-ocean/>. [Accessed: 28 Sep. 2016].
9. USA Coast Guard. (2015). A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Sea power,[online] Available at: https://www.uscg.mil/seniorleadership/DOCS/CS21R_Final.pdf. [Accessed: 28 Sep. 2016].
10. The Hans India. (2016). India, US sign Military Logistic Agreement; Say not to Involve Bases, [online] Available at: <http://www.thehansindia.com/posts/index/National/2016-08-30/India-US-sign-military-logistics-agreement-say-not-to-involve-bases/251339>. [Accessed: 02 Oct. 2016].
11. Indian Maritime Strategy. (2015). Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy. Indian Navy Naval Strategic Publication (NSP), [online] Available at: http://indiannavy.nic.in/sites/default/files/Indian_Maritime_Security_Strategy_Document_25Jan16.pdf. [Accessed: 02 Oct. 2016].
12. Sakhuja, V. (2015). The Indian Ocean in 2015, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies Forecasts, [online] Available at: http://www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/SR167-Forecasts-IndianOcean.pdf. [Accessed: 08 Oct. 2016].
13. Kotelawela Defence University. (2013). Maritime Security Cooperation in South Asia: Strategic Implications and the Way Ahead. Department of Strategic Studies,[online] Available at: <http://www.kdu.ac.lk/departments-of-strategic-studies/commentaries/88-weekly-analysis/167-maritime-security-cooperation-in-south-asia-strategic-implications-and-the-way-forward>. [Accessed: 02 Oct. 2016].

14. Baruah, D.M. (2016). Expanding India's Maritime Domain Awareness in the Indian Ocean, Carnegie Foundation for International Peace, [online] Available at <http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/07/25/expanding-india-s-maritime-domain-awareness-in-indian-ocean-pub-64188>. [Accessed: 02 Oct. 2016].
15. Potgieter, T. (2012). Maritime security in the Indian Ocean: Strategic setting and Features, Institute of Security Studies,[online] Paper no 236. Available at: <https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Paper236.pdf>. [Accessed: 08 Oct 2016].
16. USA Coast Guard. (2015). A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Sea power, [online] Available at: https://www.uscg.mil/seniorleadership/DOCS/CS21R_Final.pdf. [Accessed: 28 Sep. 2016].
17. Senaratne, B. (2015). Maritime Safety and Security: A Sri Lanka Perspective. Paper presented at IORA Meeting of experts on Maritime Safety and Security New Delhi, India.[online] Available at:<http://www.kdu.ac.lk/departments-of-strategic-studies/images/publications/BhagyaSenaratne-MaritimeSafetySecurity-TheSriLankanPerspective-VF-KDUweb.pdf>. [Accessed: 25 Sep. 2016].
18. Tondini, M. (2012).Some Legal and Non-Legal Reflections on the Use of Armed Protection Teams on Board Merchant Vessels: An Introduction to the Topic, Military Law and the Law of War Review' [online] 51 (1): 7-19. Available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2304205. [Accessed: 16 October 2017].
19. International Maritime Organization. (1988).IMO and Maritime Security, [online] Available at: http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/Guide_to_Maritime_Security/Documents/IMO%20and%20Maritime%20Security%20-%20Historic%20Background.pdf. [Accessed: 08 October 2016].
20. UNHCR, (2015) Global Trend: Forced Displacement in 2015, [online] Available at: <https://s3.amazonaws.com/unhcrsharedmedia/2016/2016-06-20-global-trends/2016-06-14-Global-Trends-2015.pdf>. [Accessed: 09 Oct. 2016].
21. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). (2001).International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, [online] Available at: <http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/y1224e/y1224e00.htm>. [Accessed: 17 Oct 2016].
22. Gunasekera, D.M. (2016). Decision of South China Sea Dispute: A lesson for Sri Lanka- India Fisheries Dispute. *Daily Financial Times*, [online] Available at: <http://www.ft.lk/article/561882/Decision-of-South-China-Sea-Dispute--A-lesson-for--Sri-Lanka-India-fisheries-dispute>. [Accessed: 17 Oct. 2016].
23. United Nations. (2015) Sustainable Development Goals: 17 goals to transform our world, [online] Available at: <http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/oceans/>. [Accessed: 24 Sep 2016].
24. Information based on interview with Mr. Kumaran Pathmanathan, Head of ex-LTTE Weapon Procurement Division, on 01 June 2013 in Colombo.

UNDERSTANDING SEPARATIST NETWORKING IN SRI LANKA: IDEOLOGY AS A CONCEPT IN NETWORK ANALYSIS*

Jeevanthie Senanayake

ABSTRACT

The existing literature identifies six theoretical concepts for insurgent network analysis that provide the basis for building models to develop network analysis tools that are widely used to study insurgent networks. No research has been recorded in literature that has tested the applicability of 'Ideology' as a concept to base the development of such tools. This research was carried out to test the applicability of 'Ideology' as a concept to develop a network analysis tool unique to study Sri Lankan insurgency networks. The study concluded that unlike insurgent networks that have been studied in other parts of the world so far, the strengthening of local intelligence networks depend heavily on ideology, and therefore, a network analysis tool that would cater the best to the local requirements has to be based on a model relying on ideology as a concept.

Keywords: Ideology, Network Analysis, Insurgency, Intelligence, Sri Lanka

INTRODUCTION

A country that has recently survived an insurgency needs to strengthen her intelligence capacities in order to ensure the effective prevention of any revival attempts of the cause and the ideology behind it. Sri Lanka too is facing this challenge in the post conflict scenario, where strong attempts are made by the pro-LTTE elements to propagate the Tamil separatist ideology¹ and discredit the efforts of the Government of Sri Lanka to bring about national integration. In this light, conducting continuous and extensive research on theoretical and methodological developments in the field of intelligence, and adopting suitable methods to enhance local intelligence outputs are of paramount importance.

Scholars around the world have conducted extensive research on insurgent movements and counter insurgency methods. One significant development was the applicability of the method 'Network Analysis' to identify insurgent networks and their 'modus operandi' after the 9/11 attack. In sociology, network analysis is

* This paper is a summary of an unpublished thesis submitted for the Commandant's Research Paper to the Defence Services Command and Staff College, Sapugaskanda, Sri Lanka.

used to depict the analysis of relationships of a set of actors who are connected through specific ties among them². Studies conducted so far have revealed six basic concepts that can be universally used to define relationships in an insurgent network: Trust, Family, Tasks, Meetings and frequency of attendance, Money and resources, Strategy and goals. These published studies have focused on the Al Qaeda network, IRA network, Saddam Hussain's network and criminal networks around the world³ where all those have shared these common concepts.

The separatist insurgency of Sri Lanka shared common features with the Al Qaeda, IRA movements and also has shown connections with criminal networks. However, it differs from the above types in its nature of claiming for a separate homeland where no historical legitimacy exists. Although the military movement of the LTTE was defeated in 2009, there have been a number of LTTE cadres who have evaded arrest or rehabilitation and are operating within the country or outside to propagate the same separatist ideology. There have been attempts by such individuals in the recent past, as identified by the local intelligence agencies, to revamp the LTTE network in the country. Four such notable attempts have been recorded between 2009 and 2014⁴.

The modern day security challenges to Sri Lanka have given rise to the necessity of moving beyond the conventional military thinking. Contemporary insurgent groups are characterized by their linkages across people and other institutions on a global scale. Any attempt to counter such groups in the present day context requires a systematic approach for understanding their interconnectedness.

The six concepts identified through academic research so far that explain properties of such networks do not include 'Ideology'. However, when examining the attempts to revamp the LTTE network within the country and activities of the pro-separatist Tamil diaspora, these six concepts seem inadequate to explain their networking. The separatist ideology seems to have played a significant role in all these. Therefore, there is a need for researching the applicability of ideology as a possible concept for the holistic understanding of insurgent networking in Sri Lanka.

INSURGENCY

The War Studies Department of the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, UK, defines insurgency as the actions of a minority group within a state that are intent on forcing political change by means of a mixture of subversion, propaganda and military pressure, aiming to persuade or intimidate the broad mass of people to accept such a change⁵. There are three core functions of an insurgency: an insurgency must survive, it must strengthen itself, it must weaken the power structure or state⁶. With these core functions, the objective of some insurgencies is to seize the governing power whereas the objective of some others can be to break away from the parent state to establish a mono-ethnic or a mono-religious autonomous state.

The origin of an insurgency is often linked with an ethno-religious, socio-economic or political reasons such as the need for a separate national identity. There are four basic tenets of an insurgency⁷: a cause, leadership, popular support and organization. Ideology is linked with the first tenet and influences the rest. Ideology is also defined as the set of beliefs characteristic of a social group or individual. They characterize the individual's or the group's goals, expectations and actions, most importantly, their social movements. Ideologies impart meaning to public matters. This very characteristic makes this concept central to any form of politics. The political framework of a separatist insurgency, where the insurgents seek to remove themselves from the rule of the parent state completely⁸, heavily relies on ideology.

THE UNIQUE CASE OF SRI LANKA

The Tamil separatist insurgency in Sri Lanka is an indirect outcome of the century long colonial rule of the British and the colonial divide and rule policy. Starting from the disproportionate number of seats in the Legislative Council that were given to the local ethnic majority and the ethnic minority by the Colbrooke – Cameron Reforms in 1833 up to the vast educational opportunities, white collar jobs that were made accessible more to the minority than the majority planted the first seeds of the separatist ideology among the local Tamil elite. This grew into a demand for fifty percent of the governing rights to Tamil and Muslim minorities from the Soulbury Commission, immediately before the granting of independence to Sri Lanka. This demand, however, was rejected by the Commission⁹.

The adoption of the Official Languages Act No. 33 of 1956 where Sinhala was officially granted the status of the national language of the country heightened the tension between the Sinhalese and Tamils¹⁰. Although the regime in power had plans to provide for the reasonable use of Tamil as an administrative language, Tamil politicians ignored this fact¹¹. This calculated act created large scale protests in the North and the East and a mass unrest in the country. By the wake of the 1970s, with the economic hardships that the entire country was facing, a youth unrest sprang up in the country. Eventually, isolated incidents of violent acts against the Police started taking place in the North and the East. By this time, the elite Tamil political parties had lost control of these armed movements that they have created and nurtured. The LTTE soon became the sole aggressor in these regions by annihilating all the other Tamil militant groups, and adopted terrorism as their major strategy to propagate the insurgency. This resulted in the three decades long war on the state of Sri Lanka.

The LTTE was militarily defeated by the Armed Forces of Sri Lanka in 2009. However, only the major strategy of the Tamil separatist movement was effectively countered with this victory. The Tamil separatist insurgency, after the military defeat of the LTTE has now metamorphosed into the form of a strategic diplomacy,

where it seeks to gain legitimacy through international consensus and pressure on the Sri Lankan state. Although not physically present as militant groups within the territory of Sri Lanka, the insurgency still exists, in ideological and diplomatic dimensions. Under any potentially favourable condition, it has the possibility to adopt armed means as the major strategy again. Historical evidence amply exhibit that resorting to an armed struggle was made possible when pro-separatist Tamil politics were operating in the North and the East¹². It is against this backdrop that the propagation of the Tamil separatist ideology in the post-conflict Sri Lanka needs to be studied.

COUNTERING INSURGENCIES IN THE PRESENT DAY BATTLE ENVIRONMENT

Countering insurgencies has become one of the key security concerns that are discussed in the world today. The focus has been the ways and means of dismantling insurgent networks. Recent research has proved that examining the inverse of this will give useful insights as to the dismantling of insurgent networks, when the focus is on the question, 'How do insurgent networks survive?'¹³. Interestingly, this question has relevance to the understanding of another dimension of insurgent networks; their re-emergence, once suppressed.

The present day battle environment goes beyond the conventional land-centric focus and involves more metaphysical concepts such as networking and network centric warfare. An idea about these new concepts, especially networking, provides the war fighter "access to new frontiers in the information domain"¹⁴. Especially when it comes to modern day threats to security where the population plays a decisive role, the environment becomes as important as the enemy. This owes to the fact that the support of the population largely contributes to the centre of gravity of the enemy force¹⁵. In the context of post-conflict Sri Lanka, identifying the enemy is a significant challenge and is an important part of the intelligence process. The adversaries of the state have the advantage of blending in with the Tamil population, global as well as local. Identifying pro-separatists correctly must take place first in order to separate them from their bases of support. Intelligence plays a prominent role here.

Intelligence is defined as the information that meets the stated or understood needs of policy makers that has been collected, processed and narrowed to meet those needs¹⁶. Although it assists most of the targeting cycle; decide, detect, deliver and assess during a conventional battle, a different approach is required when fighting a non-conventional insurgency¹⁷. Here, culture, demographics, political support, religion, and ethnicity play a significant role. Traditional intelligence is based upon the geophysical environment where the geospatial terrain is given a great importance. When countering a non-conventional threat where a local community plays a significant role, human terrain is considered as important as the geospatial

one¹⁸. The behaviour of the human terrain greatly depends on the ideologies that it has adopted. An understanding of the human terrain will give commanders a clearer picture of the non-conventional battle area and also assist intelligence analysts to develop predictions about the current and future battle space¹⁹. A tool that caters precisely to this requirement is Network Analysis.

NETWORK ANALYSIS AND INSURGENT NETWORKS

Network Analysis has applications in the natural sciences as well as the social sciences. In the social sciences, it is used as a tool to identify the connectivity among individuals and institutions. A network is a set of vertices, which are sometimes called nodes (people, institutions or events) that have connections called 'links' between them²⁰. The 'actors' represented by nodes and 'relations' represented by links are the two indispensable elements of any social network²¹.

The links connecting nodes give rise to a set of complex but understandable relationships that characterize networks. These relationships form the structural basis of the related social processes and 'actors'²².

The study of insurgent networks is part of the study of 'resistance networks' that are largely covert in nature. It can also be broadly identified within the category of criminal network analysis, which is generally applied to organized crimes where multiple offenders are involved²³. Salient features of criminal networks such as incompleteness, incorrectness and inconsistency that cause difficulties for obtaining precise data become concerns when studying terrorist networks as well.

Valdis Krebs introduces the term 'tie strength' while trying to map the terrorist network responsible for the 9/11 attack. He states that the tie strength of two nodes will be governed by the time spent together by the two individuals representing the node. This again depends on the fact whether they have attended the same school or from the same family, travelling or participating at meetings together or have financial transactions together. Intelligence agencies have used a pair of somewhat similar terms in identifying the strength of a network; strong vs weak ties. Here, strong ties are identified as the ones that have been confirmed by a secondary source. Granovetter, when introducing his concept of traffic analysis to analyse networking of the IRA in 1973 has used this term in a different sense. According to him, a weak tie is one that lies outside the relatively dense 'clique structures' of a network and is seldom used. However, in a command and control point of view, these may be the most important ties. Urgent or important signals are not frequently sent off, and as a result, are more likely to be detected as 'weak ties' than strong ones. In addition to the use of these concepts, a researcher has to bear in mind that actors in a network and their actions need to be viewed as interdependent, rather than independent, autonomous units²⁴.

The prominent works in the field of network analysis mainly including those of Malcolm Sparrow, Karl Meter, Valdis Krebs and Brian Reed have identified six concepts that define relationships in a network; Trust; Family and Relatives; Tasks; Meetings and Frequency of Attendance; Money and Resources; Strategy and Goals. These concepts have formed the basis of models that are built since then to develop tools to carry out network analysis for sociological and intelligence purposes.

Trust is associated with prior contacts in family, among friends, colleagues or even neighbourhood. This concept seems to overlap with the next one, family and relatives to a certain extent. However, these two can be distinguished by the fact that trust can be a contributing factor to relations between non family members as well. Tasks are associated with records of phone calls, travels, e-mails and other communication methods that are related to the task given to an individual. Meetings and frequency of attendance indicate the type of task that has been given to the individual and how frequently he is tasked as well as his degree of activity within the network. Money and resources indicate about bank accounts and money transfer records, pattern and location of credit card use and similar details. Strategy and goals are indicated by statements in the media, videos, travel records and similar details that reveal the objectives of the network and strategies that are used to achieve those.

THE MISSING LINK

The decade since 9/11 has given rise to a large number of researches that are focused on countering terrorism. The United States Army has conducted a considerable number of researches into the use of Network Analysis in countering terrorism and insurgencies²⁵. However, researches that are recorded in literature have not tested the applicability of “Ideology” as a concept, when building models to develop network analysis tools. Unlike all the insurgencies that have provided the basis for the development of current network analysis tools, the insurgency in Sri Lanka stands unique due to a number of reasons. The first is the fact that it was an offspring of the colonial divide and rule policy. The second is its ethno-political realities where the insurgency sprang up not because of any economic or political injustice done exclusively to the Tamil ethnic group, but because of opportunistic politics of the elitist Tamil as well as Sinhala politicians. The third is that it continues to exist in an ideological–diplomatic dimension even after the decisive defeat of its military component. These inherent characteristics call for a unique approach to analyse the networking of its contributors.

Why has insurgent networking in Sri Lanka continued to survive despite regular attacks by the military and state authorities²⁶? What has caused it to sustain itself despite persistent attempts to counter it? Based on the analysis of the questionnaire, a potential answer emerges here²⁷. The attempts to dismantle these networks have missed some component of those that has been vital for their sustenance.

The six concepts that have been identified in literature as the best suit to explain insurgent networks are Trust, Family and Relatives, Tasks, Meetings and frequency of attendance, Money and resources, Strategy and goals. If these concepts were the only valid concepts for the local scenario, and network analysis tools based on the traditional six concepts were the best suited to handle local insurgent networks, there would not have been a chance for their re-emergence over the time. In short, the network analysis tools that are currently used based on these six concepts would have catered to the early identification of such important networks.

The network analysis tool that would be used in the Sri Lankan context, therefore, has to be based on a model relying on a set of concepts that is unique to Sri Lanka. 'Ideology' is very likely to play an important role as a concept to base such a model to develop a network analysis tool, unique to Sri Lanka. There are seven indicators that suggest the presence of the separatist ideology in local post conflict insurgent networks.

- a. Ex – LTTE cadres.
- b. Civil society organizations that support Tamil separatist sentiments.
- c. Pro-separatist Tamil diaspora.
- d. Local dependents of the Tamil diaspora.
- e. Members of local Tamil nationalist political parties with separatist ideologies.
- f. University students / academics with separatist sentiments.
- g. Tamil nationalist politicians / activists / organizations in Tamil Nadu.

In a questionnaire that was used among intelligence officers²⁸ who had experience in handling the recent four attempts to revamp the LTTE network²⁹, five of these seven indicators have been ranked as 'very important' to strengthen the four networks under study. They are ex-LTTE cadres, pro-separatist Tamil diaspora, local dependants of the Tamil diaspora, local Tamil nationalist political parties and the Tamil Nadu political parties favouring separatism. These suggest that the concept that they indicate, ideology, has a strong presence in these networks.

THE PRESENCE OF 'IDEOLOGY' IN LOCAL TERROR NETWORKS

Ex-LTTE cadres had been the most involved category in the four incidents of interest and the one that has one of the most influential abilities to strengthen those networks. The vast majority of them had belonged to the former Intelligence and Military Wings that were the most active during the conflict. The category that was the most influenced by the separatist ideology during the conflict was the cadres. This influencing even went to the extent of a fraction of them being trained as suicide cadres. The LTTE has employed suicide attack operations tactically as well as strategically³⁰, which shows their readiness to embark on any activity that

their ideology calls for. Respondents to the questionnaire ranked ex-LTTE cadres to have the highest involvement in the identified networks, and identifying their contribution towards strengthening the network to be 'Very Important'.

The role of the Jews in the formation of Israel well exemplifies the amount of influence that Diasporas can have on the political and military transformations of the host and parent states³¹. They are a strong propagator of the ideology that they represent. The former District Secretary³² of a district in the Northern Province, when requested to comment about the influential nature of the Tamil diaspora factor on civilians of the North said that illiteracy and poverty drives civilians in the North to become prey of the Tamil diaspora. She further added that the reluctance of the diaspora to leave their present countries of residence and to give up the refugee status granted by those countries urge them to find prey in the local society to propagate the separatist ideology and create the image that Sri Lanka is still an unsafe place for Tamils to live.

Insurgent networks are linked domestically, regionally and internationally to their diaspora³³. The domestic fraction that facilitates this link is the local dependents of the diaspora. Therefore, they too act as a strong indicator for the presence of the ideology that the diaspora represents. Their financial dependency may have caused them to be part of the local insurgent networking assisted by the diaspora members. The majority of respondents of the questionnaire have identified this indicator as being very important to strengthen the identified networks.

Respondents to the questionnaire have had three different opinions as for the importance of local Tamil nationalist parties with separatist ideologies in strengthening the identified networks although they have ranked it as the fourth important category that was involved with insurgent networks. The reason for the difference in opinion may have been what the respondents have observed during the different areas in the country that they have served. The local Tamil political parties have their strongest presence in the North and the East than the rest of the country.

The District Secretary, when requested to comment on this factor observed that these political parties have created a survival mechanism by nurturing and harbouring separatist sentiments within their politics. Considering the ability of these parties to make their voice heard in the legislature and other policy circles, they can be considered an important contributor towards strengthening the networks. Their presence strongly indicates the involvement of 'Ideology' in the network.

Tamil Nadu political parties have a long history of supporting a number of different causes advocated by the Sri Lankan Tamils, including those for federalism, language and establishment of a separate Tamil Elam state in the North and East of Sri Lanka³⁴. During the conflict in Sri Lanka, Tamil Nadu functioned as the 'outside base' for the insurgency, supplying arsenal and providing sanctuary to the LTTE³⁵.

The vast majority of respondents to the questionnaire have listed this indicator as being very important for strengthening the identified networks during the post conflict situation.

The history of the conflict in Sri Lanka shows that the turn towards violence of Sri Lankan Tamils began when the militants formed the 'Tamil Students' Movement' in 1970³⁶. The limited student and academic community that supported Tamil separatism in Sri Lanka have played a rather subdued but an obvious role in promoting the separatist ideology since then. Respondents to the questionnaire are of the unanimous opinion that this factor had been important in strengthening the four identified networks. The District Secretary observed that the majority of these academics in the Northern Province have to depend directly or indirectly on the Tamil politicians for career advancement, which may be one reason for their direct involvement in the identified networks where these politicians themselves have been involved. The importance of this indicator as identified by the respondents again suggests that 'Ideology' has to be considered as a concept when building models to develop network analysis tools for the local context.

The role of civil society organizations has been debatable in helping to bring about national reconciliation during and post conflict situation in Sri Lanka. Certain civil society groups have been among the sympathisers of the armed combatants during the conflict. Respondents of the questionnaire have identified this factor to be mostly of a moderate importance in strengthening the incidents of concern.

Responses to the questionnaire strongly suggests that the seven indicators of 'Ideology' show a presence in the networks of the four incidents of attempts³⁷ to revamp the LTTE network in the country. This indicates the involvement of the concept 'Ideology' in those networks, and its importance in explaining the insurgency networks in Sri Lanka. It suggests the need to consider ideology as a concept when building models to develop network analysis tools for the Sri Lankan context.

THE IMPORTANCE OF IDEOLOGY AS A CONCEPT IN NETWORK ANALYSIS

Unlike the six concepts identified in literature, ideology is difficult to be attacked due to its intangible nature. Any network based and sustained on ideology will have the ability to generate membership by various means as long as the ideology is maintained attractive. This ability to recruit by different means is a key factor for sustenance and evolution of an insurgent network. As a result, sustenance of an attractive ideology prevents solutions such as attacks on the nodal points of a network, from destabilizing the network. Therefore, permanent destabilization of any kind of insurgent networks will be untenable as long as the ideology is sustainable.

The questionnaire brought five of the seven indicators to the reader's attention where respondents have identified them as very important in strengthening the insurgent network, suggesting the heavy involvement of 'Ideology' in these networking attempts. This is a marked difference from all previous studies carried out by the academia that are recorded in literature, using network analysis on other global insurgent networks. They have not identified ideology as a concept that contributes to the holistic understanding of global insurgent networks.

The importance that ideology holds in strengthening an insurgent network could be a regional phenomenon as well. Studies about terrorist groups functioning in India have also shown the sharing of ideological and regional links among these groups³⁸.

However, further research has to be carried out using networking data in order to establish this fact. Considering several types of networks in literature, David Siegel suggests a symmetric nature to social networks where those who influence others are also influenced by them³⁹. Local insurgent networks have not shown this characteristic either to the full extent where those activists at the grassroots level are often influenced by those leaders who direct them, and not vice versa. This asymmetric nature too strongly hints the influence of 'Ideology', which usually has a one-way flow from top to bottom in such scenarios.

Ideology as a concept contributes towards parameters that explain the topography of an insurgent network as well. Sean Everton's research on key players and terrorist networks indicates that analysts need to consider a network's overall topography before crafting strategies for their disruption⁴⁰. He also suggests that a holistic understanding of insurgent networks cannot be obtained without this consideration. The topography of a network is characterized by a number of parameters including density, centralization and clustering. Ideology contributes at large towards the density, centralization and clustering of 'actors' and their 'connections', depicted in a network. Therefore, according to Everton's findings, it can be observed that consideration of ideology as a concept will contribute to a more holistic understanding of insurgent networks.

Paulo Alto, when discussing meta network analysis noted that an analyst has to go beyond the communication network to consider the distribution of norms, attitudes and beliefs, the distribution of roles across gender, ages and sub groups for a better understanding of a terrorist network⁴¹. This is another occasion where ideology emerges prominently as a concept. The understanding of norms, attitudes and beliefs of those involved in an insurgent network are directly linked with the ideology behind it.

A vast majority of (92%) respondents to the questionnaire have believed that the propagation of Tamil separatist ideology might lead to another insurgency situation.

Analysis of the past election results⁴² show that the rise in Tamil militant groups has paralleled the rising popularity of the separatist ideology and that has peaked with the climax of the ideology. This observation also suggests that ideology is a factor to be considered when conducting insurgent network analysis.

A case study that has been conducted on the government of Sri Lanka's social network analysis-assisted counter insurgency campaign observes that this approach may also be counter-productive as it does not address the root causes of the problem⁴³. However, during any counter insurgency situation, the state has the prime responsibility to prevent an insurgency from escalating, in order to ensure the safety and security of the entire citizenry. Therefore, merely addressing the root causes of an insurgency does not suffice in a national security perspective. Whilst the economic and social root causes can be handled by a coordinated government mechanism, it can still be argued that network analysis methods can effectively locate and neutralize the gravest element leading to the propagation of an insurgency; the ideology.



Figure 1: Proposed model for the coordinated mechanism to obtain a holistic understanding of an insurgency network in Sri Lanka.

(Source: Author)

CONCLUSION

This study concludes that ideology is a useful concept in explaining local insurgent networks, thus, proving the alternate hypothesis. It also made the first step towards filling the gap in the existing literature, where no previous study had been conducted to test the applicability of 'Ideology' as a concept for building models to develop network analysis tools.

The findings of this research suggests that obtaining a holistic understanding of a Sri Lankan insurgency network would be possible by considering 'Ideology' in addition to the six traditional concepts that are recorded in literature. A network analysis tool based on this novel combination of concepts will benefit much in the presence of a coordinated mechanism among the strategic, operational and tactical levels of the state machinery. In such a mechanism, the strategic and policy guidelines have to provide an umbrella cover for activities in the operational level, which will largely be research oriented. The tactical level, where the first contacts are usually made with insurgent networks, has to be constantly armed with training, awareness and regular fact finding activities. There needs to be a mechanism for the umbrella cover of the strategic level to flow easily to the tactical level as well.

NOTES

1. The Tamil separatist ideology advocated for a mono-ethnic homeland for the Tamil ethnic population covering the North, East and part of the North Western provinces of Sri Lanka. The LTTE adopted this ideology, annihilated all other Tamil armed groups to claim itself to be the sole representative of the Tamil people and with the support of fractions of the Tamil diaspora that supported this claim, continued to wage an insurgency against the state for nearly three decades.
2. Brian J. Reed, 'Formalizing the Informal: A Network Analysis of an Insurgency'. PhD Dissertation, University of Maryland, 2006, p. 4.
3. Karl von Meter, 'Terrorists/Liberators: Researching and dealing with adversary social networks'. *Connections*, 24(2001) 3.
4. Valdis E. Krebs, 'Mapping Networks of Terrorist Cells'. *Connections*, 24(2001) 3.
5. Malcolm K. Sparrow, 'The application of network analysis to criminal intelligence: An assessment of the prospects'. *Social Networks*, 13 (1991).
6. Jennifer Xu and Hsinchun-Chen, 'Criminal Network Analysis and Visualization'. *Communications of the ACM*, 48(2005) 6.
7. The first attempt of this nature was when an assassination attempt was made on His Excellency the President in August 2009. The second was reported in March 2012 in Trincomalee with the assassination of a Tamil youth. The third was identified in December 2012 with the arrest of an ex-LTTE cadre in Colombo. Effective countering of the fourth was reported with the shooting down of three ex-LTTE activists in Vedivaitthakallu in the Northern Province in April 2014. (Classified source)

8. Army Field Manual Volume V 'Operations Other Than War, Section B Counter Insurgency Operations, Part 2 The Conduct of Counter Insurgency Operations'. A publication of the Defence Services Command and Staff College, Sapugaskanda, pp. 1-45.
9. Steven Metz, 'The Internet, New Media and the Evolution of Insurgency'. Parameters, 2012, pp. 80 – 90.
10. Army Field Manual Volume V, Part 1 'The Concept and Practice of Insurgency'. pp. 1-2.
11. AFM Vol V, part 2. pp. 1-5.
12. C.A. Chandraprema, 'Gota's War: The Crushing of Tamil Tiger Terrorism in Sri Lanka', Colombo: Piyasiri Printing Systems, 2012, p. 23.
13. K. M. de Silva, 'Sri Lanka's Troubled Inheritance', 2007, Kandy: International Centre for Ethnic Studies.
14. Chandraprema, 'Gota's War', p. 34.
15. Ibid, pp. 22-77.
16. Major Glenn A. Henke, 'How Terrorist Groups Survive: A Dynamic Network Analysis Approach to the Resilience of Terrorist Organizations', 2009, Monograph submitted to the School of Advanced Military Studies, USACGSC, Kansas.
17. Lt Col Michael T. Flynn, 'Understanding Our Future Battlespace: Why We Need to Integrate IO into the IPB Process'. Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin, 27(2001) 2.
18. Dan Zeytoonian, 'Intelligent Design: COIN Operations and Intelligence Collection and Analysis', Military Review, 86(2006) 5.
19. Mark M. Lowenthal. 'Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy', 2009, (4thed). Washington D.C.: CQ Press, p. 1.
20. Zeytoonian. 'Intelligent Design'.
21. Grace V. Jean, 'Human Terrain: 'culture maps' becoming essential tools of war'. NationalDefense94(2010) 675.
22. George van Otten, 'Why geography should matter to intelligence professionals'. Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin, 38 (2012) 2.
23. M. E. J. Newman, The Structure and Function of Complex Networks. SIAMReview, 45(2003) 2, see pages 167 – 256.
24. David Knoke and Song Yang. 'Social Network Analysis'. (2nded). California: SagePublications, Inc, 2008, pp. 6.
25. A. L. Barabasi, 'Linked: The New Social Science of Networks'. New York: Perseus, 2002, cited in Steve Ressler, 'Social Network Analysis as an Approach to Combat Terrorism: Past, Present and Future Research'. Homeland Security Affairs, II(2006) 2, pp. 1 - 10.
26. Xu and Chen, 'Criminal Network analysis Visualization'. Communications of the ACM, 48(6), pp. 101-107.

27. Stanley Wasserman, and Katherine Faust. 'Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications'. 1994, p. 4.
28. U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24, 2006. Counterinsurgency.
29. See note 4.
30. This questionnaire focused on understanding the extent of the involvement of the seven indicators in the four recent attempts to revamp the LTTE network in the country (see footnote 3), and their importance in strengthening those networks. It consisted of 23 questions, aiming at officers who were serving in the State Intelligence Service (SIS) and the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) who had engaged in countering the above four incidents. As the population of local intelligence officers is fairly small, and the number of officers who have actively engaged in working on the four incidents of interest was even smaller, sample size for the questionnaire had to be limited to a total of 41 respondents. This included 11 respondents from the DMI and 30 respondents from the SIS.
31. See note 27.
32. See note 4.
33. M. S. Kulandaswamy. **Sri Lankan Crisis: Anatomy of Ethnicity, Peace and Security**'. 2000. Delhi: Tarun Offset pp. 193-194.
34. Rohan Gunaratna, 'Sri Lanka's Ethnic Crisis and National Security', 1998. p. 48.
35. Classified source. This senior official of the Sri Lanka Administrative Service of the Tamil ethnic origin, who has served as a District Secretary in the Northern Province for over ten years during and after the conflict, who now holds the post of the Secretary to a non-cabinet Ministry wished to remain anonymous due to continuous threats and discrediting to her person and office by the Tamil diaspora.
36. Rohan Gunaratna. 'Sri Lanka's Ethnic Crisis and National Security', Colombo: South Asian Network on Conflict Research, p. 47.
37. Kulandaswamy, 'Sri Lankan Crisis' p. 60.
38. Gunaratna, 'Sri Lanka's Ethnic Crisis and National Security', p. 112.
39. Extracts from a release by Ernest Corea, Ambassador for Sri Lanka in the USA in July 1983, In 'The Ethnic Problem in Sri Lanka: A Collection of Articles and Essays', Colombo: Centre for Ethnic Amity, pp 45-46.
40. See note 4.
41. Aparna Basu, 'Social Network Analysis of Terrorist Organizations in India', A study conducted for the Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA), India, 2004.
42. David Siegel. 'When Does Repression Work: Collective Action in Social Networks', 2011, The Journal of Politics, 73(4), pp. 993 – 1010.
43. Sean F. Everton, 'Network Topography, Key Players and Terrorist Networks'. Connections, 32(2012) 1.

44. Paulo Alto, 'Counter Terrorism's New Tool: Metanetwork Analysis'. *Science*, 325(2009).
45. A graphical presentation of the Parliamentary election data of electorates in the North of Sri Lanka from 1952 to 1977 was used to verify the findings from the questionnaire. The graph showed a rapid increase in the number of seats secured by the political parties and candidates promoting Tamil separatism and its peaking in 1977. In contrast, parties and candidates representing the moderate Tamil sentiments showed a rapid decrease, resulting in their complete loss of seats in 1977. This trend had preceded the armed Tamil youths movement where the rise of Tamil separatist ideology had given rise to the armed movement. These armed groups started emerging in the North in the 1960s and had been well established by 1977. The indication of the presence of a separatist / terrorist ideology in a resistance network, therefore, suggests the possibility of it developing into an insurgent network later on.
46. Roger Mac Ginty, 'Social Network Analysis and Counterinsurgency: A Counterproductive strategy?', *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, 3(2010) 2.

BYTES VS BULLETS: THE CHANGING FACE OF WAR

Wing Commander Gihan Seneviratne

ABSTRACT

Warfare has been a defining characteristic of mankind, an embodiment of his greatest achievements and his greatest follies. Today, information warfare is beginning to be decisive in warfare and larger, more progressive powers are finding that they are more vulnerable to this type of warfare more than ever before. Therefore, there is a greater likelihood of small powers making their presence felt by obtaining persuasively stronger positions in the global arena by leveraging this characteristic. While the levelling of the playing field offers a greater degree of opportunity for emerging nations in the geopolitical scenario and is deemed a positive development, the potential for non-state actors too, to come to the fore as decisive elements may pose a threat to the world in terms of security. This shift needs serious consideration in the formulation of national security strategy.

Keywords: Evolution of Warfare, Information Warfare, National Security

INTRODUCTION

War continues to be a distinguishing characteristic of human social behaviour. While its presence has been a constant throughout history, the way it is waged, or warfare, has undergone gradual but certainly remarkable changes so that warfare of today, in many ways, is significantly different from what it was in the past.

The events of September 11, 2001, can be cited as one of the more recent milestones in this process of change of the character of war. It brought to the fore the idea of war being waged not by nations and states, but by non-state actors who by way of their capability and wherewithal appeared much weaker in comparison to the conventional nation states, but paradoxically, because of its non-conventional nature, actually proved to be much more powerful and lethal against a system of security designed to face the more conventional and traditional threats.

The fact that the focus of the events of September 11, 2001 was a centre of commerce and not a military target may also be indicative of a change in the focus of war itself. It can be reasonably argued that future wars will be marked by shifting from a territorial focus to an economic one, where nations will fight for a share of the global markets, which will determine the status of a nation on the international stage.

As nations strive to aggressively capture and defend their market share, information has become a commodity, the control of which will determine success and failure. And as communication technology evolves rapidly, the warfare in the information domain, or Information Warfare, will become an important factor. Information warfare is already a mainstay in the present day battle space. The increasing dependence on information systems for Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence (C3I), makes it an important own capability to protect and an important enemy capability to attack. With the rapidity of growth in this technology, it is a virtual certainty that information warfare will take on greater prominence in future wars.

One of the distinct characteristics of Information Warfare is that unlike in the case of conventional attrition warfare, the reliance of developed nations and dominant powers on information technology will make them more vulnerable to information warfare. The low entry cost as well as its effectiveness as an offensive weapon makes information warfare a viable means by which even small, relatively weak nations and even Non State actors, can challenge the hegemony of larger, more powerful nations. The increasing multi-polarity of the new world order has ensured that there is no clear 'superpower' in terms of military might. Indeed, the term 'military might' is also open to fresh interpretation for the traditional preponderance of size of the armies and fleets no longer serves as an indicator of contemporary military capability. The question of what form future warfare will take and who will dominate the future battlefield become relevant questions to be answered for they will one day become guiding principles of the defence policy of all nations. In this context the question of how information warfare will affect the evolution of warfare becomes a timely and relevant question.

THE EVOLUTION OF WARFARE

Archaeological evidences have suggested that the first act of Homo sapiens on the world stage was the systematic destruction of the Neanderthals¹. Indications are that Homo sapiens, though physically weaker and less well adapted to the environment that he lived in, was better able to communicate and to work together as a group to gradually chase away rivals to gain dominance over better settlement areas.

Today, man is the dominant species on the planet. The vast technological and sociological advances that have brought him to the top of the pecking order of the planet earth, have mostly come not despite but indeed as a result of man's engagement in the destruction of his own kind. Although many millions have died in wars, war remains and will remain an integral part of human existence. While with the evolution of mankind, warfare has not lost its importance, it too, has evolved. This evolution can be best understood by looking at three important characteristics of war, its function, form and lethality.

THE FUNCTION OF WAR

The function of war has always been the imposition of one's will on one's opponent. The means used to achieve this, the form of war, and the extent to which these means are used, the lethality of war, have however, evolved over the ages. These two attributes of war, then, will yield a good idea of the evolution of warfare.

THE FORM OF WAR

The earliest known armies were formed about 2500 BC by the City States of Sumeria consisting of infantry and war wagons or primitive chariots pulled by asses. The region of Mesopotamia and the Eastern Mediterranean saw a series of campaigns by the Egyptians, the Hittites, the Greeks, the Israelites and others to control the lands of the region, around the coast and islands as well as around the Nile, Euphrates and Tigris rivers. Troops of the period were typically armed with light bronze weapons and armour. Composite bows were the most powerful weapons on the battlefield, and the introduction of the light, two wheeled horse drawn chariot gave portions of the army greater mobility².

Circa 400BC saw the emergence of the infantryman as the dominant force in war. "Well trained and disciplined infantry could deal with chariots by remaining steady in the face of a charge or opening their ranks to let the chariots through and then attacking them." The legionnaires, the Roman heavy infantry came to dominate the battlefield. The mounted and heavily armoured knights came to dominate the battlefield during the age of the knights which followed that of the legionnaires. The infantryman came to the fore again when the advent of the crossbows, longbows and finally the firearms proved the death knell for the knights³.

A multitude of milestones of varying significance mark the progression and evolution of warfare over the ages. In two consecutive World Wars, millions died brutally while the level and intensity of war escalated. It took the destruction of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, for the world to realize that further escalation would probably prove the total annihilation of the world as was known.

The two World Wars defined the nations with the military might to dominate world affairs. In the ensuing half century, all other nations of the world aligned themselves behind the two dominant nations resulting in a clear demarcation between political affiliations. The near equality of might on both sides ensured that while the race for more potent weapons continued, these weapons were never used on a large scale; the threat of use was sufficient for order to prevail and this detente continued with the two sides competing not for dominance over the other but for parity. This standoff ensured that in the half century that ensued, the cold war never became 'hot'.

In 1992, the Soviet Union ceased to exist marking the end of the cold war. And yet, the end of the cold war did not mark the end of conflict or even war. In fact, the new world order seemed even more chaotic than the former, and it became clear that the cold war and its manifestation actually had a controlling influence not only on the two superpowers but also the remainder of the world. The fall of the Soviet Union resulted in the disappearance of the balance of power and the springing up of a multitude of regional conflicts.

For a few years subsequently, for all intents and purposes, the USA was able to hold de facto military dominion over the entire world. The Gulf war proved to the world that the USA was the undisputed military superpower of the world. The convincing victory of the coalition forces in the Gulf seemed to point towards a world where the USA would dominate the rest of the world as it did the UN Coalition. Thus, it was a war that changed the world.

Yet, as Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui opine, the “war which changed the world ultimately changed war itself⁴. In repeated conflicts since then, all of which the USA got involved in invited or uninvited, it was not able to win a convincing victory. Although the USA continued to lead the world in virtually all aspects that traditionally determined world dominance and influence, the premise of all powerful-ness was shattered by the events of 9-11, when usually innocuous airliners were used to inflict massive damage to the impression of the invincibility of the USA, giving rise to a new term to describe the new warfare of today, Asymmetric Warfare.

In “Unrestricted Warfare”, authors Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui refer to a “new concept of weapons” that could well explain the success of the 9-11 attack. According to them, the “new concept of weapons is a view of weapons in the broad sense, which views as weapons all means which transcend the military realm but which can still be used in combat operations⁵.” In this context everything that can benefit man can also harm him. The events of 9-11 would be the perfect example for this new concept of weapons.

THE LETHALITY OF WAR

Lethality is the third defining characteristic of war. A good indicator of the lethality of war during a certain period of time in history would be a comparison between the number of deaths due to war and the number of deaths due to other causes. Matthew White has compiled comprehensive database of death wherein he analyses the trends in human destruction especially at man’s own hand⁶.

In terms of world population, the number of deaths due to wars, atrocities and other man-made disasters in the 20th Century, calculates to 11% of the total world population as compared to 3% and 5% for the 18th and 19th centuries respectively.

This means that a greater percentage of the world population of consecutive centuries died due to wars, atrocities and other man-made disasters⁷.

In the 18th Century the number deaths due to wars, atrocities and other manmade disasters came to 0.56% of the total number of deaths due to all causes. In the 19th Century, this figure rose to 1.05%, a moderate increase of 86% over the previous century. However, in the twentieth century, certainly the bloodiest century for mankind, the percentage of deaths due to unnatural causes came to a stupendous 4.48% of the total number of deaths due to all causes. This was a phenomenal 328% increase over the previous century. Hence, in the twentieth century a greater percentage of the total deaths occurred due to wars, atrocities and other manmade atrocities than in the previous two centuries⁸.

Of the top 20 most lethal events of all of history, the 20th century takes the lion's share with 6 such major events leaving 8.77% of the total world population dead⁹. Hence, the 20th century has been by far the most violent of centuries in the history of the world.

However, the trend of increasing lethality over the centuries seems to have made a significant turn for the better during the 20th century. Of the top 30 most lethal events of the 20th century, from which it can be seen came 174,307,000 of the aforesaid 180,000,000 war deaths of the 20th century, we see that the majority of the death toll came from the first half of that century. It is clearly evident that a drastic reduction in the number of deaths in conflicts took place after the turn of the century in 1950¹⁰.

INFORMATION WARFARE DEFINED

Today, the term 'Information Warfare' (IW) is commonly thought of in terms of Information Technology. However, conceptually, information warfare predates modern computers by many thousands of years. According to Wray, the term Information Warfare first came into popular usage in 1995¹¹. Since then, it has evolved along with modern communication technology to the point where today, the term encompasses electronic warfare, as well as cyber warfare¹².

According to the US Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction No. 3210.0, information warfare is defined as "actions taken to achieve information superiority by affecting an adversary's information, information-based processes, information systems, and computer-based networks while defending one's own information, information-based processes, information systems, and computer-based networks."

In Airpower Australia, Carlo Kopp defines IW as a term for "paralysing, deceiving or disrupting an organisation through the disruption, manipulation or destruction of its information infrastructure¹³."

A better approach to defining Information Warfare may be through its effects. Colonel Richard Szafranski, first holder of the Chair of National Military Strategy at the Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama underscores the targets of Information Warfare as follows:

- a. The knowledge systems of the adversary
- b. The belief systems of the adversary¹⁴

Kopp too, reinforces this approach and states “IW is ultimately about messing up the “thinking” processes of an opponent, and any means which achieve this will therefore qualify as IW¹⁵.”

SIGNIFICANCE OF INFORMATION WARFARE

Information warfare first saw application as a useful tool in conventional attrition warfare which helped reduce the fog and friction of war by facilitating increased information dominance. However, it is increasingly apparent that standalone may well be the way of the future whereby a nation may be able to influence the will of an opponent without resorting to lethal means by using sophisticated information related technologies.

The impact and significance of information warfare can be better understood in the context of two concepts that have seen prominence in modern warfare. While Warden’s Five Ring Theory and Boyd’s Observe, Orient, Decide, Act (OODA) Loop do not presume to dictate the formula for winning wars, they have been accepted as principles that can contribute significantly to victory in war.

Five Ring Theory: The concept of the Five Rings put forth by USAF Col John Warden and that was put to effective use in the First Gulf war, dictates that in war, one has the option of targeting a number of concentric rings that will have varying effects on the war-waging capacity of one’s enemy¹⁶. The outermost ring represents the fielded forces while the inner-most ring constitutes the strategic leadership of a nation. The inner circles in increasing importance as they get closer to the centre are the population, the infrastructure, and the system essentials such as important communications facilities. As the focus of one’s attack moves inwards from the outer rings, the decisiveness of the action increases. In the gulf the massive dominance in airpower allowed the US to strike decisively at the second ring that comprised the system essentials such as the communication facilities that destroyed the link between Saddam Hussein and his Forces. The ability to bypass the outer rings and strike at the more critical rings gave the coalition forces the advantage and resulted in a quick, clean war.

The OODA Loop: Another retired air force officer, Colonel John Boyd was responsible for a new theory with respect to the age old manoeuvre warfare. Boyd postulated that decision making in combat occurs in a recurring cycle of Observe-Orient-Decide-Act¹⁷. The essential of Boyd's theory of the OODA Loop is that the advantage lies with the side that has a shorter OODA Loop. By increasing the tempo of battle and getting inside one's opponent's OODA Loop, one can seize the advantage and thus achieve victory.

Implications of Information Warfare: Modern Information warfare can target many aspects of a nation's will to resist war and to wage it. The most obvious means of its use is in capitalizing on the preponderance of information technology in today's military to drastically reduce its combat effectiveness (CE). Command, Control and Communication Warfare (C3W) is but a basic form of this. It can also target civilian communications and media to significantly affect the sense of security and normalcy of a nation and to influence the will of the military and civilian population. In terms of Warden's Five Rings, this translates to the simultaneous attack of multiple rings; in terms of Boyd's OODA loop, it can affect the tempo of the OODA loop, to slow one's enemy's cycle time while accelerating one's own.

THE EMPHASIS ON INFORMATION WARFARE IN EMERGING MILITARY DOCTRINE

In its constant drive for full spectrum domination, the US is giving a high priority to IW, including but not restricted to psychological operations, electronic warfare and involvement in foreign journalism. A 2003 Pentagon document, released by the National Security Archive of the United States on January 26, 2006, deals with the US military's information operations, including psychological operations, electronic warfare, and involvement in foreign journalism. "Information, always important in warfare, is now critical to military success and will only become more so in the foreseeable future¹⁸."

"IO (information operations) becomes a core competency. The importance of dominating the information spectrum explains the objective of transforming IO into a core military competency on a par with air, ground, maritime and special operations¹⁹."

The USA is not alone in developing its information warfare capabilities. In the late 1990s, the Chinese Defence Ministry established the "NET Force", initially a research organization, which was to measure China's vulnerability to attacks via the Internet²⁰. Soon this led to examining the vulnerability of other countries, especially the United States, Japan and South Korea, all of which were heavy Internet users. NET Force has continued to grow. Today, it is widely accepted that China is pursuing an aggressive Information Warfare doctrine engaging in cyber-attacks on many defence related networks in the USA, UK, Germany and recently India on a regular basis.

The Russian Military Doctrine recognizes “hostile information operations that damage the military security of the Russian Federation and its allies” as one of the main threats to military security²¹. The Russian government is also suspected to be protecting what is considered the most powerful internet weapon, the “Storm Botnet.” This is a network of over 250,000 computers infected with a software worm known as the “Storm Worm” that is causing these computers to generate spam to other computers connected to the internet. The storm botnet is believed to be capable of shutting down any military or commercial site on the planet²².

India has recently admitted that it too has been subject to “heavy cyber war attack” from hackers that can be traced back to China. In a recent Army Commanders Conference chaired by General Deepak Kapoor a decision was taken to boost the Cyber Security of its information networks²³.

THE FUTURE OF WARFARE

In the past, territorial aspirations drove global politics. From Hannibal to Hitler, leaders took their nations to war mainly to capture more territory. Territory by itself gave a nation power and influence, a greater ability to influence the will of others.

The catalyst for the Gulf war of 1991 in all likelihood was, territory. The annexation of Kuwait by Saddam Hussain to restore the formerly lost territory to Iraq was the event that sparked off this conflict. And yet, it is common speculation that the underlying reason for the USA to lead the coalition against Saddam Hussain was the need to protect the source of the black gold, the fossil fuels that drove the US economy.

Today, the extent of territory has become secondary in terms of influence to economic power. Hence, warfare of today, unlike in the past, is driven more by economics than territorial aspirations. While for the US in the Gulf this may have translated to Petroleum oils, for many other nations the critical economic consideration may be their share of the global market place.

POWER PROJECTION REDEFINED

The shifting of focus from territorial aspirations to economic ones has also resulted in the manner in which nations project power across their borders. In order to capture territory, nations projected military power, nations now have to project economic power and influence in order to fulfil their economic aspirations.

Knoema, a US-based company founded in July 2011 and headquartered in Washington, D.C. presents comparative data on the world's top economies historically. According to the analysis presented, in the year 2000, the world's top

economies, on the basis of GDP based on Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) valuation were the USA, China, Japan, Germany and India. By 2011, India had moved up to overtake both Japan and Germany, positioning itself at third place next to the USA and China. In 2014, China overtook the US reaching the topmost position and has remained there since, with the USA at second place and India and Japan firmly ensconced at 3rd and 4th places²⁴.

In a discussion of global power and influence, economic power is just one aspect and is considered alongside four other dimensions of global power, namely international diplomacy, military capability, cultural presence and domestic system²⁵. However, the changing of the prominent powers of the world in terms of economic standing cannot be discounted on the basis that the emergent nations are not as powerful in terms of the other dimensions. This is because, as can be clearly seen in today's context, the growth in economic power almost inevitably leads to growth in the other dimensions as well and as a result, leads to an overall increase of global power and influence. At the same time, the present context also effectively nullifies the importance of military prowess as a measure of international power, and thereby changes the overall dynamic of international relations, thereby effectively empowering some of the emerging economic giants to take positions of greater stature in the global setting.

THE BATTLE FOR THE MARKET SHARE

Economic might is not just a function of the amount of resources in the possession of the nation. Resources and commodities are only as valuable as the leverage it brings the nation in the global market. In mature low growth markets like in the developed world, business is said to operate as a zero sum game where for one to gain, someone has to lose the corresponding amount. Hence, market survival is a battle where competitors battle for their share. In time to come, when increasing population and dwindling resources will increase competition, this phenomenon will spread to the entire market and the battle for the market share will become a battle for national survival. When this happens, a nation's strategy will need to be geared to aggressively defend its share of the global markets against competition.

Thus, the ability to secure, defend and expand its market share is an important part of a modern nation's national security agenda. Increasingly, the most effective means by which this is achieved is turning out to be through the domination of the information domain or through information warfare.

The great potential of Information warfare lies in its accessibility to those players who are not resource rich. The domination of the information warfare battlefield will not be limited to those who have the wherewithal in terms of manpower and arsenal but to those whose mastery of the information technology domain is

superior. The accessibility and the rapid spread of information technologies and related fields of specialty across the world has resulted in an environment where technological superiority in the information domain is not by any means confined to those traditional superpowers.

At the same time, the increasing dependence on information technology and related technologies across the whole spectrum of operation of nations has increased the vulnerability of those nations to information warfare. From Banking to Traffic management to any number of critical activities of nations are now completely controlled by information systems. This greater reliance can also effectively contribute to be a further leveller in the battlefield, making the greater more progressive powers more vulnerable to attack.

Information warfare while empowering smaller, less powerful nations has a tendency to make the more powerful nations more vulnerable. Thus, Information Warfare presents a means by which traditionally smaller powers can effectively pose a credible threat to larger powers. The increasing dominance of information warfare is changing the battlefield of the future and making it a more level playing field where the dominance enjoyed by the traditional powers will no longer be present.

THE IMPLICATIONS

The increasing importance of Information Warfare is indeed likely to bring about a significant change in the future battlefield. While the function of warfare, that of one nation imposing its will on another, will remain a requirement of global geopolitics, the increased awareness of the value of human life and human rights, manifested in the overall insistence on the adherence to established laws of human conflict and the aggressive prosecution of violators is likely to drive a change in the form and lethality of war. It is only inevitable that a form of warfare less in lethality but more effective in influencing the will of the opponent will be preferred.

Information warfare, because of its near surgical effectiveness in debilitating not only critical military capabilities but more importantly the administrative and critical machinery of a state will prove a much more effective means of influencing the will of a people and increase the pressure on states to give in to the will of an aggressor. The fact that the use of it will be a viable option not only for traditional great powers but indeed for smaller powers as well will have some implications for all nations in the formulation of national security strategy.

NEW VULNERABILITY

The fact that information technology offers significant improvements in terms of efficiency and effectiveness in all spheres of human endeavour is accepted. The significant advantages it offers in areas of automation, high speed analysis and lightening quick responses with cold objectivity has seen it taking human civilization far beyond what was ever dreamed possible. While the internet itself, which has revolutionised man's quest for and furtherance of knowledge, provides enough of a benefit, many do not readily appreciate that such capabilities as space travel, satellite technology, advances in medical sciences and many other achievements would not have been possible if not for the developments in information technology. With the great utility that it has offered, it has also created greater vulnerability, for indeed the greater the reliance on it for the day to day necessities the greater the impact of any disturbance or disruption. This was amply demonstrated by the cyber-attack on Estonia in 2007.

In 2007 the computerized infrastructure of Estonia's high tech government became the victim of a coordinated series of Denial of Service (DoS) attacks that effectively crippled the nation's administrative structure for days. Estonia denounced the attacks as an "unprovoked act of aggression" from a regional foe, pointing the finger at Moscow. The latter however, denied all knowledge and responsibility. Experts in Cyber Security called it the "future of warfare"²⁶.

PROMINENCE OF NON-STATE ACTORS

When the cold war ended with the fall of the Soviet Union, the world was faced with the prospect of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorist organizations. The concern that these groups, ungoverned by international treaties and conventions would not be deterred in the indiscriminate use of such technology continues to be a grave threat to human security. The increasing prominence of information warfare too, has the potential of empowering non-state actors, not only the so called terror organizations but even ubiquitous and often unscrupulous multi-national corporations that constitute a law unto themselves in the modern geopolitical setting, to debilitate nations and states in the pursuit of their agendas. The fact that there are very few international protocols governing the use of this type of warfare adds to the danger.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL DIMENSION

Warfare being directed towards ultimately targeting the will of the people, the effect of psychological operations has always been recognized as a critical area of emphasis. While traditionally, such operations were specialised and limited in utility in conflict, and relied primarily on print and electronic media such as

television and radio, the increased pervasiveness of the internet and social media has offered a platform on which any organization with a bare minimum presence can reach an unprecedented audience instantaneously and effectively, using rich media. Creating and shaping of opinion has become a matter of course, with little consideration for credibility and veracity.

CONCLUSION

Warfare has always been an important part of the social behaviour of humans, whereby one group of humans attempted to influence the will of another. This function of warfare has remained constant through history and can be expected to remain so in the future.

The form and lethality of warfare has seen continuous change and evolution, and by the end of the twentieth century showed a trend of reducing lethality, with the world becoming increasingly aware of the human toll of warfare and actively endeavouring to reduce it to a minimum. While eliminating warfare may not be viable in the existing context, reducing its lethality may be achievable, especially through the use of information technology which has seen tremendous growth and influence in all spheres of human activity.

The utility of information warfare can be seen through the framework of existing analytical tools of war studies such as Wardens Five rings and John Boyd's OODA loop. The use of information warfare can and will lead to more decisive results in conventional wars with less human cost. Thus, even in the present day battlefield, information technology, and information warfare can effectively increase the efficiency of warfare.

As information warfare takes on greater prominence in the battlefield, possibly resulting in a change in the character of warfare itself, the battlefield of the future is likely to become a more level playing field unlike that of the past where traditional great powers enjoyed dominion and prominence. This, while offering relatively smaller powers a greater say in world affairs also poses certain threats to global security.

The future battlefield may not take the form seen in futuristic science fiction movies where nations will fight from behind computer screens. And yet, the developing trends indicate that there will be a greater emphasis on information warfare. The trend is certainly to be taken into serious consideration in the formulation of national security strategy for the remainder of the 21st century and beyond.

NOTES

1. Dugdale-Pointon, T.(2003). The Evolution of Warfare, the 3 element approach. [Online] Available at: http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/concepts_evolution.html [Accessed 20 June 2016].
2. Hill, A.(2006). Timeline. [Online]Available at: '<http://www.historicalwarfare.com/20061123.htm> [Accessed April 2008].
3. Dugdale-Pointon, op.cit.
4. Liang, Q. and Xiangsui, W. (1999). *Unrestricted Warfare*. Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts.
5. Ibid
6. White, M. (2014). Necrometrics. [Online] Available at: <http://necrometrics.com/index.htm> [Accessed 20 Jun 2016]
7. ibid
8. Ibid
9. Ibid
10. Ibid
11. Wray, S. J., 1997. *The Drug War and Information Warfare in Mexico*. Austin: The University of Texas at Austin.
12. Mackey, R. R., 2015. Information Warfare. [Online] Available at: <http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199791279/obo-9780199791279-0024.xml> [Accessed 1 November 2016].
13. Kopp, C. (2008). Information Warfare. [Online] Available at: <http://www.ausairpower.net/OSR-1296.html> [Accessed 3 July 2008]
14. Szafranski, R., Spring (1995). A Theory of Information Warfare - Preparing for 2020. Airpower Journal.
15. Kopp, C. (2008). Information Warfare. [Online] Available at: <http://www.ausairpower.net/OSR-1296.html> [Accessed 3 July 2008]
16. Warden, Col John A, III, Air Theory for the Twenty-First Century, USAF
17. Boyd, John. R., The Essence of Winning and Losing, 28 June 1995 [Online] Available at: <https://web.archive.org/web/20110324054054/http://www.danford.net/boyd/essence.html>
18. Jessop, B. (2007). Full Spectrum Information Warfare. [Online] Available at: <http://www.knowledgedrivenrevolution.com> [Accessed May 2008].

19. Ibid
20. The Chinese Three-Headed Monster. [Online] Available at: <http://www.strategypage.com/htm/w/htiw/articles/20080106.aspx> [Accessed 12 October 2008].
21. Arms Control Association (2000). Russian Military Doctrine. [Online] Available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000_05/dc3ma00 [Accessed 14 October 2008].
22. StrategyWorld.com (2008). India under Attack. [Online] Available at: <http://www.strategypage.com/htm/w/htiw/articles/20080414.aspx> [Accessed 21 September 2008]
23. Ibid
24. Knoema (2016). World GDP Ranking 2015 | Data and Charts. [Online] Available at: <https://knoema.com/nwnfkne/world-gdp-ranking-2015-data-and-charts> [Accessed 21 Jun 2016]
25. Chen, D. (2016). China is a Different Kind of Global Power. *The Diplomat*. [Online] Available at: <http://thediplomat.com/2014/06/china-is-a-different-kind-of-global-power/> [Accessed 22 June 2016].
26. Bruno, G. (2008). Backgrounder: The Evolution of Cyber Warfare. *The New York Times*. [Online] Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/cfr/world/slot1_20080227.html [Accessed 29 May 2008].

EMERGING ISSUES IN URBAN CONFLICT

Nilanthan Niruthan

ABSTRACT

Cities are steadily becoming the forefront of 21st Century warfare. The “Fidayeen” model of assault, where disparate but coordinated attackers simultaneously unleash an onslaught on civilian targets, is being adopted by insurgent groups across the world. Many of the world’s major cities are finding themselves at the receiving end of this brutal tactic, one that is unlikely to disappear soon. That warfare is now moving into our cities should not come as a surprise - for the first time in human history more people live in urban than rural areas. Emerging technologies, particularly in communication, have greatly multiplied the capabilities of non-state actors in asymmetric environments like cities.

The aim of this paper is to explore the security and legal challenges states are likely to face as urban conflict becomes the norm. How will the security apparatus of the state (particularly in the developing world) have to adapt in order to meet this threat? What are the legal implications that states must be cognizant of while fighting in cities? Are there new technologies that could tilt the balance of power towards non-state actors?

The paper will endeavour to answer such questions and wherever possible, suggest potential scenarios for policymakers to consider. It will look at terrorist sieges like the 26/11 attacks in Mumbai, the Nairobi mall attack in Kenya and the Charlie Hebdo massacres in Paris; along with large-scale urban warfare like the Battle of Sadr City in Iraq and Russia’s Grozny. By analyzing the lessons learnt from such events, the paper will attempt to shed more light on these complex issues and provide suggestions on how states can prepare for future conflicts.

Keywords: Urban Security, Fidayeen, Human Shields, Siege, Urban Warfare

INTRODUCTION

While the tendency is to often look at the origin of cities from an economic perspective, one cannot overlook that they were originally formed for protection¹. Cities are not merely centres of commerce. Theoreticians of warfare from Sun Tzu² to Clausewitz³ have stressed on the importance of finding strength in numbers; it is easy to see why. With the advantage of a large population and walled settlements, cities enabled human society to develop. The concentrated economic and military

might of cities gave them vast power over thinly populated neighbour villages. It is commonly acknowledged by historians today that European cities for example, originated from feudal princes who required a fortified compound to shelter their men⁴.

But the very security that made cities a symbol of power has made them ripe targets for terrorism⁵ – a threat that cannot be repelled with walls. Cities have critical infrastructure that they cannot survive without. Urban systems such as mass transit rapidly amplify the disruptiveness of any attacks; the population density and concentration of wealth magnifies the physical and psychological impact of terrorism. The attractiveness of cities as a target is unlikely to dissipate anytime soon, as for the first time ever more people in the world today live in urban than rural areas⁶.

As counterterrorism expert David Kilcullen points out, the population of the planet is becoming so urban in the next three decades that the world will see three billion new city dwellers, almost all of them in the coastal cities of the developing world. To illustrate the enormity of such a swing, consider this – it took from the beginning of human history to the middle of the 20th Century to get the entire world population from zero to three billion people. No generation has ever witnessed a change in global demographics on such an incredible scale⁷. By 2050, the estimate is that 75% of the global population will be urban⁸.

The speed with which this forecasted urbanization process manifests itself will come with more complications. Rapid growth in cities can often be unplanned, leaving gaping holes in the provision of public services like law enforcement and emergency response. This is particularly true in the developing world. At the same time, cities have also been known to aggravate existing social divisions since it forces a wide range of linguistic, ethnic and economic groups into close proximity with each other. Modern non-state actors are seasoned at exploiting these divisions⁹. From the cultivation of safe havens to recruiting and radicalizing the youth into their fold, the cosmopolitanism of cities becomes a vulnerability to be targeted.

The aim of this paper is to explore the emerging issues states are likely to face as urban conflict becomes the norm. How will the apparatus of the state (particularly in the developing world) have to adapt in order to meet this threat? What is the *modus operandi* and sophistication level of modern urban insurgents? Are there lessons that can be learned from past experiences which hold great value while planning for future urban operations? The article will endeavour to answer such questions.

There are two primary models of conflict in cities that will be explored here – **urban sieges**¹⁰, where a handful of armed attackers (known as ‘Fidayeen’) or a single terrorist (known as a ‘lone wolf’) are unleashed on a civilian population; and

urban warfare¹¹, where a sustained military campaign is waged between the two sides with the city itself as a battlefield. While the distinction between the two may be subtle, it is a very important one. In urban sieges, the counterterrorism response is primarily left up to local law enforcement, since they would be the first to arrive on the scene. In urban warfare, the same task would be left to a conventional army (often a foreign, ‘occupying’ force) dealing with insurgents who attack from the shadows.

Examples of urban sieges would be acts of terrorism like the 26/11 attacks in Mumbai, the Nairobi mall attack in Kenya and the Charlie Hebdo massacres in Paris; while examples of urban warfare would be more like the sustained military campaigns major powers like the USA and Russia have waged in the Middle East and Eastern Europe.

URBAN SIEGES

There is nothing new about the urban siege – cities have been under siege for as long as cities have existed. The historical prominence of sieges in conflict is apparent from the evolution of warfare technology itself. The first fortified cities arose because walls offered a great deal of protection and did not require food to survive like a soldier¹². To smash through those defences, attackers developed ballistic technology like cannons, after which the defenders built stronger walls and fortifications. The 16th Century in particular, was known for a fortification revolution that transformed warfare¹³.

With state vs state warfare being unlikelier today than it has ever been in the past, another important phenomenon is now taking centre stage – the urban insurgent. Unlike traditional guerrilla insurgents who seek refuge in the countryside and look to have protracted ideological struggles, the urban fighter goes for direct violence. They are particularly dangerous in the 21st Century, with modern technology making it possible for a small group or even an individual actor to mount devastating attacks. The word ‘siege’ might be misleading, since there is no artillery or battering ram or catapult involved. Instead, a small group of armed gunmen (or an individual acting alone) is able to paralyse an entire city, bringing life to a standstill and imposing a state of high alert while it lasts.

In urban sieges, assailants often pursue easy targets like transportation, shopping malls and public squares in prominent, often capital, cities¹⁴. After the initial attack, they usually flee the scene, trigger a manhunt by the authorities, and murder civilians for as long as possible either before escaping or dying a martyr. By remaining at large and inflicting casualties along the way, they greatly increase the coverage of both the attack itself and the political message of their organization. By attacking civilian targets, they present policymakers with a difficult problem-the

very security measures that are meant to protect the people from acts of terrorism will make life more oppressed and paranoid, getting the terrorists what they want.

Two basic types of urban sieges have emerged – ‘lone wolf’ attacks and ‘Fidayeen’ attacks.

LONE WOLVES AND THE IDEOLOGICAL ‘BAZAAR’

As the network of terrorist organizations has become more diffused, the threat level has exponentially increased. Analyst John Robb describes modern terror networks as being more akin to a ‘bazaar’¹⁵ where geographical and even organizational divisions are no longer a hindrance. During the three-day Charlie Hebdo attacks for example, there were two separate parties – the Kouachi brothers who claimed to be affiliated to Al Qaeda and Amedy Coulibali who pledged allegiance to Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Despite being from different organizations, Coulibali took a kosher grocery store with numerous civilians hostage the day after the attack on the Charlie Hebdo office, and threatened to kill them if the authorities pursued the Kouachi brothers. The bad blood between Al Qaeda and ISIS in the Middle East meant nothing to him in Paris¹⁶.

This is a worrying sign for states that are threatened by Islamist non-state actors. What analysts fear is the emergence of “broad based jihad via a loose social movement”¹⁷ where one group of attackers could inspire another, activating sleeper cells of different organizations to work individually but for the same cause in the same city.

There are further illustrations of this. The recent arrest of Ahmad Rahami, the man charged with planting multiple bombs in New Jersey and New York, has shed some revealing details. His ideological roots do not seem grounded in any singular terrorist organization. It seems very likely that he saw it as a loose social movement; his journal contains praise for members of Al Qaeda, ISIS, even fellow Mujahideen in Afghanistan and Palestine¹⁸. His indoctrination cannot be attributed to an individual group.

These are not isolated cases either. Omar Mateen, the shooter during the Orlando attacks, displayed similar characteristics. He had expressed support for both ISIS and Jabhat Al-Nusra, despite them being rival groups. He had even claimed to be a Hezbollah member previously¹⁹. Asia Siddiqui, who was arrested in April 2015 for a conspiracy to perpetrate a terrorist attack, was another lone wolf whose ideology was shaped by both ISIS and Al Qaeda²⁰. Mahin Khan, an 18 year old arrested on charges connecting him with a terrorist conspiracy to attack Arizona government buildings, seems to have been a supporter of both the Pakistani Taliban and ISIS²¹.

This highlights the dangerous flexibility of ideological threats, where groups that have bloody rivalries in their home territory still manage to inspire lone fighters abroad under a wider banner. The differences between both groups appear to matter little to jihadists in other parts of the world, who find the feuds “distant, annoying, and counterproductive”²².

One of the temptations states will thus have to resist is the desire to pin the attacker's allegiance on one particular organization. Studies have shown that these lone wolf insurgents “conflate personal grievances with terrorist ideologies”²³ rather than drawing inspiration from one particular group. Cities are a prime breeding ground of these ‘personal grievances’ along ethnic, linguistic and economic lines.

Visualizing terrorist networks as a ‘bazaar’ might seem bizarre, but it is clear from the examples above that John Robb's thesis is firmly rooted in reality. This fusion of ideologies, where fighters pick and choose what they like from various groups is likely to be the norm in the future. The challenge to the state in countering this process of self-radicalization will be a very testing one.

LONE WOLF TACTICS

The tactics used by lone wolf terrorists are very diverse. They have used everything from knives to bombs to guns to launch their attacks. Some analysts have noted that they are likely to be very creative and think out of the box²⁴, since there is no superior command structure from which they require approval. It has been observed that they rarely act on impulse either, with their attacks usually planned out in advance. They seem to prefer firearms as the most common tool of violence²⁵, though this could also be because much of the reliable data gathered in studies come from attacks in the USA.

Returning fighters pose a massive threat to their home state as well. Insurgents who have fighting experience often come back with skills in bomb making, combat tactics and the use of firearms, not to mention a contact base with terrorist networks. From 2011 to 2015, it has been observed that there has been increased lethality in lone wolf attacks perpetrated by attackers with foreign experience. As a matter of fact the average deaths per attack is 7.3 when done by a returning fighter, compared to just 1.2 when done by terrorists with no real experience in battle²⁶.

It is also likely that non-state actors like ISIS deliberately utilize this tactic by encouraging its members to stage attacks when they reappear home. Since these attacks would not be monitored by any overarching structure or direction, it would become nearly impossible for law enforcement to detect such plans.

Assuming that they are the only threat however, would be disastrous. A few months after he was prevented from traveling to Turkey to become a foreign fighter, Martin Couture Rouleau attacked two soldiers²⁷. Brushtom Ziami was arrested in the UK for planning a domestic terror attack – he was caught with a knife and hammer, allegedly on his way to behead a soldier²⁸. In Australia, Abdul Numan Haider stabbed multiple police officers when his passport was cancelled²⁹. These men were not seasoned fighters in the civil wars of the Middle East, but were enthusiastic and bold enough to spring into action at home if they could not make it to those conflicts. In the last six years, there have been twice as many terrorist attempts from these home-grown fantasisers than returning fighters. While they might lack battle sophistication and lethal skills, they are still a dangerous presence in an urban environment.

RISE OF THE FIDAYEEN

The other form of urban siege, perhaps even more prominent in recent years, is the 'Fidayeen attack'. What exactly is it? The Lashkar-e-Toiba pioneered this style against India, frequently using armed gunmen to launch devastating assaults on military targets³⁰. Sometimes misconstrued as suicide terrorism, it is a model of assault in which a small cluster of well-trained commandos engage in fierce combat with a selected target, wreaking as much havoc as possible. It is not a suicide attack per se, as the goal of the assailant is not to die but to inflict as many casualties as possible before succumbing to injuries or escaping. While far more difficult to execute than a bomb blast or rural ambush, it attracts unprecedented media attention and strikes a more critical blow against the psyche of the nation and its population.

Though such attacks have been common for more than a decade, it was not until the 26/11 slaughter in Mumbai that the potential for using this model to hold an entire city under siege came to the fore. Jihadist groups all over the world have emulated it since then, most notably in events like the Westgate Mall attack in Nairobi³¹ and the Charlie Hebdo massacre in Paris³², which have been studied in-depth by security analysts.

In terms of planning, it is on the other end of the spectrum. While lone wolf attacks are creative but unsophisticated, Fidayeen attacks are carefully planned and orchestrated with remarkable attention to detail. Many of these attacks are what some refer to as terror by "remote control"³³ where satellite phones, Skype and social media are used by controllers in hostile states to orchestrate an attack through foot soldiers on the ground. During the 26/11 attacks for instance, the handlers from the off-shore team in Pakistan are alleged to have used coverage from some of India's largest English news networks and social media updates to keep their operatives abreast of any security updates³⁴. This use of technology was also put to great effect in the Westgate Mall attack in Kenya.

Numerous high-profile tragedies caused by the Fidayeen model have hit the headlines in recent years. In December 2014, 132 children were slaughtered by the Pakistani Taliban in one of the most gruesome Fidayeen attacks ever³⁵. Earlier that year, the same outfit had staged a daring assault on the Jinnah International Airport in Karachi, with the assailants disguising themselves as airport personnel³⁶. The attackers in these cases are likely to have much higher level of training than a lone wolf, sometimes even possessing past experience in urban firefights.

Understandably, this model of attack is also problematic for law enforcement to prepare for. The State security apparatus has to coordinate police patrols, emergency medical teams, crowd control, media management, the fire service and civil authorities, to only name a few. This level of coordination is sometimes impossible in the cities of the developed world, let alone the developing ones.

These scenarios are a drastic departure from conventional hostage situations as well. The operational demands that come with countering a Fidayeen attack are far more enormous. As J. Paul D. Taillon observes in his research on hijacking and hostages, successful counterterrorist operations usually require forward base access, cooperation, and specialized units capable of dislodging attackers³⁷. Fidayeen attacks on the other hand would require that the first responders on the scene will meet the assailants and try to neutralise them as soon as possible. It is thus imperative that law enforcement have the training and equipment necessary to halt the momentum of the attack and more importantly, minimize civilian deaths.

As a response to this, states are increasingly militarizing their cities. In his seminal book *Cities Under Siege: The New Military Urbanism*, Stephan Graham illustrates how surveillance is now focused on cities on an unprecedented scale. Biometric systems and CCTV cameras monitor most tourist hotspots, shopping malls, embassies and financial districts. Police departments in the United States are also being trained and equipped to respond to such threats. As an example, the New York Police Department's Strategic Response Group and Emergency Services Unit are trained in melee combat and the use of heavy weapons, before being stationed around high-priority targets like Times Square³⁸.

Once again, this cannot be seen as a positive improvement. As a matter of fact it could be argued that this is precisely what terrorist organizations want - an atmosphere of fear being projected by the state.

URBAN WARFARE

The other form of conflict that is also going to see a steep rise in the coming years is full blown urban warfare in cities. This would be the mirror image of a siege. While in an urban siege a handful of commando-style assailants would threaten

the security of the state, the urban warfare scenarios that are likely to materialize are highly capable state armies fighting in hostile cities against insurgents who use stealth and terrain-familiarity to their advantage. With many of the world's major powers actively involved in military operations in other parts of the world, this model will have to be discussed in detail as well³⁹.

Unlike the modern urban siege, urban warfare has been around quite prominently in the 20th Century⁴⁰, although its transformation is equally fascinating. Beirut in the 70s and Sarajevo in the 90s both saw significant urban fighting, with large portions of the city reduced to rubble⁴¹. The weapons were generally low-tech antitank grenades to be fired from the shoulder, assault rifles and mortars, and machine guns mounted on pickup trucks that put an emphasis on mobility and stealth.

The sheer size of the population, infrastructure and movement in a city makes it a very unique battlefield. The normal difficulties armies face in conventional warfare become even greater. The cyber and electronic aspects of warfare can become a bit overwhelming even for highly skilled armies. Mobile communications are extremely cheap today, limiting the state's capacity to target and track insurgents with surveillance platforms. That is not the only technological change that has made things deadlier; the ease with which modern insurgents are able to construct Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) is alarming. The increasing proliferation of drones in commercial services will mean the technology gets cheaper and easier to procure. Though terror groups have displayed nothing more than sporadic sophistication at modifying commercial drones so far, this is unlikely to be the case for long⁴².

There are generally considered to be two major schools of thought in counterinsurgency – “Enemy-centric” counter insurgency where the military strategy is primarily focused on eliminating the adversary and “Population-centric” counterinsurgency, where the primary emphasis by the state is on winning the “hearts and minds” of the local population⁴³. In urban warfare scenarios, the only way for an advancing army to avoid walking into a death-trap is if they have the support of the local population, who might be able to give them vital intelligence that could save their lives.

There are a number of cities in recent years that have been wrecked by urban warfare. Beirut, Mogadishu, Chechnya, Syria, Iraq, Grozny and Lebanon are just some of the stages on which massive battles have been waged between a conventional army and a non-state actor. There are a number of worrying trends that have come out of these examples.

UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS WITH CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES

Urban insurgents who wage war against a state army can often display more ingenuity than their lone wolf or even Fidayeen counterparts. They have shown an ability to transform civilian technology for deadly conventional warfare purposes. Analysts are pointing out that fighting in urban areas has a way of negating the technological advantages that State actors generally depend on⁴⁴. Weapons that may seem low tech and crude could still form a formidable arsenal in the narrow alleys and back streets of the developing world's cities.

Consider the example of ISIS breaking into the Iraqi city of Ramadi. By modifying an ordinary bulldozer that was used for civilian purposes, followed by several cargo and dump trucks packed with explosives, ISIS managed to shatter its defences. The bulldozer had been armoured with reinforced steel plates, making it invulnerable to the machine guns and rifles of the Iraqi forces. Despite the Iraqi army throwing every weapon they had at it, the makeshift tank ploughed straight ahead and began to remove the concrete barriers that had been erected to repel suicide car bombers. As one layer of concrete was removed after another, the large convoy of armoured trucks behind the bulldozer began to move in. As each truck moved in, the suicide bomber driving it would detonate the payload, leaving gaping holes in the city's defences. As truck after truck left massive gaps in the barriers, the ISIS insurgents swarmed the city and Ramadi had been taken⁴⁵.

What makes this example so relevant is that the Iraqi forces could have repelled the ISIS offensive if only they had an anti-tank missile system. Since ISIS was a non-state actor, the security forces were not prepared for such an eventuality, presumably because they assumed non-state actors cannot fight conventionally. Those who claim that conventional warfare is dead and that only asymmetric warfare will be seen in the future should thus revise their position. It might be true that state vs state conflict will no longer be the norm, but state vs non-state battles could continue to be conventional in many cases.

This is not the first case of a non-state actor shocking the adversary with conventional capabilities in urban warfare either. As far back as the Second Lebanon War in 2006, the world was taken aback by the ferocious firepower with which Hezbollah met the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) a USA Army College report named "The 2006 Lebanon Campaign and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defence Policy" sternly cautioned strategists against placing too much of an emphasis on traditional guerrilla warfare, also suggesting that future insurgents would copy Hezbollah and start using conventional warfare tactics as well⁴⁶. The future of Ramadi may have been different had the Iraqi forces heeded that warning.

This exploitation of asymmetry was equally evident from the Russian campaign in Grozny. Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs) were used with devastating effect by the Chechens, particularly because a large portion of Russian soldiers were young and relatively untrained in the ways of urban combat. Russia had hoped that its airpower would allow it to crush the adversary, but this turned out to be impractical as well. A combination of poor weather and logistical problems kept their large fleet of aircrafts from playing a decisive role. The only airpower advantage they had was the use of combat helicopters in picking off hidden snipers⁴⁷.

CIVILIANS AS HUMAN SHIELDS

It might be stating the obvious to say that states are going to face a tremendous challenge in urban areas because of the rampant use of human shields in such conflicts. The international practice⁴⁸ regarding human shields is that states must always determine whether the civilians involved are doing so of their own volition. If they are, they are not entitled to the protections non-combatants enjoy in conflict, since they deliberately placed themselves in danger. If they are not, the laws of war still protect them as they are not willing participants in the struggle.

While this seems laudable in theory, it has frequently led to law-abiding, democratic countries finding themselves shackled in combat, while giving ruthless insurgent groups more incentive than ever before to blur the lines between civilians and combatants. Since states are bound by international laws and pressures, their options on a battlefield have become significantly limited against adversaries who force civilians into the line of fire, while non-state actors against whom there is no mechanism to enforce the laws of war rampantly use civilians as a barrier between the adversary's path of attack⁴⁹.

The issue of human shields is a central part of the public perception about warfare, especially in the age of social media. They have become a useful propaganda tool and give insurgents a win-win formula. If the state proceeds with its attack, the resulting humanitarian catastrophe can be used to recruit more fighters against the state and used to portray it as a genocidal, mass-murdering war machine. If the state decides not to attack, the human shields have served their purpose as shields. In urban wars, sensitive locations like hospitals and schools become an easy platform on which insurgents can mount attacks on states, while ensuring that any response from the state itself would lead to dire humanitarian consequences.

The legal position seems to be changing though, with states slowly starting to realize how crippling the use of human shields could be to their chances of success in urban wars. In a recent development that has the potential to transform key aspects of warfare, the U.S Department of Defence (DoD) – in its “*Law of War*” manual published in June 2015 – explicitly countered the prevalent narrative

that a distinction must always be drawn between “voluntary” and “involuntary” human shields in warfare. While addressing the issue of human shields, the manual does not classify the civilians in question as either those trapped against their will as hostages or those intentionally aiding the enemy as non-combatant shields, removing the need for that separation altogether in U.S military operations. It will take “feasible precautions” as always in the conduct of war, but will not allow that distinction to control its strategic options against an enemy⁵⁰.

The DoD’s decisions to move away from the present consensus drew sharp criticism from some legal quarters, with accusations that its position was legally and morally indefensible. This is understandable, given that it would enable the U.S Army – and more importantly other countries that will inevitably follow suit – to justify direct attacks on urban centres like schools and hospitals. It would also mean civilians involuntarily used as human shields are deprived of their rightful protection even when they have not done anything to disqualify themselves from non-combatant status. A group of hostages forced to shield an armed terrorist might not have been attacked by an American soldier earlier, but it would be consistent with military doctrine to do so now⁵¹.

These fears should be a serious concern while battles rage in densely populated cities. However, there is a chance – and this may seem unpalatable to some – that this departure will ultimately have a positive impact on the protection of civilians than a negative one. It robs non-state actors of their incentive to use civilians as shields and of their “win-win” luxury. Taking the above example of a group of civilians used to shield a terrorist, it is indeed true that it is grossly unfair to strip them of their rights as non-combatants. But in the larger, long-term scheme of things, such people might find themselves less likely to be used as a shield, since it no longer provides that insurmountable tactical advantage in a battlefield. Insurgents require a certain amount of public support to thrive as well. If they are not protected by the presence of civilians, it is possible that incorporating unwilling civilians into their plans will no longer seem as attractive.

It is crucial for states to assert that culpability for all civilian deaths must lie with the party that employs shields, provided the attacker took “feasible precautions” in the conduct of the attack; this could result in a drastic decrease in the use of human shields, for strategic if not ethical compulsions. The propaganda value of endangering civilians will still exist, thus making the total eradication of the practice impossible. It could however, drastically decrease its utility and thus, its frequency. While no doubt an uncomfortable issue to grapple with, this potentially paradigm-shifting solution might ironically turn out to be the most significant decision in the protection of civilians in urban warzones. Those who protest this move as a serious attempt to undermine human rights are justified in their apprehension, but the future may be even bleaker if the current trends continue.

CONCLUSION

As seen from the diverse range of new trends that are emerging, there are no easy answers to the problems that states will encounter as the frequency of urban conflict increases and soon becomes the norm.

Ultimately, it will not be the intellectuals who will have to guide future generations into this maze, but policymakers and defence personnel. And there is a vast difference between the perspective of an intellectual and that of a policymaker. The intellectual can choose which aspect of urban warfare to study and prepare for, whereas policymakers will have immediate crises imposed on them. Intellectuals can allocate whatever time is necessary to study each new trend; the overwhelming challenge to policymakers is taking a quick decision. Intellectuals run no risk while studying urban conflict; if our findings prove wrong, we can write another article. Policymakers will be permitted only one guess; their mistakes will prove to be the difference between life and death.

Thus, while it is important for researchers and intellectuals to analyze these issues, the aim of this paper is to ultimately spark an interest in policymakers and defence personnel. It is they who will ultimately have to grapple with these trends in real life; not the academics who write research papers.

NOTES

1. Mumford, L. (1970). *The culture of cities*. New York, NY: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
2. Defence and Freedom, (2010, February 14). Sun Tzu and cities. Retrieved October 9, 2016, from <https://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2010/02/sun-tzu-and-cities.html>.
3. Von Clausewitz, C., Howard, M., Paret, P., Notes, B. H., Von Clausewitz, K., & Heuser, B. (2007). *On war* (Oxford world's classics). New York: Oxford University Press, USA.
4. Pirenne, H. and Clegg, I.E. (2006). *An economic and social history of medieval Europe*. London: Routledge.
5. Robb, J. (2016). *The coming urban terror*, *City Journal*, [Online]. Available at: <http://www.city-journal.org/html/coming-urban-terror-13026.html> [Accessed: 7 November 2016].
6. World's population increasingly urban with more than half living in urban areas (2010). [Online] Available at: <http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/news/population/world-urbanization-prospects-2014.html> [Accessed: 9 October 2016].
7. Kilcullen, D. (2013, September 26). An interview with David Kilcullen on the future of guerrilla warfare. [Online] Accessed: 9 october 2016 from <http://www.hurstpublishers.com/future-of-guerrilla-warfare/>

8. Wilson, M. (2012). By 2050, 70% of the world's population will be urban. Is that A good thing? [Online] Available at: <https://www.fastcodesign.com/1669244/by-2050-70-of-the-worlds-population-will-be-urban-is-that-a-good-thing> [Accessed: 9 October 2016].
9. Samuel, Thomas K.(2011). The Lure of Youth into Terrorism, SEARCCT's Selection of Articles, Vol. 2, pp. 109-113.
10. Sullivan, J.P. and Elkus, A. (2015). Urban siege in Paris: A spectrum of armed assault. *Small Wars Journals*, [Online]. Available at: <http://smallwarsjournal.com/print/20955> [Accessed: 9 October 2016].
11. Serena, C.C. and Clarke, C.P. (2016). A new kind of battlefield awaits the U.S. Military — Megacities. Available at: <http://www.rand.org/blog/2016/04/a-new-kind-of-battlefield-awaits-the-us-military-megacities.html> [Accessed: 9 October 2016].
12. Jones, A. (1987). *The art of war in the Western world*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, p.11
13. Ibid, p.194
14. Security Middle East. (2016). Urban terrorism is not new, or even the 'new normal'. [Online] Available at: <http://securitymiddleeast.com/2016/04/22/urban-terrorism-not-new-even-new-normal/> [Accessed: 9 October 2016].
15. Robb, J. (2007). The Bazaar's Open Source Platform. [Blog] Global Guerrillas. [Online] Available at: http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/globalguerrillas/2004/09/bazaar_dynamics.html [Accessed: 9 October 2016].
16. Chrisafis, A. (2015). Charlie Hebdo attackers: Born, raised and radicalised in Paris. *The Guardian* (January).
17. Watts, C. (2015). Inspired, Networked & directed – the muddled jihad of ISIS & al Qaeda post Hebdo. [Online] Available at: <http://warontherocks.com/2015/01/inspired-networked-directed-the-muddled-jihad-of-isis-al-qaeda-post-hebdo/> [Accessed: 9 October 2016].
18. Joscelyn, T. (2016). Bomb suspect praised Osama bin laden, Anwar al Awlaki in notebook. *The Long War journal*. [Online] Available at: <http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/09/bomb-suspect-praised-osama-bin-laden-anwar-al-awlaki-in-notebook.php> [Accessed: 9 October 2016].
19. Taylor, A. (2016) 'Omar Mateen may not have understood the difference between ISIS, al-qaeda and Hezbollah', Washington Post (June). [Online] Available at: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/06/13/omar-mateen-may-not-have-understood-the-difference-between-isis-al-qaeda-and-hezbollah/> [Accessed: 7 November 2016].

20. Project, Counter Extremism (2016) RESOURCES. [Online] Available at: <http://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/asia-siddiqui> [Accessed: 9 October 2016].
21. Roney, C.M. (2016). Tucson terror suspect Mahin khan pleads not guilty. *The Arizona Republic* (July). [Online] Available at: <http://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/phoenix-breaking/2016/07/12/phoenix-tucson-terror-suspect-mahin-khan-pleads-not-guilty-federal-court/87004890/> [Accessed: 7 November 2016].
22. Vidino, L. (2015). Wrong assumptions: Integration, responsibility, and counterterrorism in France. [Online] Available at: <http://warontherocks.com/2015/01/wrong-assumptions-integration-responsibility-and-counterterrorism-in-france/> [Accessed: 9 October 2016].
23. Pantucci, R., Ellis, C. and Chaplais, L. (2015). Lone-Actor Terrorism: Literature Review. [Online] Available at: http://www.strategicdialogue.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Literature_Review.pdf [Accessed: 9 October 2016].
24. Simon, J.D., Jenkins, B.M. and IVONNE, P. (2013). *Lone wolf terrorism: Understanding the growing threat*. New York, NY, United States: Prometheus Books, p 80
25. Spaaij, R. (2011). *Understanding lone wolf terrorism: Global patterns, motivations and prevention*. Dordrecht: Springer, p. 21.
26. Hegghammer, T. and Nesser, P. (2015). Assessing the Islamic State's Commitment to Attacking the West. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 9(4).
27. Robertson, D. (2015). John Gilchrist: SS 106 brings a lively slice of Italian. *Calgary Herald* (September),
28. Gardham, D. and Spillett, R. (2015). Teenager found guilty of plotting to behead British soldier. *Daily Mail* (February).
29. Anderson, S. (2016). Officer feared he would be beheaded by knife-wielding teen. ABC News (March) [Online] Available at: <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-03-17/numan-haider-inquest-police-officer-saved-my-life-by-shooting/7253968> [Accessed: 7 November 2016].
30. Niruthan, N. (2015). India's Fidayeen woes. *The Diplomat*, [Online]. Available at: <http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/indias-fidayeen-woes/> [Accessed: 7 November 2016]
31. McConnell, T. (2016) "Close your eyes and pretend to be dead", *Foreign Policy* (September). [Online] Available at: <http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/09/20/nairobi-kenya-westgate-mall-attack-al-shabab/> [Accessed: 7 November 2016].
32. Paris, a year after Charlie Hebdo attacks (2016). Al Jazeera Media Network (January). [Online] Available at: <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2016/01/paris-year-charlie-hebdo-attacks-160106072037634.html> [Accessed: 7 November 2016].

33. Kilcullen, D. (2016). Westgate mall attacks: Urban areas are the battleground of the 21st century. *The Guardian* (September). [Online] Available at <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/27/westgate-mall-attacks-al-qaida> [Accessed: 7 November 2016].
34. Ali, A.S. (2016). 26/11 attack: Media pulled by supreme court for it's role. *The Times of India*, [Online]. Available at: <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/mumbai/26/11-attack-Media-pulled-by-Supreme-Court-for-its-role/articleshow/16054201.cms> [Accessed: 10 October 2016].
35. BBC (2014), Pakistan Taliban: Peshawar school attack leaves 141 dead. [Online] Available at: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-30491435> [Accessed: 10 October 2016].
36. BBC (2014), Gunmen kill 13 at Karachi's Jinnah international airport. [Online] Available at: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-27757264> [Accessed: 10 October 2016].
37. Taillon, J. (2002). *Hijacking and hostages*. Westport, Conn.: Praeger
38. Graham, S. (2004). *Cities, war, and terrorism*. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.
39. Press, D.G. (1999). Urban warfare: Options, Problems and The Future. *MIT Security Studies Program*. [Online] Available at: http://web.mit.edu/ssp/publications/conf_series/urbanwarfare/urbanwarfare.html [Accessed: 10 October 2016].
40. Hermit, T.T. (2016). *Examining Terrorist Tactics: The Lethal Geography of Downtown Dallas*. [Blog] The Tactical Hermit. [Online] Available at: <https://thetacticalhermit.com/tag/history-of-urban-warfare/> [Accessed: 10 October 2016].
41. Ron, J. and Andreas, P. (2009). The Folly of Siege Warfare. [Online] Available at: <http://jamesron.com/documents/media-2009-folly-warfare.pdf> (Accessed: 10 October 2016).
42. News, B. (2016) Islamic state fighters using drones with IEDs and spy cameras, says Pentagon. *The Telegraph*, [Online]. Available at: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/07/07/islamic-state-fighters-using-drones-with-ieds-and-spy-cameras-sa/> [Accessed: 10 October 2016]
43. Kilcullen, D. (2007). *Two schools of classical Counterinsurgency*. [Blog] Small Wars. [Online] Available at: <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/two-schools-of-classical-counterinsurgency> [Accessed: 10 October 2016].
44. Piotrowski, M.A. (2015). Hezbollah: The Model of a Hybrid Threat, *Bulletin, Polish Institute of International Affairs*, [Online] 24(756). Available at: https://www.pism.pl/files/?id_plik=19320 [Accessed: 10 October 2016].
45. Ollivant, D.A. (2016). The rise of the hybrid warriors: From Ukraine to the Middle East. [Online] Available at: <http://warontherocks.com/2016/03/the-rise-of-the-hybrid-warriors-from-ukraine-to-the-middle-east/> [Accessed: 10 October 2016].

46. Mozgovaya, N. (2016). U.S. Report: *Hezbollah fought Israel better than any Arab army*. Haaretz, [Online]. Available at: <http://www.haaretz.com/u-s-report-hezbollah-fought-israel-better-than-any-arab-army-1.259847>.
47. U.S Army FM 3-06.11 Appendix H (2002) [Online] Available at: http://www.inetres.com/gp/military/FM3-06_11H.html [Accessed: 10 October 2016].
48. Customary International Humanitarian Law (ICRC). J.-M. Henckaerts& L. Doswald-Beck eds., 2005), Rule 22.
49. Bassiouni, M.C. (2008). The New Wars and the Crisis of Compliance with the Law of Armed Conflict by Non-State Actors. *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, 98(3).
50. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LAW OF WAR MANUAL (2015) [Online] Available at: http://www.dod.mil/dodgc/images/law_war_manual15.pdf#page=271 [Accessed: 10 October 2016].
51. Haque, A.A. (2015). The defence department's indefensible position on killing human shields. *Just Security*, [Online] 22 June. Available at: <https://www.justsecurity.org/24077/human-shields-law-war-manual/> [Accessed: 10 October 2016].

BACK TO CIVILIAN LIFE: DYNAMICS OF ECONOMIC REINTEGRATION PROCESS OF EX-LTTE COMBATANTS IN POST-WAR SRI LANKA*

Wing Commander Vajira Senadheera

ABSTRACT

The ending of Sri Lanka's armed conflict with the military defeat of the LTTE in May 2009 brought to the fore a plethora of challenges. One of the many such challenges was the rehabilitation and reintegration of ex-LTTE combatants. Often hailed a success story, Sri Lanka's post-war rehabilitation process witnessed approximately 12,000 ex-combatants being rehabilitated and reintegrated into society. The rehabilitation approach the Government of Sri Lanka adopted which is known as the 'six plus one model' allowed restorative justice elements to take the lead role both at institutional level and at societal level. However, despite the many successes the rehabilitation process achieved, economic reintegration of the ex-combatants remains a challenge due to reasons partially emanating from macroeconomic factors of the country. This paper thus examines the post-war economic reintegration process and attempts to endorse a number of recommendations for the reintegration process to be a sustained success.

Keywords: Post-war Rehabilitation, Ex-combatants, Economic Reintegration, Employability

INTRODUCTION

Following three decades of protracted conflict¹, in 2009, the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) implemented the process of rehabilitation² for the surrendered or captured combatants of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) with the subsequent aim of reintegrating them back into society. Sri Lanka's post war rehabilitation experience provides a unique example of a society in transition from conflict to post conflict state with an ultimate aim to achieve sustainable peace in Sri Lanka through re-building the shattered lives of the ex-LTTE combatants. This paper is an attempt to examine the dynamics of the rehabilitation process taking into account some of the unresolved issues of economic reintegration of ex-combatants even after seven years of extensive efforts made by various government as well as non-government institutions.

* This paper is based on an unpublished thesis submitted for the Commandant's Research Paper to the Defence Services Command and Staff College, Sapugaskanda, Sri Lanka.

As per the statistics available at Bureau of Commissioner General of Rehabilitation (BCGR)³ 12,169 ex-LTTE combatants either surrendered to or were apprehended by the security forces by May 2009. This included a mixed crowd of forcibly conscripted combatants ranging from hardcore LTTE cadres to child soldiers. On behalf of the Government of Sri Lanka, this mammoth task of conducting rehabilitation and reintegration for ex-LTTE combatants was undertaken by the BCGR with the assistance of Sri Lanka armed forces and other government and non-government agencies. Paradoxically, Sri Lankan military forces being the victorious party to the war had to undertake this responsibility which involved the rehabilitation training, reintegration activities and most notably to transform their lives back to a civilian set up. This Sri Lankan experience sets the backdrop of a classic example where the involvement of the country's military personnel became the catalyst for the accomplishment of the entire endeavor of rehabilitation placing the role of Sri Lanka's armed forces integral in the development process of a post-war state.

Even though, there were separate rehabilitation and reintegration programmes launched for ex-LTTE child soldiers⁴ and adult ex-LTTE combatants, this paper only focuses on the latter. Further, attempts were made to do a systematic evaluation of the rehabilitation and reintegration process underwent by the ex-LTTE combatants to estimate whether the rehabilitation process has positively contributed in attaining successful economic reintegration. This was done by highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of the rehabilitation and reintegration processes drawing special attention to productivity of vocational training offered and the, economic and social status of the ex-combatants. In order to arrive at a balanced and fair interpretation of the reintegration process, criticisms, observations and opinions made by the rehabilitees as well as members of the Tamil community were used to gauge the extent to which the rehabilitation and reintegration process has reached its ultimate objectives. Exploration of ex-LTTE combatants' successful absorption into the economic activities and looking back and re-evaluation the post-reintegration, monitoring and assistance mechanism were the main objectives of this study.

MAIN PHASES OF REHABILITATION AND REINTEGRATION IN POST-CONFLICT SRI LANKA

Along with the humanitarian operation a parallel operation was launched to ensure the safety of civilians who were either rescued or escaped from the LTTE. In order to rehabilitate ex-LTTE combatants who had surrendered and captured by the forces, Sri Lanka developed a multifaceted programme to engage and transform the violent attitudes and behaviours of the ex-LTTE combatants. As each conflict is different, the rehabilitation process too differs from other similar experiences. Hence, the approach GoSL adopted was different to other rehabilitation stories allowing restorative justice elements to take the lead role both at administrative or institutional level and at societal level. At institutional level, this challenge

was entrusted with the Bureau of the Commissioner General of Rehabilitation (BCGR)⁵ established under the Justice Ministry.

Twenty four (24) Protective Accommodation and Rehabilitation Centres (PARC) were made functional separately for children, females and males in accordance with international standards. Several United Nations and humanitarian agencies, notably International Organization for Migrants (IOM) and Hazardous Area Life-support Organization (HALO) Trust, assisted the GoSL since 2009. The rehabilitation was designed according to the model of the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research in Singapore⁶. GoSL rehabilitation programme was an extensive residential programme known as “6+1 model” consisting of 6 integrated components and one segregated component covering (1) educational (2) vocational (3) psychological and creative therapies (4) social cultural and family (5) spiritual and religious (6) recreational and community rehabilitation⁷.

A comprehensive profiling of the cadres was executed in accordance with the international best practices and thus the rehabilitation process was structured into five stages as per the ILO guidelines (2010); i.e., Assurance, Basic Profiling, Socio-Economic Profiling, Psycho-Social Profiling and Reintegration. Thereafter, job oriented training or vocational training along with required technical training and skill development was given to the inmates in order to achieve smooth reintegration with sustainable livelihood for the beneficiaries.

The rehabilitation period included professional training courses in areas such as mechanical skills, information technology, agriculture, animal husbandry, beauty culture, food processing, education, handicrafts, carpentry and construction. The rehabilitation programme also comprised of psychological assistance, education, sports, and spiritual, religious and cultural empowerment. The duration of rehabilitation training varied depending on their involvement and period of service with the former LTTE group, age etc. and their release from rehabilitation centre was decided by the rehabilitation authorities after a comprehensive evaluation. Just after the reintegration, the progress and welfare of the ex-LTTE combatants were constantly monitored by the Socio Economic Welfare Coordinating Office for Rehabilitated Beneficiaries⁸ (SEWCORB), established at the District Secretariat offices in all districts in the Northern and Eastern provinces.

According to BCGR website, a total of Rs. 1.3 billion has been spent on the rehabilitation of former LTTE cadres as at September 2013. In 2016, this amount has been reduced to Rs. 65 million.

The role played by the Sri Lankan armed forces at the rehabilitation process is immense as their sheer dedication and commitment were instrumental in providing security, logistic, administration, training and development support to their former rivals. The effective role played by the armed forces was remarkable in changing

perceptions amongst ex-LTTE combatants which was useful in winning their hearts and minds during rehabilitation process. The professionalism, empathy and expertise possessed by the armed forces, and most notably their ability to undertake important tasks in diverse fields, specially, the transferring of knowledge and skills of technical military tradesmen such as electrician, plumbers, mason, carpentry, motor mechanic etc. was very much fruitful in developing mutual understanding, friendship and trustworthiness between both parties.

Since May 2009 to-date the situation in the country can be considered as one of transitional periods from post-war to peace where Sri Lanka is challenged in taking a strategic move from the transitional peace to sustainable peace. Hence, it is of paramount importance to study the post-rehabilitation phase of the ex-LTTE combatants in determining success of the reintegration.

Despite many successes attained by the rehabilitation process within a short period of time, there remains a host of issues which needs careful scrutiny. It has been revealed that the youth who were given vocational training still remained unemployed or were engaged in jobs not relevant to the respective vocational training they had received. This is a concern highlighted in many post-war rehabilitation analyses published by various individuals and organizations. In the light of these differing observations, a close examination of the dynamics of economic reintegration of ex-LTTE combatants and to explore the prospects remain for economic reintegration is a necessity to make this endeavour more productive, sustainable and meaningful.

METHODOLOGY

The author had the opportunity in the year 2010 to serve as the Commanding Officer of a PARC which accommodated approximately 2,000 ex-LTTE combatants at Trikonamadu in the eastern province where he got first-hand experience on the rehabilitation process. During that one year period he got engaged with PARC administration and rehabilitation activities in liaison with rehabilitation authorities. The author was able to build close relations with many ex-combatants at PARC and exploited this unique opportunity to discover about their social, economic backgrounds and about factors that led them to join the LTTE as well as their post-rehabilitation expectations. The plethora of experience gained through interaction with different personalities and observations made on their behaviour compelled the author to conduct this study to evaluate their economic reintegration prospects and challenges after rehabilitation. The author's apprehension was mainly based on the mass scale vocational training offered to ex-combatants at the PARC and how these training have been beneficial to sustain reintegration process in terms of livelihood survivability.

As an empirical research study the researcher used the descriptive approach on the collection, evaluation, analysis of the data and recommendation of this study

to improve or shape the present rehabilitation and reintegration strategy for better results in the future; hence the relevance and applicability. Out of 12,000 rehabilitated ex-LTTE combatants, a survey was carried out among two randomly selected samples drawn from Mulliyaweli, a village situated in Mullaitivu district representing rehabilitated and reintegrated ex-LTTE combatants and civilian members who are living with the ex-combatants. The sample consisted of 30 rehabilitated individuals and 100 civilian community members. A questionnaire was administered to both categories and the data was further substantiated by the official statistics of BCGR and Terrorist Investigation Department.

Even though the researcher has a moderate command of the language of the respondents with the ability to communicate and understand the Tamil language, the assistance of two interpreters were sought in order to obtain more accurate information during the interviews.

THE SUCCESS OF THE REHABILITATION PROCESS: A TWO SIDED STORY

Sri Lanka's post-war rehabilitation process focussed on four main aspects; first to safeguard the rights of the victims, including the responsibility to protect and to assist them in accordance with the constitution of the country and state's international obligations, second, to contribute towards sustainable peace, reconciliation and social cohesion and wellbeing, third, to enhance the employability of rehabilitees to minimize their risk of socio-economic marginalization and to utilize their underutilized knowledge and skills to create opportunities for economic revitalization in post-conflict development efforts and finally to inculcate the values and requirement of family culture attitude and to empower the community through proper education, instil values and norms and to create a discipline society. The third goal being economic reintegration in the long run had to focus on and fulfil a number of prerequisites such as changing of the mind-set of the beneficiaries and to make them psychologically strong and adapted to face the new life that awaited them. No integration process is considered a success if the beneficiaries feel distanced from the normal, civilian life.

The government was able to fulfil that task of changing the mindset of the ex-LTTE combatants who were highly brainwashed by their organization and alienated from the civil society to a certain extent⁹. Previous research conducted with thousands of ex-LTTE combatants yielded encouraging results and has found that over time, Tamil attitudes toward the Sinhalese have significantly improved. The probability of a future war is minimal given that there are no clues to postulate that Tamil youth will take up arms again to rebel against the government¹⁰.

During rehabilitation, all ex-combatants were given the opportunity to learn Sinhala and English languages which was very useful in bridging the language gap between both communities. This language training further enabled them to secure jobs in the private and the public sectors.

Despite many a success stories of the post-war reintegration process, there remains an undercurrent that makes this entire effort deflected from achieving its ultimate objectives. The economic reintegration of rehabilitated ex-LTTE combatants continues to be a challenge due to lack of satisfactory employment opportunities in conflict-affected areas or insufficient livelihood support through the aftercare programme.

A somewhat negative feedback was received from the ex-combatants on their present economic status and usefulness of vocational training given during the rehabilitation process. Even though they underwent a wide range of vocational trainings most of them were found to be unemployed or engaged in jobs that are not related to the particular vocational training they had received. Finding a job to suit the vocational training they received in the Northern Province proved quite a difficult task in the post-war situation, especially for rehabilitated cadres¹¹. This situation needs to be addressed swiftly as it may not be favourable for future developments. Vocational training should be an important part of the rehabilitation process and it will enable the target group to return to society with confidence and find employment and settle down as civilians. The point is vocational training that will be imparted during the rehabilitation process should be based on demand-driven, based on informed decision of the beneficiaries¹².

The sample of 30 ex-combatants in the Mulliyaweli village who were interviewed during the study revealed that 22 of them followed masonry as vocational training and that only 03 of them were engaging in the same occupation. 11 of them who have not done any vocational training were engaging in traditional fishing. Fishing and agriculture being the mainstay of the economic activities in the Northern and Eastern regions have not been able to receive due attention in the creation of jobs for these youth. Therefore, emphasis on these two areas by way of providing modern techniques of fishing and agriculture, for example, might be useful in the long term as poor design and implementation of vocational training projects are considered key conflict risks and challenges in relation to socio-economic reintegration¹³.

Many economic reintegration parameters constitute creation of an income generating, sustainable livelihood opportunities both in the employed and self-employed sectors taking into account the national and local economic realities¹⁴. Kulathunga, in his study on effects of reintegration observes a similar tendency as stated above that the economic reintegration status of ex-LTTE combatants have not presented positive results as was expected.

Some of the fundamental challenges in the economic reintegration of the beneficiaries include lack of private sector involvement, lack of appropriate funding channels and programming, poor design and implementation of vocational training projects, insufficient support to new entrepreneurs and political sensitivity. These challenges need due intervention by the government agencies as the negative dynamics of economic reintegration may one day steer the country away from the benefits of hard-earned peace¹⁵. Therefore, the government should continue making efforts to improve employability and to create an enabling economic environment, especially in local communities with high return for ex-combatants.

Economic reintegration was to be achieved by providing employment or support for self-employment through the aftercare system, and by ensuring employability of rehabilitees through catch-up programmes. The need for the establishment of a continued monitoring and mentoring system of rehabilitated combatants exists, in order to evaluate the progress of, and support for, the reintegration component of Sri Lanka's rehabilitation and reintegration efforts¹⁶. Provision of financial assistance in terms of bank loans, living allowance etc. has been an important part of reintegration process. As per the data available with BCGR, a small number of combatants (1782) or 15% of the total 12, 169 were facilitated with financial assistance granted by state banks during their reintegration period.

District	Reintegrated Ex-combatants	Number of Ex-combatants	Amount Granted (LKR)
Jaffna	3336	288	423,50,000.00
Vavniya	1282	309	446,85,000.00
East	616	68	31,25,000.00
Mullaithivu	2477	430	596,40,000.00
Kilinochchi	2998	342	476,95,000.00
South	64	2	4,50,000.00
Trincomalee	601	23	970,00,000.00
Mannar	795	320	481,50,000.00
Total	12169	1782	3430,95,000.00

Table 1: Self employment loans provided by state banks

(Source: BCGR data as at 2016)

The employment status records of reintegrated ex-LTTE combatants available at BCGR as at year 2016 indicates an overview of how the reintegration process has had an overarching impact on the employability of the beneficiaries. A noteworthy trend is observed as 497 personnel (3.9 %) have joined the Civil Security Department/ military forces and 4,283 of them (35.19 %) have engaged with farming, carpentry, masonry, business, private sector, fisheries and self-employment signifying an improvement of their avenues of financial gains. The data indicates that 1,055 of them (8.66%) have migrated for various employment. Significantly, it is found that 2,798 personnel (22.99 %) are doing daily labour while 714 (5.86 %) are unemployed which indicates that altogether 28.85 % of ex-combatants do not have steady income generation means, a matter which has to be seriously examined and dealt with care. However, a large number of beneficiaries who have been trained on carpentry, masonry, farming and self-employment were actually found to be engaged in the jobs related to the same field which amounts to 2,605 out of the total rehabilitees. The data categorised in the table as “others” represents 1454 beneficiaries (11.94%) engaging in employments such as driving, tailoring, bomb disposal, computer operator, animal husbandry, teaching, barber, welder and clergy, house wives roles etc.

District	Male	Female	Identified	Not identity	Military /Civil Service Dept	Farming	Carpentry/ Masonry	Business	Private sector	Fisheries	Self-employment	Migrate	Labour	Unemployed	Others
Jaffna	3336														
	2637	699	2910	426	12	122	373	121	101	246	72	412	751	274	
Mullaitivu	2477														
	2016	461	2663	186	160	324	277	125	144	146	103	173	725	180	
Kilinochchi	2998														
	2426	572	2894	104	285	239	259	137	228	120	295	189	653	125	
Vanni	2077														
	1706	371	1351	726	-	252	71	44	43	95	35	100	425	69	
East	1217														
	1052	165	895	322	-	119	35	51	23	57	17	176	239	61	
South	64	48	16	-	10	2	-	-	-	-	5	5	5		
Total	9892	2277			457										
	12169		10761	1408	497	1066	1017	478	541	659	522	1055	2798	714	1454

Table 2: Present employability of reintegrated ex-LTTE combatants

(Source: BCGR data as at 2016)

Generally, reintegration has been a challenge for female ex-combatants due to several reasons. This is due to reasons ranging from social to cultural which make females discouraged from pursuing income generating options.

During interviews held with the ex-combatants it was revealed that most of them have been subjected to social stigma due to lack of support and non-receptive attitude shown by local government officials when approached for their daily administrative needs. And the negative attitude shown towards them by the general Tamil community is another hindrance. This has prevented them from seeking suitable employment in their vicinity. As a result ex-combatants have to seek the interference of SEWCORB at the District Secretariat offices to resolve most of their personal administrative issues. Finding employment is also hindered due to administrative related problems relating to land, housing, birth certificates, National Identity Cards, death certificates, education certificates etc. as they do not have the required documentation to prove their identity and educational qualifications.

It is worthy to study whether the new employment opportunities which emerged in the Northern and Eastern provinces have been optimally utilized for giving reasonable chances to these ex-combatants or to see whether there were any underlying factors that kept this group of people away from those opportunities. The author was able to identify another significant reason that has affected unemployment as most of them are reluctant to move out from their home areas to places afar due to many personal and social reasons.

Against this backdrop, the establishment of SEWCORB at the District Secretariat offices covering all districts of North and East is one of the important measures taken by the government to assist their grievances, monitor progress and ensure sustainable socio-economic reintegration of all rehabilitated ex-combatants and their families in the respective districts. The ex-combatants are happy and positive about the establishment of SEWCORB and they expect the service of it to be expanded to Divisional Secretariat level to have a much more efficient service.

THE WAY FORWARD TO ACHIEVE SUCCESSFUL ECONOMIC REINTEGRATION

Reintegration can usually be defined as a process in which fighters change their identity from 'combatants' to 'civilian' and alter their behaviour by ending the use of violent means and increasing activities that are sanctioned by the mainstream community. The change in behaviour is visible in three arenas: social, political and economic¹⁷. The ultimate goal of rehabilitation is national reconciliation, long lasting peace, prosperity and development of the country through restoring the shattered lives of ex-LTTE combatants. In most post-conflict societies, economy remains fragile for some time to come to absorb the combatants and therefore job creation in a post-conflict society becomes challenging to the authorities.

The general expectations of these ex-LTTE combatants at the outset of the rehabilitation process were to obtain a suitable vocational training to start own venture, to find a job suitable for their skills, land, money and other facilities to start a business or to go abroad or continue education. Improving employability and creation of a conducive environment to sustain their livelihood activities are key components of a reintegration effort¹⁸. The analysis of ex-combatants' present employment data shows that the majority of them are employed in entirely different fields contrary to the vocational training given. However, the failure in this aspect cannot be totally attributed to the rehabilitation process itself. What must be noted here is that there is a mismatch between the training given and employment opportunities available in the local area. This tendency is no different from the rest of the country where there has always been a mismatch between the demand and supply of labour. The 2014 World Bank Report titled 'Building the Skills for Economic Growth and Competitiveness in Sri Lanka' concludes that skills shortages and mismatches are an impediments to Sri Lanka's growth aspirations unless urgently addressed¹⁹. Certain cultural practices too tend to have an impact on these beneficiaries, as has been learned during interviews, it has been revealed that people of higher castes show reluctance to employ them in different occupations due to inherent dogmatic characteristics in their social strata. Former Commissioner General of Rehabilitation Major General Jagath Wijethilleke speaks out that "most of the ex-combatants are from low castes and they were controlling the people during the LTTE period. Those villagers, who still hate the ex-combatants for conscripting their children, had mistreated them once they were reintegrated. This situation needs time to heal"²⁰.

As the way forward, providing finance and other material assistance will lay the foundation for these people's effort to begin a new life and future sustenance of their livelihood. The financial and cooperate sector involvement for this effort needs to be encouraged as this lapse could lead to create an undesirable situation as it directly affects to the post-rehabilitated life of ex-combatants.

The identified impediments during the reintegration process, particularly in the social and economic layers would damage the triumphs of the rehabilitation if not properly handled. The government efforts in reviving the potential economic growth of war zone areas yet to reap its results and efforts taken to strengthen the lives of these ex-combatants would still be an advantage for the country for its long journey towards reconciliation. Failure to address these post-conflict challenges could impede the country's long-term economic goals as well. In order to make the reintegration effort an investment on human capital, the following propositions need careful attention:

- a. The mismatch between the vocational training given at rehabilitation process and employment opportunities available in the local area needs to be balanced by offering suitable vocational training for identified ex-combatants

or granting financial and material support as appropriate to main/ traditional local industry. Example: providing boat engines or boats for ex-combatants living closer to coastal areas.

- b. A sound monetary/ material assistance plan (by giving a dole, bank loan, value for their products, creations and labour) will help an ex-combatant to sustain initial reinsertion issues until the beneficiary is fully reintegrated, independent, and self-reliant. It is observed that GoSL has spent a large volume of money on the rehabilitation and reintegration processes well beyond its capacity, and financial constraints are the biggest impediment faced by the reintegration process. To alleviate this situation establishing a 'National Rehabilitation Fund' is suggested with the support of general masses and Tamil Diaspora. This will render the Sri Lankan rehabilitation and reintegration processes a wider local and international acceptance paving the way for fruitful national reconciliation.
- c. Establishing economic empowerment programmes which commensurate with ex-combatants skills, capabilities and needs is one of the most important measures to promote their economic participation to establish sustainable peace. Introduce new job markets, investment opportunities, find new marketplaces for their products, government intervention in administrative issues etc. are some of the possible measures that the government can implement to address the issue.

The rehabilitated former LTTE combatants were "reinserted" (resettled) in their original homes with a three-month reinsertion assistance package that was meant to meet their preliminary basic needs in terms of shelter, food, clothing, and healthcare. This process was sought to rely on community-based support structures²¹. The ex-combatants were away from their villages for a long time during the conflict and social absorption was a challenge to them with the negative gestures of the community. Necessary action needs to be taken to change the perceptions of the community in the area through a community-based support structure, community education programmes and community participation on their reintegration process which beneficial to ex-combatants to mitigate most of the issues they faced during transition period.

The ex-combatants entry into the main political stream is one of the significant achievements in the post-war period, and for them to engage in active politics, a favourable political environment, confidence regarding the present political system and democracy is required. Hence, a conducive social, economic and political environment needs to be maintained within democratic government system with the support of main Tamil political parties to give them more opportunity to serve the Tamil masses.

It is suggested that the present SEWCORB system established at the District Secretariat offices in all districts in the Northern and eastern provinces to be extended to Divisional Secretariat levels. They can serve as contact points for the reintegrated ex-combatants to seek remedy for their grievances and also to act as the link between ex-combatants and BCGR by providing necessary guidance and assistance. Establishing a continuous rehabilitation process is essential as a long term measure, which offers its services to reintegrated ex-combatants to undergo further rehabilitation or vocational training of their choice. The coordination of the same through SEWCORB will be an effective mechanism to gain confidence and monitor ex-combatants' future activities.

In this context, Liberian experience in 1997 DDRR programme²² provides Sri Lanka some lessons to reshape its rehabilitation and reintegration efforts to achieve its long-lasting objectives. In Liberia the DDRR programmes had limited success due to; many of the children and young people who disarmed during the process were not met with expectations or they were unable to find viable employment opportunities after receiving vocational training, lack of funding and support from donors, resource limitations and the inappropriateness of singling out of ex-combatants for special treatment in the eyes of the other war-affected Liberian people, some programmes were slow to start up and did not reach many communities etc²³.

As such, understanding ground realities and prompt reaction to issues highlighted in Sri Lankan rehabilitation and reintegration processes is of paramount importance specially in terms of social and economic prospects. Initiation of short and long term economic plans, providing financial and material assistance, public-private partnership in generating job opportunities, encourage foreign and local investors and constant government assistance are some of the progressive measures that GoSL can initiate to make this effort more meaningful and a success. Furthermore, measures must be taken to develop the business environment to create long-term employment opportunities attracting more private sector investments.

Peace education is a neglected subject the world over and the world has paid dearly for this neglect and taking tangible steps to introduce this subject to Sri Lankan context is recommended to commence at all levels of the society to mould a stronger and more caring national character for Sri Lanka.

CONCLUSION

Sri Lanka post war rehabilitation experience provides a unique example of a nation's transition from conflict to post conflict society with an ultimate aim of taking advantage of the opportunities arising from political, economic, and social stability. However, the destruction caused by the 30-year war is such that it requires rapid, but careful intervention by the government to restore the disrupted civilian

life. Post-war rehabilitation and reintegration process of Sri Lanka is considered a success story in harnessing the once lost potentials of a country's segment of the human capital.

This paper endeavoured to explore three important areas of concern relevant to rehabilitation and reintegration aspects of ex- LTTE combatants which are vital to achieving sustainable peace through reconciliation. It is agreed that the rehabilitation and vocational training efforts have helped many ex-combatants to change their present and future life in terms of psychological and socio-economic reintegration dimensions. But, it has left a considerable segment of ex-combatants unprivileged and desperate in receiving equal socio-economic opportunities or advantages such as self-reliance, economic absorption etc. This is due to many risks and challenges found in the Sri Lankan socio-economic reintegration experience including factors such as; addressing socio-economic causes of conflict, overcoming barriers to economic activity, lack of appropriate funding channels and programming, poor design and implementation of vocational education and training projects, insufficient support to new entrepreneurs and political sensitivity²⁴. The critical and sensitive areas discovered with the rehabilitation and reintegration processes are needed government concern and intervention to rectify flaws in community education, vocational training, administrative procedures, political and economic empowerment etc.

Failure to successfully complete reintegration and reconciliation phases may seriously endanger the overall reconciliation process of the country. The economically underprivileged presence of unemployed, formerly armed combatants poses a threat to community and national level security. This can thereby jeopardize all other efforts of economic recovery as well as the reconciliation efforts of the country. It is therefore vital for policy-makers and practitioners to ensure that the challenges and risks related to socio-economic reintegration of former combatants are understood and taken into account, simultaneously exploiting the success it gained, on the way to sustainable peace.

NOTES

1. Sri Lanka has been ravaged by a ruthless civil conflict between Liberation of Tigers of Tamil Ealam (LTTE) and Government of Sri Lanka. The conflict cost the lives of an estimated 80,000 to 100,000 people, and left a large number of people maimed while displacing thousands of civilians. The Sri Lankan Government militarily defeated the LTTE in May 2009. For a comprehensive list of fatalities of terrorist violence in Sri Lanka, see http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/shrilanka/database/annual_casualties.html
2. Ex-LTTE members who surrendered or were captured or detained by the armed forces were put through post-war rehabilitation plans, which lasted up to two years.

3. Rehabilitation of ex-LTTE Combatants was the prime task of BCGR. It was set up under the guidance of Ministry of Defence. The Bureau is under the Ministry of Rehabilitation and Prison Reforms since 30 April 2010. See <http://www.bcgr.gov.lk/history.php> for more details about the establishment and the mandate of the BCGR.
4. LTTE forcefully conscripted and used children under 18 years as combatants. At the end of war 594 children conscripted as child soldiers were rehabilitated and directed for further education.
5. The staff of the BCGR mostly comprised National Cadet Corps as they had the skills to handle the students. Army personnel in the staff were minimal. The rehabilitation process officially commenced on 01 October 2009 and prior to that the whole staff of the BCGR was given a special training on the rehabilitation process to execute their job humanely. Even cooks and minor staff were not spared of these training and educative sessions. See Rathnayake, R.M.D. Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Ex-combatants in Post-war Sri Lanka. Available at: http://www.kdu.ac.lk/southern_campus/images/documents/symposium/symposium2012/papers/ts/RehabilitationandReintegrationofExCombatantsinthePostWarSriLanka_.pdf
6. The International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR) is a specialist centre within the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) at Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. ICPVTR conducts research, training, and outreach programs aimed at reducing the threat of politically motivated violence and at mitigating its effects on the international system. See www.rsis.edu.sg/
7. Hettiarachchi, M. (2012). Sri Lanka's Rehabilitation Program: A New Frontier in Counter Terrorism and Counter Insurgency. *Journal of the Centre for Complex Operations*, [online] Vol.4, no.2, pp.105-122. Available at: cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/prism/prism_4.../prism105-122_Hettiarachchi.pdf [Accessed 10 Oct 2016].
8. The primary responsibility of this office is to ensure the successful and sustainable socio-economic reintegration of all rehabilitated ex-LTTE combatants and their families in the respective districts by coordinating with all government and non-government agencies.
9. Thalpawila, N. (2015). Rehabilitation and Reintegration as a Key Activity of Post-War Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka, [online], pp. 14-15. Available at: www.ijsrit.com/uploaded_all_files/1898033422_m2.pdf [Accessed 02 Oct 2016].
10. Kulathunga, R. (2015). Effects of Reintegration modalities on Ex-Combatants in Kilinochchi and Jaffna; A Situation Analysis, [online], p. 142. Available At: www.kdu.ac.lk/proceedings/irc2015/2015/dss-022.pdf [Accessed 02 Oct 2016].
11. Thalpawila, op.cit., pp.14-15
12. Keethaponcalan, I. (2009). Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Former Rebels for Sustainable Peace in Sri Lanka: A Post-war Challenge, [online], pp.29-31. Available at: [dl.nsf.ac.lk/bitstream/handle/1/14290/ER-35-\(7-8\)_26.pdf?sequence=2](http://dl.nsf.ac.lk/bitstream/handle/1/14290/ER-35-(7-8)_26.pdf?sequence=2) [Accessed 05 Oct 2016].

13. Ibid, pp.29-31
14. Ozerdem, A and Podder, S. (2008). Reinsertion Assistance and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in War to Peace Transitions Thematic Working Paper 4, [online], Available at: http://www.academia.edu/207856/Reinsertion_Assistance_and_Reintegration_of_Ex-Combatants [Accessed 05 Oct 2016].
15. Specht , I. (2010). 'Peacebuilding essentials for economic development practitioners' Practice note 4: Socio-Economic Reintegration of Ex-Combatants, [online], pp.3-5. Available at: www.enterprise-development.org/wp-content/.../InternationalAlert_ExCombatants.pdf [Accessed 02 Oct 2016].
16. Dharmawardana, I. (2014). Sri Lanka's Post-Conflict Strategy: Restorative Justice for Rebels and Rebuilding of Conflict, [online], p. 31-32. Available at: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/310> [Accessed 02 Oct 2016].
17. Torjesen, S (2013). Towards a theory of ex-combatant reintegration. Stability: International Journal of Security and Development, [online], p.Art. 63. Available at: <http://doi.org/10.5334/sta.cx> [Accessed on 05 Sep 2016].
18. Specht , op.cit.,pp.3-5
19. World Bank. (2014). Building the Skills for Economic Growth and Competitiveness in Sri Lanka. [Online] Available at: <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/790661468114536058/pdf/882690PUB0978100Box385205B00PUBLIC0.pdf>.
20. Jeyaraj, D.B.S. (2015). Rehabilitation of Ex –LTTE Combatants is a Sri Lankan Success Story: Commissioner-General of Rehabilitation Speaks Out, [online], Available at: dbsjeyaraj.com/dbsj/archives/40415 [Accessed 02 Oct 2016].
21. Dharmawardana, op.cit.,pp.31-32
22. Liberia commenced its disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration and rehabilitation (DDRR) of ex-combatants following the end of 14 year civil war in 2003. The Liberian conflict began in late 1989 when rebel leader Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) launched an incursion from neighbouring Cote d'Ivoire and after fourteen failed peace agreements, a binding ceasefire was achieved in 1997 and Charles Taylor became the president. Source: www.sussex.ac.uk/migration/documents/mwp29.pdf
23. Bragg, C .(2006). Challenges to policy and practice in the disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration and rehabilitation of youth combatants in Liberia, [online], p.7. Available at: www.sussex.ac.uk/migration/documents/mwp29.pdf
24. Specht , op.cit.,pp.3-5

PEACE EDUCATION IN THE CONTEXT OF A POST- INTRACTABLE CONFLICT

Nirmali Wijegoonawardana

ABSTRACT

The fundamental question addressed is whether peace education can facilitate the change of attitudes, emotions about the opponents' goals, causes of conflict and the desired solutions within the context of a post-intractable conflict. This study elucidates the scope and nature in which peace education is most applicable and the scenarios in which it would be most applicable to be used as a future strategy in addressing and preventing conflict. The evaluation of academic and programming literature will be scrutinized in order to clearly establish the role of peace education in peacebuilding processes as well as to identify knowledge gaps. Unmistakably, there is no single method for peace education. The objectives and the projects depend not just on the origins and innovativeness of the educators, but on the particular needs and the connection of each society. The general themes are often well based, however, the specific substance, systems, and techniques must be altered to suit the specific cases by specific educators. Finally, an effective perception of peace education can only be assessed in the next generation based on whether they experience bloodshed or whether it will embark on a new road that will lead to peace, security, and prosperity.

Keywords: Post-intractable Conflict, Peace Education, Reconciliation, Conflict Resolution and Peace Building

INTRODUCTION

Conflicts between groups of society, between social orders, or between countries emerge when their objectives, aims, and/or activities are seen as commonly contradictory and when those activities that take after as needs be. *Intractable Conflicts are described as those enduring no less than 25 years over objectives that are seen as being existential, violence, unsolvable, and of a zero-entirety nature, greatly engaging society's members with parties all set on their continuation².

* "I must now expose more fully something which was briefly glimpsed in my analysis when I spoke of the necessity to renew the means of production if production is to be possible. That was a passing hint. Now I shall consider it for itself. As Marx said, every child knows that a social formation which did not reproduce the conditions of production at the same time as it produced would not last a year. The ultimate condition of production is therefore the reproduction of the conditions of production. This may be 'simple' (reproducing exactly the previous conditions of production) or 'on an extended scale' (expanding them). Let us ignore this last distinction for the moment." Louis Althusser, *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*, Monthly Review Press 1971.

This paper, in this light tries to explain how education is often used as a means in intractable long drawn conflicts to control and manipulate masses, to perpetuate ideological beliefs by parties in intractable conflicts, to defame the 'other'. It also addresses how peace education can change the attitudes and the objectives of both parties engaged in the conflict thereby increasing the likelihood of creating a desirable solution to the conflict leading to stable peace. The paper recommends that peace-education is imperative in communities recovering from intractable conflicts, to robustly replace years of regressive ideological teachings that promote violent conflicts and divisive beliefs in disintegrating communities. Furthermore, this study, describes the nature of reconciliation that is needed in order to establish a lasting and stable peace. As well as it outlines two possible stages of peace education that can be put in place in societies submerged in the post-intractable conflict.

Education is a tool that can be utilized and controlled as a means to meet different ends for different causes. The most widely recognized use of it being, to provide education as a political means for achieving ideological extension of beliefs. This can run in its type of seriousness; from the utilization of education for the formation of liberal thoughts to the most extremes, and also especially, political inculcation or indoctrination of a set of beliefs. Education may likewise be deciphered as an apparatus equipped for giving information and aptitudes vital for monetary upgrade and societal portability. The view of education as a medium that germinates social inequalities hence to be cast aside and exchanged from time to time, may be relied upon by some zealots to banter negative generalizations or support practices that approve of violence or the formation of conflict. Following the dynamics of indoctrination in which school children in communities facing intractable conflict were fraternized for engaging in such conflict, every one of the channels of communication and societal institutions were found to be utilized to support the cause for conflict. Educational systems alone cannot divert the general public to change its ethos and society. Keep in mind that the entire educational process was coordinated to fortify the rationale for the continuation of conflict, to create de-authorization of the opponent, and to strengthen patriotism so as to secure and keep up mobilization for the conflict, interest in it, and even the status to die for the collective. What's more, we ought not to, overlook the considerable number of school staff who, via conveying the act of peace education, get to be specialists of progress themselves in the public arena. The peace procedure needs mobilization of the masses, leaders, mass media, and elites to support the peace process and strive to change the overarching beliefs, attitudes, emotions, and behaviors that served as the premise for the fueling of the conflict for a long time. In this endeavor, school systems assume a critical part.

MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS AND PEACE EDUCATION

The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) related to education have contributed largely in increasing attention towards the role of education in conflict-affected countries. An increase in the awareness of the Education for All (EFA) goals; can only be plausible if education can be accessed by children in conflict affected contexts, who are amongst the hardest to reach³. Since the publication of a United Nations Special Report on Children and Armed Conflict⁴, attention has been driven towards assessing the impact of conflict on education. These include the disruption of schools, attacks on teachers and pupils, forced recruitment of child soldiers, and the needs of refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs). Two recent reports from UNESCO are amongst the numerous researches conducted on the effects of conflict on education⁵.

An examination of studies led in the previous decade demonstrates an expanded enthusiasm for the ramifications of specific entrances of education on struggle⁶. In any case, of exceptional significance is the educational framework, which serves as a noteworthy indicator for socialization for a conflict through school text books, educational materials, teacher manuals and school functions, etc. This socialization has significant impacts on the grounds of convictions introduced in the instructive framework giving way to a youthful era since education is obligatory in all social orders. Thus it results in securing of and cooperation in this socio-psychological base as a vital pointer for enrollment in and recognizable proof with society. Collective memory of conflict develops to depict the "history" of the conflict to society's members⁷. Ethos of conflict gives overwhelming perspective to a society at present and guides it for the future⁸. They subsequently legitimize the position of society in conflict, depict it in exceptionally positive light and as the casualty of the conflict, and delegitimize the adversary. Notwithstanding societal convictions, the socio-psychological collection in circumstances of intractable conflicts incorporates passionate introductions. The most outstanding is the collective perception of fear⁹, be that as it may, what's more, they might be ruled by hatred and displeasure and guilt or pride¹⁰. This research elucidates the extent and nature through which peace education can be implemented and can be used as future strategies in addressing and preventing conflict. Moreover, this study proposes a standout amongst the most unmistakable and productive strategies for advancing a reconciliation process in peace education.

NATURE OF RECONCILIATION

The reconciliation process is a long one and does not happen spontaneously; rather scholars today suggest the arrangement or reclamation of authentic peaceful connections between social orders that have been included in intractable conflict after its formal resolution is accomplished¹¹. Reconciliation goes past the strategy

of formal conflict resolution to changing the inspirations, objectives, convictions, attitudes, and emotions by a considerably larger share of society's members with respect to the conflict, the nature of the relationship between the parties, and the parties themselves¹². Specifically, reconciliation comprises of mutual acceptance, interests and objectives in creating peaceful relations, mutual trust, enriching attitudes, and affectability and thought of other party's needs and interests. Every one of these components of reconciliation apply to the post-intractable conflict situation in which the two parties assemble peaceful relations in two separate political elements—both their states and the circumstances in which the two opponent parties keep on living in one political substance. Inevitably, reconciliation underpins and sets the peace as a new type of intergroup relations and serves as a steady foundation for cooperation and cordial acts that symbolize these relations. A peace that is bolstered by no less than a majority of society will dependably be at danger of disintegrating. In perspective of the psychological mental progression that overwhelmed years of intractable conflict, reconciliation more often than not requires mobilization of the masses in backing the new peaceful relations with the past enemy. This is an exceptionally complex process that demands a well-defined policy, planned initiatives, and a wide assortment of exercises—all geared towards the end goal of persuading society's members of the need, utility, value, and attainability of the peace process¹³. With respect to knowledge, a stance of significance would be to reshape the criterion on which the ethos of conflict is based and the collective memory of conflict in an attempt to develop new objectives and new perspectives of the adversary, of the conflict, and of the peace¹⁴. Reconciliation likewise requires the development of a general positive ambiance and specific emotions about the peaceful relations with the past adversary, for instance hope¹⁵. This is generally a procedure of societal change since peace education is propelled when society's members stagnate with an image of the conflict containing thoughts that repudiate the standards of the peace procedure and reconciliation¹⁶.

TWO PHASES FOR PEACE EDUCATION

This study outlines two possible phases for peace education that can be launched in societies submerged in the post-intractable conflict; direct peace education and auxiliary peace education. Direct peace education refers to themes that allow construction of new ethos—an ethos of peace that will serve as a basis for the evolvement of a culture of peace that also includes new collective memories corresponding to the new emerging culture. Moreover, institutions such as the Ministry of Education and large significant segments of society object to the launching of direct peace education. With regards to auxiliary peace education it strives to cultivate conflict resolutions skills that have a positive influence on the young generation.

DIRECT PEACE EDUCATION

Direct peace education, as noted, can be launched when the societal and political conditions are ripe and the educational system is administratively and pedagogically ready for this endeavor. Direct peace education directly refers to themes of conflict and tries to change societal beliefs, attitudes, values, and behaviors related to culture of conflict. Examples of direct peace education are the Education for Peace (EFP) project, carried in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which attempted to transform the lives of students, teachers, and the whole community by confronting the participants with the topics that stood at the heart of the conflict¹⁷. Its main characteristic is that it refers directly and specifically to the themes of the conflict between the engaged societies and the peace process whilst differentiating between the perspectives of the opponent, and the collective portrayal of reactions.

PERSPECTIVES OF THE OPPONENT

One of the key themes involves the portrayal of the opponent with whom society was forced to endure an intractable conflict¹⁸. This involves the authorization, equality, diversity, and individualization of the opponent. Authorization permits the portrayal of the opponent as being an opponent that falls under the classification of an acceptable group that behaves within the acceptable parameters of international norms which allows an easier route through which it becomes desirable to terminate conflict and build positive relations. This accepts the genuine presence of various other groups with variations in their goals, values, ideology, religion, race, nationality, ethnicity, culture, and other domains. Whereas, equality assures an equal field between the opponents allowing the formation of new relations. The achieving of this requires the acceptance of the principle of status equality between the groups, a principle that is first tested during negotiations and later brought into all forms of interactions between the two groups.

Diversity leads to the heterogenization of the opponent group. It allows a renewed sense of awareness of the opponent that has previously been perceived as a homogeneous hostile entity. The new observation infers that the opponent group is composed of multiple subgroups that all vary in views and ideologies. Thus, disparity elucidates the diversity in opinion on conflict and possible resolution methods amongst the members of the opponent group. It delivers a more humane perspective to the opponent group and does more towards the understanding of its complex structure. In addition to this, individualization permits the perception of the opponent group not as a depersonalized entity, but as consisting of individuals with ordinary human characteristics, concerns, needs, and goals. This is a process of individualization after prolonged period of de-individualization and requires an additional step after diversity. Individualization can be portrayed through

diversity in three levels: within an individual, among individual members, and among roles. Within an individual, diversity addresses the level of complexity of individual perception. Diversity among individuals elucidates the acknowledgment of individual differences, primarily to perceive groups as composed of individuals who vary in many aspects such as appearance, characteristics, opinions, concerns, needs, and goals. Finally, it countenances the perception of members of groups in various personal or social roles, such as mothers, sons, students, teachers, physicians, peasants, and so on*.

A COLLECTIVE PORTRAYAL OF REACTIONS

On the affective level, two affiliated processes need to take place. On the one hand, there is a requirement for a depreciation in collective fear and hatred, and, on the other, there is a requirement to generate collective hope, trust, and mutual acceptance¹⁹. The conjoined acceptance of the availability of hope emerges upon the reassurance of a steady positive goal²⁰. It inculcates the perceptive elements of visualizing and expecting as well as the tangible feeling of positive energy with regards to events and outcomes that are yet to come²¹. The growth and preservation of hope inculcates the higher mental processes of vision, imagination, goal setting, planning, and considering alternatives, all of which require openness, creativity, and flexibility²². Creating a collective sense of hope for peace requires generating a set of new goals, such as the ability to coexist in a peaceful manner and to willingly cooperate with history's opponent. This requires the ceasing of bloodshed, destruction, misery, hardship, and suffering whilst simultaneously permitting the emergence of peace, tranquility, prosperity, and growth. It also requires the drafting of new schemes to achieve these goals, such as negotiation, mediation, compromise, concession, and reciprocity²³. Furthermore, there is a requirement to create a collective acceptance of the former opponent, and it should replace the feeling of hatred felt throughout the past. It depicts a positive evaluative reaction toward the other group, portraying an intention to form positive relations. Such changes in the internalized perception of each group is required to ensure the sustainable establishment of new relations**.

* In the case of the Israeli Jewish society, the context consisted of major events and provided major information that shed light on them, related to the Camp David summit and the beginning of the Al Aqsa Intifada in 2000. This context served as a basis for the emergence of fear, de-legitimization of the Palestinians and a self-collective view as a victim, which became major obstacles that prevented any meaningful negotiation towards the achievement of a peaceful solution (Bar-Tal, D., & Teichman Y. (2005). *Stereotypes and prejudice in conflict: Representations of Arabs in Israeli Jewish society*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

** The above-described conditions of cohabitation will create a positive environment in the society that facilitates the achievement of peaceful conflict resolution. For example, the necessary condition for progress towards peaceful resolution of the South Africans conflict was negotiation between the rivals that allowed the development of mutually acceptable agreement.

AUXILIARY PEACE EDUCATION

Auxiliary peace education suggests how society acts as a basis on which it will be easier to impart themes of direct peace education thus eventually strengthening peacemaking and reconciliation. An important theme that is essential in ensuring sustainable peace is the attainment of conflict resolution skills.

CONFLICT RESOLUTION SKILL

Conflict resolution skills infers the capability of negotiating, mediating, and collaboratively solving problems within the context of conflict situations. It provides a pathway to resolving conflict peacefully, through the perception of it as being of a mixed-motive nature and solvable. The aim in acquiring the art of conflict resolution is to advance the following key abilities and skills²⁴: understanding that conflict is a natural and a necessary part of life; becoming a better conflict manager (knowing which kind of peaceful conflict determination technique is ideal suited for a particular conflict problem); becoming perceptive of that it is so basic to the procedure of constructive conflict resolution to offer data about one's own particular point of view and to comprehend the viewpoint of the opposite side; successfully recognizing positions from needs or interests; articulating emotions in nonaggressive, non-inflammatory ways; reframing a conflict as a mutual problem that should be resolved cooperatively with bargains through negotiation and/or with the help of a third party; and brainstorming to make, expound on, and upgrade an assortment of serene solutions.

Four fundamental educational approaches were proposed inside the conflict resolution learning structure²⁵: namely; the peer-mediation program approach, the process curriculum approach, the peaceable classroom approach, the whole-school peaceable approach. The peer-mediation program approach enables students to acquire training in mediation and mediate disputes among their peers²⁶. The process curriculum approach, educates students in the form of a separate course²⁷. The peaceable classroom approach, includes classroom administration techniques within the core subjects of the educational programs²⁸ and the whole-school peaceable approach, requires all member of the school to follow conflict resolution principles standards²⁹. Conflict resolution abilities can be seen as one of the focal segments of peace education³⁰. According to Deutsch, the primary concept of conflict resolution education is “to instill the attitudes, knowledge, and skills which are helpful for successful, agreeable critical thinking and to discourage the attitudes...”³¹. Therefore, the primary concept of conflict resolution education is to encourage an understanding of conflict and to aid individuals in developing a nonviolent, constructive approach to conflict resolution in the perspective of auxiliary peace education which complements the objectives of direct peace education.

CONCLUSION

The above content brings to light how peace education can change the attitudes and the objectives of both parties engaged in the conflict thereby increasing the likelihood of creating a desirable solution to the conflict leading to stable peace. Making peace-education is crucial in communities recuperating from intractable conflicts, to stealthily replace years of backward ideological lessons that advance violent conflicts and divisive convictions in deteriorating communities.

Through the schools, it is conceivable to reach the new generations and start to create individuals with changed attitude toward the conflict, the rival, the peace process, etc. They will be the future individuals from society who will be ready to take a gander at reality through another prism that permits them to free themselves from the chains of the past and look to the future with new objectives of building up peaceful relations with the past opponent, bolster the peacemaking process, and hope for reconciliation. Unmistakably, there is no single method for peace education. The objectives and the projects depend not just on the originations and innovativeness of the educators, but on the particular needs and the connection of each society. The general themes are pretty much steady, however the specific substance, systems, and techniques must be adjusted to the specific cases by the specific educators. They need to choose and/or construct the particular programs and later execute them as per the general guiding principles that encourage the accomplishment of good results and important commitments to the cause.

The fundamental that this study attempted to convey indicates that under each condition (notwithstanding amid brutality), peace education (in its backhanded way) can prosper in light of the fact that its topics additionally bolster humanism and democracy, which are very much acknowledged by numerous societies. Societies are slowly gravitating towards/preparing for peace processes to set in and thereby end the culture of agony and bloodshed. Furthermore, general democratic and humanistic education, can handle straightforwardly the establishments that the conflict, namely, the ethos of conflict, the collective memory of conflict, and collective emotional orientations that underlie it. Educating the young generation about the price to be paid and the significance of living in peace stands as one of the most critical difficulties for people wherever they live and for educators who have to meet these objectives. Such education will depend, at any rate to some degree, on whether the next generation will experience bloodshed, suffering, and misery, or whether it will embark on a new road that will lead to peace, security, and prosperity.

NOTES

1. Bar-Tal, D., Kruglanski, A. W., & Klar, Y. (1989). Conflict termination: An epistemological analysis of international cases. *Political Psychology*, 233-255; See also Mitchell, C. R. (1989). *The structure of international conflict*. Springer; And also Rubin, J. Z., Pruitt, D. G., & Kim, S. H., (1994). *Social conflict: Escalation, stalemate, and settlement*. McGraw-Hill Book Company.
2. See for more details Azar, E. E., (1990). *The management of protracted social conflict*. Hampshire: Dartmouth Publishing; and also, Bar-Tal, D., (1998). Societal beliefs in times of intractable conflict: The Israeli case. *International Journal of Conflict Management*, 9 (1), 22-50; for further details, please refer to Kriesberg, L. (1998b). Coexistence and the reconciliation of communal conflicts. In E. Weiner (Ed.), *The handbook of interethnic coexistence* (pp. 182-198). New York: Continuum.
3. Save the Children improved the quality of education for 1.5 million children in conflict-affected countries and enabled 215,000 children to access education. See for more details Save the Children Alliance Annual Report 2006.
4. See for more details: Machel, G., (1996). *UN study on the impact of armed conflict on children*. New York: United Nations.
5. The press release of the 2010 edition of this UNESCO report on global education states, The aftershock of the global financial crisis threatens to deprive millions of children in the world's poorest countries of an education, the 2010 Education for All Global Monitoring Report warns. For further details; Education for All Global Monitoring Report, 2010 (UNESCO).
6. See for more information; Bush, K. D., & Saltarelli, D. (2000). The two faces of education in ethnic conflict: Towards a peacebuilding education for children (No. innins00/7); Also refer to Smith, A., & Vaux, T. (2003). *Education, conflict and international development*; And also Buckland, P., (2005). *Reshaping the future: Education and post-conflict reconstruction*. World Bank Publications; In addition to this refer to Davies, L. (2003). *Education and conflict: Complexity and chaos*. Routledge; And also - Tawil, S., & Harley, A. (2004). *Education and identity-based conflict: Assessing curriculum policy for social and civic reconstruction*. Education, Conflict, and Social Cohesion. Geneva: UNESCO International Bureau of Education.
7. For further details: Cairns, E., & Roe, M. D. (Eds.). (2003). *The role of memory in ethnic conflict*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan; Furthermore, Halbwachs, M., (1992). *On collective memory*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Also refer to Wertsch, J. V., (2002). *Voices of Collective Remembering: Text*. Cambridge University Press.
8. See for more details: Bar-Tal, D., (2000). From intractable conflict through conflict resolution to reconciliation: Psychological analysis. *Political Psychology*, 21(2), 351-365.

9. See more information: Bar-Tal, D., 2001. Why does fear override hope in societies engulfed by intractable conflict, as it does in the Israeli society? *Political Psychology*, 22(3), pp.601-627.
10. See likewise; Kaufman, S. J., (2001). *Modern hatred: The symbolic politics of ethnic wars*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press; and also Petersen, R. G., (2002). *Understanding ethnic violence: Fear, hatred, and resentment in twentieth-century Eastern Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; As well as; Scheff, T.J., 1994. *Microsociology: Discourse, emotion, and social structure*. University of Chicago Press.
11. For more details: Ackermann, A., (1994). Reconciliation As A Peace Building Process in Postwar Europe. *Peace & Change*, 19(3), 229-250; moreover, refer to Asmal, K., Asmal, L., & Roberts, R. S. (1997). Reconciliation through truth: A reckoning of apartheid's criminal governance (No. 74). New Africa Books; In addition to Bar-Tal, D., (2000). From intractable conflict through conflict resolution to reconciliation: Psychological analysis. *Political Psychology*, 21(2), 351-365; And also Gardner Feldman, L., (1999). The principle and practice of 'reconciliation' in German foreign policy: Relations with France, Israel, Poland and the Czech Republic. *International Affairs*, 75(2), 333-356; Furthermore, also refer to Krepon, M. L., & Sevak, A. (Eds.) (1996). *Crisis prevention, confidence building and reconciliation in South Asia*. New York: St. Martin's; and also Kriesberg, L., (1998a). *Constructive conflict: From escalation to resolution*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield; In addition to this also refer to Lederach, J. P., (1997). *Building peace: Sustainable reconciliation in divided societies*. Washington DC, 4; and also Norval, A. J., (1998). Memory, identity and the possibility of reconciliation: The work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa. *Constellations*, 5(2), 250-265; Also Rothstein, R. L., (1999). In fear of peace: Getting past maybe. In R. L. Rothstein (Ed.), *After the peace: Resistance and reconciliation* (pp. 1-25). Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner; and finally, Wilmer, F., (1998). The social construction of conflict and reconciliation in the former Yugoslavia. *Social Justice*, 25(4 (74)), 90-113.
12. Reference to Bar-Tal, D., & Bennink, G. H. (2004). The nature of reconciliation as an outcome and as a process. From conflict resolution to reconciliation, 6; Will elucidate further details; also refer to Borneman, J. (2002). Reconciliation after ethnic cleansing: Listening, retribution, affiliation. *Public Culture*, 14(2), 281-304; And also De Soto, A., (1999). Ending violent conflict in El Salvador. *Herding cats: Multiparty mediation in a complex world*, 349-386; Furthermore, Kelman, H.C., 1999. The interdependence of Israeli and Palestinian national identities: The role of the other in existential conflicts. *Journal of Social Issues*, 55(3), pp.581-600; as well as Lederach, J. P., (1997). *Building peace: Sustainable reconciliation in divided societies*. Washington DC, 4; Moreover, refer to Maoz, M. (1999). The Oslo agreements: Towards Arab-Jewish reconciliation. *After the peace: Resistance and reconciliation*, 67-83; And Shonholtz, R., (1998). *Conflict Management Training: A Transformative Vehicle for Transitional Societies*. *International Negotiation*, 2(3). In addition to the above refer to the following; as well Staub, E., (2006). Reconciliation after genocide, mass killing, or intractable conflict: Understanding the roots of violence, psychological recovery, and steps toward a general theory. *Political Psychology*, 27(6), 867-894; Theidon, K., (2006). *Justice in Transition*

- The Micro Politics of Reconciliation in Postwar Peru. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 50(3), 433-457; Weiner, E., (Ed.). (1998). *The handbook of interethnic coexistence*. New York: Continuum; As well as Wilmer, F. (1998). *The social construction of conflict and reconciliation in the former Yugoslavia*. *Social Justice*, 25(4 (74), 90-113.
13. Please see the following references for further details Bar-Tal, D., & Bennink, G. H. (2004). The nature of reconciliation as an outcome and as a process. From conflict resolution to reconciliation, 6; Bloomfield, D., Barnes, T., & Huyse, L., (Eds.). (2003). *Reconciliation after violent conflict: A handbook*. International Idea.
 14. For more details, please see the following references Barkan, J. D., (2000). Protracted transitions among Africa's new democracies. *Democratization*, 7(3), 227-243; Bloomfield, D., Barnes, T., & Huyse, L. (Eds.). (2003). *Reconciliation after violent conflict: A handbook*. International Idea; and also see, Borer, M.I., 2006. The location of culture: The urban culturalist perspective. *City & Community*, 5(2), pp.173-197; furthermore, refer to Borneman, J. (2002). Reconciliation after ethnic cleansing: Listening, retribution, affiliation. *Public Culture*, 14(2), 281-304; As well as, Conway, B., (2003). Active remembering, selective forgetting, and collective identity: The case of Bloody Sunday. *Identity: An International Journal of Theory and Research*, 3(4), 305-323; Also refer to Kaufman, S., (2006). Escaping the symbolic political trap: Reconciliation initiatives and conflict resolution in ethnic wars. *Journal of Peace Research*, 43(2), 201-218; And Nets-Zehngut, R., (2006). *Refugee Tales: 1948 Considered-A historical analysis of Israeli attitudes towards the creation of Palestinian refugees in 1948*. *Yale Israel Journal*, 10, 12-26; And Rotberg, R. I., (2006). Building legitimacy through narrative. *Israeli and Palestinian narratives of conflict: History's double helix*, 1-18; Furthermore, refer to Salomon, G., (2004). A narrative-based view of coexistence education. *Journal of Social Issues*, 60(2), 273-287; And also Theidon, K., (2006). *Justice in Transition The Micro Politics of Reconciliation in Postwar Peru*. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 50(3), 433-457.
 15. Refer to the following for more details: Averill, J.R., Chon, K.K. and Hahn, D.W. 2001. Emotions and creativity, East and West. *Asian Journal of Social Psychology*, 4(3), pp.165-183; Bar-Tal, D., Halperin, E., & De Rivera, J. (2007). Collective emotions in conflict situations: Societal implications. *Journal of Social Issues*, 63(2), 441-460; Kaufman, S., (2006). Escaping the symbolic political trap: Reconciliation initiatives and conflict resolution in ethnic wars. *Journal of Peace Research*, 43(2), 201-218; And also Jarymowicz, M., & Bar-Tal, D. (2006). The dominance of fear over hope in the life of individuals and collectives. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 36(3), 367-392; For further references refer to Snyder, C. R. (Ed.). (2000). *Handbook of hope: Theory, measures, and applications*. San Diego, CA: Academic Press; and also refer to Staub, E., Pearlman, L. A., Gubin, A., & Hagengimana, A. (2005). Healing, reconciliation, forgiving and the prevention of violence after genocide or mass killing: An intervention and its experimental evaluation in Rwanda. *Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology*, 24(3), 297.
 16. See for more details Danesh, H. B., (2006). Towards an integrative theory of peace education. *Journal of peace education*, 3(1), 55-78.

17. Please refer to Clarke-Habibi, S., (2005). Transforming Worldviews, The Case of Education for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. *Journal of Transformative Education*, 3(1), 33-56.
18. Refer to Bar-Tal, D., & Teichman, Y. (2005). Stereotypes and prejudice in conflict: Representations of Arabs in Israeli Jewish society. Cambridge University Press; And also Bar-Tal, D., Halperin, E., & De Rivera, J. (2007). Collective emotions in conflict situations: Societal implications. *Journal of Social Issues*, 63(2), 441-460.
19. See for more details Bar-Tal, D., Halperin, E., & De Rivera, J. (2007). Collective emotions in conflict situations: Societal implications. *Journal of Social Issues*, 63(2), 441-460.
20. Please also refer to Lazarus, R. S. (1991). Progress on a cognitive-motivational-relational theory of emotion. *American psychologist*, 46(8), 819; And Stotland, E. (1969). Exploratory investigations of empathy. *Advances in experimental social psychology*, 4, 271-314.
21. For more details: Staats, S. R., & Stassen, M. A. (1985). Hope: An affective cognition. *Social Indicators Research*, 17(3), 235-242.
22. Further details can be found in Snyder, C. R., (1994). *The psychology of hope*. New York: Free Press; And also Snyder, C. R. (Ed.). (2000). *Handbook of hope: Theory, measures, and applications*. San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
23. More details: Jarymowicz, M., & Bar-Tal, D. (2006). The dominance of fear over hope in the life of individuals and collectives. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 36(3), 367-392.
24. Please refer to Bodine, R. J., & Crawford, D. K. (1998). *The Handbook of Conflict Resolution Education. A Guide to Building Quality Programs in Schools*. The Jossey-Bass Education Series. Jossey-Bass Inc., Publishers, 350 Sansome Street, San Francisco, CA 94104; And also Deutsch, M. (1993). Educating for a peaceful world. *American Psychologist*, 48(5), 510-517; In addition to Raider, E., Coleman, S., & Gerson, J. (2000). Teaching conflict resolution skills in a workshop. In M. Deutsch, & P. T. Coleman (Eds). *The handbook of conflict resolution: Theory and practice* (pp. 499-521). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
25. More details at Bodine, R. J., & Crawford, D. K. (1998). *The Handbook of Conflict Resolution Education. A Guide to Building Quality Programs in Schools*. The Jossey-Bass Education Series. Jossey-Bass Inc., Publishers, 350 Sansome Street, San Francisco, CA 94104.
26. For more details: Coleman, P. and Deutsch, M., 2001. Introducing cooperation and conflict resolution into schools: A systems approach. *Peace, conflict, and violence: Peace psychology for the 21st century*, pp.223-239; and Hall, R. (1999). Learning conflict management through peer mediation. In A. Raviv, L. Oppenheimer, & D. Bar-Tal, (Eds.), *How children understand war and peace: A call for international peace*

- education (pp. 281–298). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass; and also Johnson, D. W., & Johnson, R. T. (1996). Conflict resolution and peer mediation programs in elementary and secondary schools: A review of the research. *Review of Educational Research*, 66(4), 459–506.
27. See for more details Bickmore, K., (1999). Teaching conflict and conflict resolution in school: (Extra-) curricular considerations. In A. Raviv, L. Oppenheimer, & D. Bar-Tal (Eds.), *How children understand war and peace: A call for international peace education* (pp. 233–259). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
 28. Further details at Levin, D. E., (1994). *Teaching young children in violent times: Building a peaceable classroom*. Cambridge, MA: Education for Social Responsibility.
 29. More details available in Avery, P., Johnson, D., Johnson, R., & Mitchell, J. (1999). Teaching an understanding of war and peace through structured academic controversies. *How children understand war and peace*, 260–280.
 30. See for more details: Johnson, D. W., & Johnson, R. (2005). Essential components of peace education. *Theory Into Practice*, 44(4), 280–292.
 31. Deutsch, M., (2005). Cooperation and conflict: A personal perspective on the history of the social psychological study of conflict resolution. In M. A. West, D. Tjosvold, & K. G. Smith (Eds.), *The essentials of team working: International perspectives* (pp. 1–35). New York: Wiley.

IDEOLOGY AND RITUAL OF WARFARE IN SRI LANKA

Indrakeerthi Siriweera and Sanath de Silva

ABSTRACT

Warfare is a universal phenomenon that had existed from tribal era. It has had strong psychological effects, both on the individual and on society. As a result, societies and the individuals have evolved various ideologies on warfare. This paper discusses the ideological contexts that influenced warfare in Sri Lanka in different historical trajectories. Being an island, one of the popular ideological stances that Sri Lankan society adopted was that foreign invaders should be expelled from the country at any cost and that the supreme purpose of the state was defending the Buddhist order in the Island. The authors postulate that national unity was achieved as a result of war when kingdoms and Buddhist religious order were threatened by external forces.

Keywords: Just War, Religion, Ideology, Rituals

INTRODUCTION

“Wars are begun in the minds of men,” is an age-old Vedic maxim which has been adopted by the UNESCO. Whether it is in the East or the West, human history is replete with warfare. Wars have been conducted for the purpose of defending or expanding kingdoms and empires. The use of violence against the enemy has been legally justified as a legitimate means to protect the sovereignty of a country against internal or external threats.

All religions abhor violence and bloodshed; however, a series of religious wars was waged in Europe during the period 1524-1648 on the basis of religious differences. In reality, religion and war have gone hand in hand and political and religious leaders preaching that God is with them have sent armies to the battlefield to defend their religions. The ordinary soldier was made to believe that he will be rewarded a place in heaven for his martyrdom if he makes the supreme sacrifice with his life, for a just cause. Soldiers were sent to the battlefield often after receiving blessings and making sacrifices to God to keep the Almighty on their side. In some tribal cultures, there have been instances when a tribe loses a war, the ritual of embracing or worshipping the deity of the winner had to be performed by the defeated party.

The 'Just War' theory that was developed by theologians such as St. Augustine (354-430 A.D.) and Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274 A.D.) seeks to elucidate the ideology of warfare. It sets a solid moral basis to justify the actions of a state to wage war in the Western context. The 'Just War' theory suggests four conditions (explained in the following lines), which are required to wage a 'just war' or to establish the right to war by a sovereign state¹. Accordingly, first and foremost, only a just authority or a political authority must wage wars. In such instances, a sovereign state is the only entity that can wage a war. Secondly, the state should have a morally acceptable cause, or a just cause, to decide to go to war. Self-defence is considered the most justifiable cause to go to war. Thirdly, the combatants must have the "right intention" to wage a war in order to prevent evil and disaster. This intention includes, creating, restoring or keeping a just peace, righting a wrong, assisting the innocent etc. If a state wages war to promote wrong motives, it was believed that the state will destroy itself, because nothing can be hidden from the Almighty God. The concept of a 'just war' also suggests that a state should only go to war if it has tried every possible, non-violent resource available to resolve the problem. This is because a state's prime responsibility is to protect the lives of its citizens. If such wars are premised upon 'just' grounds, wars must be conducted in a righteous manner. The warring parties must match the proportionality of forces. They must also distinguish between combatants and non-combatants. Harmless, non-military people must be precluded from becoming the target of attacks.

The concept of "Just War" is prevalent even in the Eastern civilization. Mahabharata, the great Sanskrit epic, also discusses the issue of 'Just War'. Generally, the Hindus believe that it is justified to use force in self-defence. It is further proven by the Rig Veda statement which says:

May your weapons be strong to drive away the attackers,
may your arms be powerful enough to check the foes,
let your army be glorious, not the evil-doer².

Resorting to war in order to safeguard *Dharma* is acceptable in Hinduism. *Dharma* has many meanings such as the sense of righteousness, discrimination between good and bad or morals and ethics or that, which is lawful.

The Buddhist idea of warfare is somewhat different. Buddhism is essentially a peaceful tradition. Buddhist teachings never give support to the use of violence as a means to resolving conflicts. It emphatically states the need to love your enemy no matter how brutally he treats you. Majjima Nikaya thus states:.

Even if thieves carve you limb from limb with a double-handed saw, if you make your mind hostile, you are not following my teaching³.

Even though Theravada Buddhist culture rejects all kinds of violence, popular Buddhism of the masses extols violence in order to protect the Buddhist order as evident in the wars of Duttagamini. Zen Buddhism and samurai warrior culture in Japan also have very strong mutual links.

Warfare needs to be understood in these and many other complex contexts and it must be conceded that it is a somewhat complicated process. The basic identification of warfare is based on intention and allocation of resources to its cause. A state or an organization could commence war in an offensive or defensive manner. At the same time, it can decide whether the waging parties want to win it by allocating all possible resources (Total War) or limited resources (Limited War). Therefore, in modern parlance, different wars have been interpreted in many different ways, the nomenclature includes, 'Total War', 'Limited War', 'Irregular or Asymmetric War', 'Traditional War', 'Just War', 'Holy War' and 'Obligatory War'.

Perhaps more terms may be coined in future to indicate certain present-day violent phenomena found in Syria, Iraq, Libya and Afghanistan. As far as the peasant communities of Sri Lanka is concerned, prior to independence, it may be more appropriate to use the term 'traditional war' when describing them, although the Portuguese Captain General Azavedo and the British Governor Brownrigg put into practice the concept of 'total war' against the Kandyan kingdom and when suppressing the Uva rebellion of 1818 respectively.

Theoretical treatises and manuals on war have been compiled from very ancient times up to the present, both, in the East and the West. The best known Eastern treatise is the Chinese General Sun-Tzu's Art of War ascribed to Pre Christian era but not before the fifth century B.C.⁴. The most spoken of authoritative book in the West on warfare is the treatise titled *On War* written by the Prussian military strategist, Carl von Clausewitz in the early 19th century⁵. Besides, political theorists both in the East as well as the West, such as the Indian Kautilya⁶ in the third century B.C. and the Italian Machiaveli⁷ in the fifteenth century A.D. have set aside important sections in their works for warfare.

WARFARE IN SRI LANKA

The Arthasastra of Kautilya was known and studied in Sri Lanka at least during and after the 12th century. Prince Parakramabahu in his wars against Gajabahu II (1132-1153) is said to have studied texts such as the Arthasastra. According to the chronicle, he wrote down the military strategies and explained them to his subordinates⁸ before launching campaigns. However, it is reasonable to presume that in addition to following texts such as the Arthasastra, Sri Lankan kings, including Parakramabahu I, adopted their own military strategies to suit peculiarities and specific circumstances which they experienced in facing enemies.

Most of the wars in Sri Lanka, as anywhere else in the world, had a certain ideological base. One of the ideological stances of wars in the Island was that foreign invaders should be expelled from the country at any cost. In the pre-colonial era, the invaders were mostly South Indians, except Magha from Kalinga and Chandrabhanu from Indonesia. Subsequent invaders were colonial powers; the Portuguese, the Dutch and the British.

The reaction to the earliest South Indian invasions of the second century B.C. launched by Sena and Guttika, sons of a Dravidian entrepreneur engaged in trading horses is not very pronounced in the chronicles because a unified kingdom had not emerged at the time. Political and social ideologies too were in the formative stages. Yet, the series of South Indian invasions beginning with the capture of the throne by Sena and Guttika could be understood in the context of kingdoms in the extreme South of India posing a threat to Sri Lankan polity from the earliest times.

In an era in which territorial annexations and conquests or direct political influences were achieved through armies marching across land or by sea and confronting the opponents face to face in battle, none of the power centres of the Northern India posed a serious threat to Sri Lanka, or even to the kingdoms in the extreme South of India. In fact, the relationships between the power centres in Northern India and Sri Lanka during almost all periods of history were based on friendly cultural and commercial ties.

However, the centres of power in the extreme South, namely Tamil Nadu, posed intermittent threats to the stability and security of the Sri Lankan state from very early times. Tamil Nadu's political strategy and its economic potential were not identical with those of the North. The Northern kingdoms based their struggle primarily on acquiring large areas of territory, and their revenue came mainly from the land. The structure of the Southern kingdoms had also to take in to account effects of sea power as well as the economics of maritime trade which produced a more complicated pattern than that of the North. The Palk Straits which separated Sri Lanka from South India are at their narrowest point, only twenty two miles and invaders could arrive in the Island in sea going vessels without much difficulty. Dravidian chiefs Elara and; Pulahattha, Bahiya, Panayamara, Piliya Mara, Dathika (103B.C.-89B.C.); Pandu, Parinda, Khudda Paridna, Tiritara, Dhathiya and Pithiya (433-459 A.D.) who captured the throne of Anuradhapura kingdom, were undoubtedly supported by various South Indian commercial and political pressure groups interested in economic gain both in Tamil Nadu and Sri Lanka. The resentment shown to and the subsequent overthrow of these South Indian rulers by the Sinhala establishment and the aversion to their rule displayed in the Buddhist chronicles in the island, suggest that in the established political order, the rule of the South Indians was considered a threat to the island's polity⁹.

Subsequent invasions of the Pandyas and Cholas as well as the Vijayanagara empire were viewed by the Sri Lankan rulers as a grave threat to the long established Sinhala dominated political and social order of the island. They countered the threat by violence and warfare and social system accepted the need for such action. The chronicles while eulogizing the wars of kings such as Dhatusena (455-473), Mahinda IV (956-972) and Vijayabahu I (1070-1111) state that due to their services in liberating the Island from South Indian invaders, they attained heaven¹⁰. The South Indian Cholas who invaded Sri Lanka in the reign of Sena I (833-853) and Sena V (972-982) are portrayed by the chroniclers as “blood sucking yakkhas” or “devils¹¹.” The exploits of royal princes such as Virabahu who fought against the invader Chadrabhanu have also been extolled by them¹². The adoption of the name “Bahu” (strong arm) by many kings of the Polonnaruwa, Dambadeniya, Yapahuwa, Kurunegala, Gampola and Kotte too indicates that military strength was considered an important virtue of the rulers.

While Buddhism remained the dominant religion in Sri Lanka throughout history, in South India, particularly after the fifth century A.D., both Buddhism and Jainism declined and gave rise to a resurgent and militant movement of Vaishnava and Saiva forms of Hinduism. In this context, religion constituted an important cultural marker which distinguished the Sri Lankans from the greater majority of South Indians. In some inscriptions, the Sri Lankan rulers claimed that their dynasty was descended from the lineage of the Buddha. Some went further and stated that they were bodhisattvas or future Buddhas. It was also maintained that kingship in the island was an office bestowed by the Sangha or priesthood for the express purpose of defending the Buddhist Order in the island¹³.

Another element of ideology was the concept of the Sinhala identity which emphasized the bonds of common heritage and interests that linked all the people of the island. This ideology articulated by the rulers and the literati was also active in propagating it through their chronicles and other writings¹⁴. It played an important role in mobilizing support for the resistance that the Sri Lankan rulers offered against all invaders. It also further contributed to the evolution of the Sinhala identity. In other words, conditions of war and the threat of war contributed towards furthering the process of ethnicization¹⁵.

The chronicles as well as literature emphasized that the rule of the non-believers or heretics is harmful for the Sinhala Buddhist state. According to the Mahavamsa the most prolonged and violent battles launched by Dutthagamani (161-137 B.C.) is said to have been conducted by him “not for the joy of sovereignty” but “to establish the doctrine of Sambuddha¹⁶.” Against this background the authors of the ancient Pali and Sinhala chronicles and texts have perceived what is called a “plausibility structure¹⁷” for the social and psychic existence of the majority Buddhist community. This plausibility structure was to be found in an ideal Buddhist state-

Dhammadipa or Land of Righteousness. In order to create this ideal Buddhist state, the chroniclers as well as literary works have emphasized that the Buddha visited Sri Lanka thrice. The Buddha, in these visits not only purified Sri Lanka but also conquered it for Buddhists by compelling the Yakkhas— the non believers— to flee from the Island. The historicity of the legend can be subjected to different interpretations but the fact remains that the chroniclers and literature portrayed Sri Lanka as an ideal Buddhist state.

But there is no disputable interpretation or narrative regarding the official introduction of the doctrine of the Buddha to Sri Lanka and the Buddhists' ecclesiastical structure, by the thera Mahinda with the patronage of king Devanampiya Tissa (250-210 B.C.) about three centuries after the Buddha's Parinibbana. The conversion of the people in the Island to Buddhism laid the foundation for a Buddhist state. From this time onwards, the idea that the Buddhist state existed parallel to the sangha in a spiritual realm was firmly established. The ideal kings such as Dutthagamani (161-137 B.C.) in the chronicles and literature ruled Sri Lanka with a precise understanding of this crucial purpose of the state¹⁸.

Thus the monarchs, who supported the sangha and elevated the Buddhist order, even by conquest and building Stupas, Viharas etc. were considered wise. The ideological belief was that, if Lanka was united under a Buddhist king, the dhamma flourished, tradition counseled, the monarchy thrived, the Sangha was a blessing and the people prospered. When the dhamma was not protected, disorder prevailed¹⁹. Thus, there was an irrefutable interconnection between Buddhism and Sri Lanka. The Pujavli as well as the Saddharmalankara clearly state that the residence of misbelievers in the Island will never be permanent²⁰.

The ideology propagated by the chroniclers condoned war and violence perpetrated for the unification of the country in order to uphold the social order which protects Buddhism. For example wars of Parakramabahu I (1153-1186) have been extolled in the chronicles because he brought in political unity and religious purity sometimes through war. His demonstration of courage and strength occasionally through killings and deceit is praised by the chroniclers because they had been perpetrated to unify the Island and to uphold Buddhist order. Even after unifying Lanka by taking over Rajarata from Gajabahu II, Parakramabahu considered his rule illegitimate without possessing the Tooth Relic and Bowl Relic. Therefore he waged war against Sugala of Rohana to gain their custody and there was no hesitation on the part of the chroniclers to justify these wars and praise his hero credentials.

The success in warfare against the Portuguese initially by the Seetawaka kingdom was partially a result of the Buddhist ideology and it was this ideology which helped it to mobilize people. As a result of Kotte Bhuvanekabahu's encouragement of Catholic missionaries and later, Dharmapala's embracing Catholicism, their support base had been completely eroded and people flocked to Seetawaka. But

when Seetawaka Rajasinha embraced Saivism his popularity too began to wane and immediately thereafter the Seetawaka kingdom collapsed. The Kandyan kingdom rose to its heights in military strength after Konappu Bandara who had embraced Catholicism as Dom Jao of Austria was reconverted to Buddhism and became king of Kandy. Subsequently, all Kandyan kings including the Nayakkars of South Indian origin either embraced Buddhism or patronized Buddhism in order to retain power.

WARFARE AND RITUAL

There was interconnection between warfare and ritual up to a certain extent. The ritual of Asvamedha mentioned in the earliest Indian texts such as the Rig Veda and Sathapatha Brahmana is rich in symbolism with varied levels of meaning. According to the ritual a sacrificial horse followed by armed men were allowed to roam freely in selected territories of other rulers for about one year and if any of them opposed the troops, they were overcome with power and finally the horse was sacrificed. This risky ritual could be undertaken only by powerful rulers. Here, the ritual was substituted for violent assault on potential rivals contending for power²¹.

There were no similar rituals in Sri Lanka, but before, during and after battles, contending parties resorted to different kinds of rituals. The Mahavamsa states that Dutthagamani's campaign against Elara assumed the character of a holy war, the sole objective of which was the perpetuation and glorification of Buddhism. He is said to have carried the Buddha's relics on a spear into the battlefield. It further states that a band of five hundred bhikkhus from the Tissamaharama monastery accompanied the army and shared the perils and hardships of the campaign together with the ordinary soldiers²². If the Mahavamsa statements represent historical facts, they are not in conformity with the Buddha's doctrine.

Most likely, they are not historical facts, but the chroniclers included these to indicate that there was an irrefutable interconnection between Buddhism and unified Sri Lankan state. As Bardwell L Smith has pointed out, in the chronicles of Sri Lanka bare fact was always less important than what the fact signified²³. The Mahavamsa was in fact "compiled for the serene joy and emotion of the pious" and as Walpola Rahula has pointed out "secular history is subservient to religious history"²⁴. B.C. Law further illustrates this point by stating that in Sri Lankan chronicles germs of historical truth are "buried deep under a mesh of absurd fables and marvelous tales"²⁵.

Nevertheless, ritual was important in all aspects of life including warfare. Alagakkonara's construction of four devales on top of the ramparts in the Kotte fortress facing the four directions and dedicated to the four guardian deities of the Island, Kihireli-Upulvan, Saman Boksai, Vibhisana and Skandakumara illustrates the importance of ritual in warfare. He ordered that the shrines should be worshipped constantly, accompanied by dancing, singing, beating of drums and other forms of music²⁶.

The construction of four shrines dedicated to deities at the very initial stage of a defence fortress is particularly important in understanding the religious ethos and attitudes of the society at the time. Especially during times of adversity or war, the Sri Lankan rulers as well as the ruled, sought the blessings of gods and other super natural beings of their belief. For soldiers stationed in a fortress, worship and religious ritual gave courage and hope. Alagakkonara's troops included Tamil mercenaries who were Hindus, and Sinhala Buddhist soldiers. The representation of gods in image form is more a Hindu phenomenon, and in any case the god Skandha is the Hindu god of war. The complex of shrines dedicated to common deities also served the purpose of bringing about unity among groups of soldiers beyond social and ideological differentiations.

CONCLUSION

According to Paranavitana, the Hero Stone datable to a period between 10th and 12th centuries discovered at Velanadamana in the Vilacchiya Korale in the North Central Province and preserved in the Anuradhapura Archaeological museum, indicates that like many other peoples of antiquity, the Sinhalese believed that a warrior fallen in the battle field would attain the bliss of heaven²⁷. A stone sculpture found at Polonnaruwa too suggests that heroes who died in the battle field enter heaven²⁸. Not only in sculpture, but also in poetry, metaphysical subtleties are clothed in an imagery intelligible to the average man. For example, the Kavisilumina states that those who die for the country while fighting a war will be reborn in heaven.

Even European colonial powers, resorted to religious ritual in relation to warfare. For instance, when Seetawaka Rajasinhe laid siege on Kotte from 1563 to 1565, the Catholic priests played a remarkable role in encouraging the soldiers. According to Do Couto "the friars were those that did most, because they fought spiritually with prayers, and by persuading the men to defend themselves and to ask pardon of god for their sins"²⁹.

The major invasions of the Portuguese always had military chaplains who played an important role in encouraging the fighters. During the march, the banner of Christ or a crucifix, in addition to the Portuguese national flag, was carried normally by a religious father. In one of Azavedo's annual forays in to Kandy in 1611, his army found it difficult to cross the river at Getambe because it was deep and current was rapid. According to Queyroz, the military Chaplain, Father Gaspar de Mandella, "stepped in to the river with a crucifix in his hands" and the soldiers then rushed in to the river³⁰.

A graphic image of the death of Constantine de Sa at the Battle of Randeniwela has also been portrayed by Queyroz. Accordingly, after bodyguards of Constantine de Sa had been killed, only his father Confessor had fought by his side and when

arrows hit de Sa's body, he had asked for absolution from Father kneeling before him³¹.

Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that throughout history there had been a co-relation between warfare and ideology as well as an interaction between warfare and ritual. Theoretically, the influence of religions that espoused the cause of non-violence could inhibit the military activities but in practice, religions particularly religions of the masses did not have much negative influence on warfare.


NOTES

1. Michael Lacewing. Just War Theory. Routledge Tyler and Francis Group. [online] Available at: <http://documents.routledge-interactive.s3.amazonaws.com/14/10/2016>.
2. Griffith, Ralph T.H. (1896). *The Hymns of the Rig Veda* 1-39:2. 2nd ed. Kotagiri (Nilgiri). [online] Available at: <http://www.sanskritweb.net/rigveda/griffith.pdf>.
3. Kakacupama Sutta, Majjhima-Nikkaya I ~ 28-29.
4. Sun- Tzu, *Art of War*. Translated with an introduction by Samuel B. Griffith, Oxford University Press , 1963.
5. Clausewitz, Carl Von. *On War*. Translated and edited by M. Howard and P. Paret. Princeton University Press, 1976.
6. *Arthasastra*, English Translation by R. Shamasastri, Mysore, 1923.
7. Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince*, Translated by George Bull, Penguin Books, 1961.
8. *Chulavamsa*, 64:3; 70:56-58.
9. Siriweera, W.I. (2004). *History of Sri Lanka*, Second print, Colombo: Dayawansa Jayakody Publishers, p. 42.
10. *Chulavamsa* (CV) 39:113; 42:117; 54:57; 60:91.
11. *Ibid.*, 54:67; 55:22.
12. *Ibid.*, 83:47.
13. Gunawardena, R.A.L.H. (1995). Warfare, The State and The Proto-World Economy: Armed struggle in Ancient and Early Medieval Sri Lanka. *SLJH*, 16(182), pp. 39-40.
14. *Ibid*, p.40.
15. *Ibid*.
16. *Mahawamsa* (MV) 25:17.

17. The phrase is borrowed from: Peter Berger, *The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion*, New York, 1969.
18. For details see: Regina T. of Power in Sri Lanka, ed. Bardwell L. Smith, Chambersburg, 1978, pp.36-47
19. Alice Greenwald, *The Relic on the Spear: Historiography and the Saga of Dutthagamani*, in *Religion and Legitimation of Power*, pp.13-35.
20. Saddhatissa, Bentara. (1930) ed. *Pujavali*. Pandura, 1930, p.699; *Saddharmalankara*, ed. Kirielle Gnanawimala, Colombo, 1959, p.409.
21. Gunawardena, "Warfare," p.19.
22. *Mahawamsa*, 25: 1-4; 55-56.
23. *Religion and Legitimation of Power*, p.48.
24. Rahula, Walpola. (1966). *History of Buddhism in Ceylon*, Colombo, 1966, p.XXXIV.
25. B.C. Law. (ed.), (1959). *Dipavamsa*. Maharagama. p.5.
26. Siriweera, W.I. *The City of Jayawardena Kotte: History, Form and Functions*. SLJH, 19 (1&2), p.3.
27. Paranavitana, S. *A Sinhala Hero Stone*. *Artibus Asiae*, Institute of Fine Arts, New York, vol. 22, pp.153-158.
28. Wickramasinghe, Martin. (1953). *Kalunika Seveema*, Colombo, pp.134-35.
29. Diogo Do Couto, *The History of Ceylon from the Earliest Times to 1600 AD As Related by Joao de Barros and Diogo do Couto*, Tr. & ed. By Donald Ferguson, First published in Colombo, 1909, Reprinted by Navrang, Delhi, 1993. p. 217.
30. Fr. Farnao de Queyroz, *The Temporal and Spiritual Conquest of Ceylon* 3 vols. (Originally Published in Portuguese in 1687) Tr. Fr. S.G. Perera, (First Print Colombo, 1930), AES Reprint, Delhi, 1992, pp.613-615.
31. Ibid.

A View from the International Maritime Boundary Line: India-Sri Lanka, by Prasad Kariyapperuma, edited by Dr. Sinharaja Tammita-Delgoda, Godage Publishers, Colombo, 2016

Reviewed by Apsara Karunaratne



A View from the International Maritime Boundary Line: India-Sri Lanka by Captain Prasad Kariyapperuma deals with an important area of the Indian Ocean, the International Maritime Boundary Line (IMBL) dividing Sri Lanka and India and the issues and challenges faced by Sri Lanka in maritime security. This work was first conceived as a postgraduate dissertation during the author's time at the Bandaranaike Centre of International Studies (BCIS), supervised and subsequently edited by Dr. SinhaRaja Tammita-Delgoda. On 28 April 2016 this study was launched as a book, published by Godage Brothers, at Sri Lanka Navy Headquarters.

"The International Maritime Boundary Line (IMBL) defines the maritime frontier between India and Sri Lanka. Bisecting the seas between the two countries, this narrow sea stretches for more than 600 Nautical Miles."

Contouring the multitude of issues pertaining to IMBL, the author provides a detailed account of the IMBL of Sri Lanka through an in-depth presentation followed by an analysis of case studies. The case of India and Sri Lanka on the IMBL is unique as the geographies of the seas surrounding the two countries make it the narrowest of borders.

Based on his experience on the ground, the author's analysis runs for eight factually rich chapters, which deal with the issues faced by Sri Lanka in the areas of human smuggling, contraband, poaching, maritime terrorism, search and rescue (SAR), marine pollution and environmental damage on the IMBL. These issues, though common in nature to both countries, poses a dilemma for small states such as Sri Lanka, given India's "super power status" on the subcontinent.

This incisive book is unique in that it is the first of its kind produced by a serving naval officer. The author's credentials as a naval officer who has served in the Navy as a Acting Sub Lieutenant and Captain for 28 years make this book all the more

important, making it a credible source of information and reference for the general public as well for those whose academic interest lie in maritime security and maritime affairs in the Indian Ocean.

In his introductory chapter, the author sets the rationale behind the book by mentioning the significance of the IMBL and the importance of safeguarding its security. He makes the point that this could be detrimental for the territorial integrity of both countries, if not properly safeguarded and if the issues surrounding the IMBL are not duly addressed. The author argues that little attention has been paid to concerns of the IMBL and presents a number of case studies of actual incidents recorded on the IMBL.

Chapter two deals with the issue of smuggling of goods, which has increased at an unprecedented rate in the recent past. Of late, Sri Lanka has become a transit point for heroin, cannabis and illicit drugs. All these reach the island in the guise of fishing boats. The apprehending of such boats has become an extremely arduous task, given that any misapprehension may lead to disputes between the two countries. This chapter presents figures obtained from the Navy Intelligence Department on drug trafficking on the North, North Western and North Central coasts of Sri Lanka.

Chapter three unfolds with a colourful and comprehensive map depicting an incident reported on Kachchativu Island. Human smuggling is a South Asian malady which has its symptoms in the form of poverty, economic deprivation, lack of opportunities for upward social mobility and the widening gap between the rich and poor of these traditional societies, heavily influenced in turn by the forces of globalization. The author notes that

“Human smuggling across the IMBL is a threat which could have widespread repercussions. It is linked to maritime terrorism, piracy, armed robbery and alleged attacks on fishermen out at sea. The narrow stretch of sea between the two countries is one of the most important elements in this traffic.”

Sri Lanka's conduct on the IMBL proves itself to be worthy of mentioning here given the fact that the tiny island nation's behavior in conformity with international law has given her the necessary soft power. Sri Lanka has a comprehensive domestic legal and institutional framework to protect marine security and fight pollution- The Marine Pollution Prevention Act, Marine Environment Protection Authority, The National Environmental Act 1980, Central Environmental Authority, The Fisheries and Aquatic Resources Act, The Coast Conservation Act. It is hoped that mechanisms like these will enable her to safeguard her marine environment.

Chapter four focuses on the issue of poaching or illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing and bottom trawling. Both Indian and Sri Lankan fishermen have been fishing in the Palk Bay since time immemorial. However, a host of issues have emerged after the signing of maritime agreements in 1974 and in 1976 between India and Sri Lanka. Palk Bay, on the Sri Lankan side, is rich in maritime resources and it is preyed on by the Indian fishing trawlers that enter Sri Lanka's territorial waters.

This chapter also discusses a host of other issues linked to poaching such as the threat to sovereignty, security, as well as the immense damage caused to the marine environment. The author thus advocates peaceful cooperation between the two states and the strengthening of the capacity of coast guard as the way forward.

An analysis of the Sea Tiger wing of the LTTE in chapter five reveals how other terrorist groups have emulated the tactics and innovations employed by the LTTE in the realm of maritime security.

Chapter six focuses attention on Search and Rescue and presents a body of hitherto unknown information about the services and assistance rendered by the Sri Lanka Coast Guards. It emerges that the Coast Guard has been extending a supportive role to the Sri Lanka Navy since its establishment in 2009 by engaging in rescue operations.

Marine Pollution emanating from the human activities of the IMLB continues to endanger the marine ecosystems of both countries. In chapter seven, the author notes that the area surrounding the Gulf of Mannar and Palk Bay has a rich ecosystem. On the Sri Lanka side of the IMLB the author draws our attention to the fact that the Bar Reef Marine sanctuary is home to 150 different species of corals and about 280 different species of fish. Another unique feature of Gulf of Mannar is its sea grass. The Gulf of Mannar has as many as thirteen varieties of the fifty species of sea grass found in the world. This is a clear testimony to the vital ecological importance of this region. The safety of the marine environment will not only ensure the wellbeing of the bordering states, it will also affect the other littoral states of South Asia.

The book concludes with a proposal to strengthen the capacity of the Coast Guard, which is considered the "soft civil power" at sea, rather than allowing the Navy to deal with the issues on the IMLB. As Sri Lanka is the party most affected by poaching and other illegal activities, it is argued that cooperation between the respective Navies and Coast Guards is not only necessary but essential.

Captain Kariyapperuma is at his best when in describing actual events while citing credible sources as he analyses. He makes good use of the confidential data available to the Sri Lanka Navy's Intelligence Department. The footnotes used in

the publication provide wide-ranging sources of information, drawn from personal interviews, Navy communication signal messages, newspaper articles, radar information and UN Conventions. All of these sources are fully and thoroughly documented, giving substance and authority to the arguments made.

Another striking feature is the widespread use of colourful maps which are modified by the author to depict each incident so as to enable the readers to grasp the incident more accurately.

The bibliography provides ample sources of information for any reader or academic who has an interest in widening their knowledge on the subject. A combination of first person accounts of incidents blended with an incisive analysis of issues ranging from marine environment to maritime security, the book offers a thought-provoking exploration of the most pressing issues of the IML. Kariyapperuma calls for strengthening cooperation between Sri Lanka and India in order to share and preserve maritime resources and the environment. In this cause, sustained and collective efforts should be made by the two states to translate their efforts into actual practice, for as the author points out any minute breach of security could affect bilateral relations between India and Sri Lanka.

This work makes a pertinent contribution to the field of maritime security. It documents and then disseminates information on the actual costs of breaching security at sea with reference to the environment, the economy and the livelihood of the people of both countries. This is an important first.

What becomes clear throughout this study is that India has a great responsibility for the sound and sustainable policing of the maritime border. India has a large stake in the security of the Indian Ocean region and the IML is a vital component. Any breakdown in security and control will affect India as much as it affects Sri Lanka.

The strategic value of the Indian Ocean is important to India in leveraging its super power status as well as to Sri Lanka whose ambition is to become the maritime hub of South Asia. In this context, a broad based Indian Ocean security strategy, instead of a mutually exclusive one, appears to be the best way forward. This strategy has to be acceptable to all parties and it needs to be put in place both at macro level through diplomacy and at the micro level.

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Admiral Jayanath Colombage (Rtd) is a former Commander of Sri Lanka Navy and a distinguished officer who served the navy for 36 years. He has an MSc in Defence and Strategic Studies from Madras University and an MA in International Studies from Kings College London. He obtained a doctorate from Kotelawala Defence University (KDU), Sri Lanka. Presently he is working as the Director for Indo-Lanka Initiatives at Pathfinder Foundation and is a Member of the Advisory Council of newly-formed think tank of the Ministry of Defence, Institute of National Security Studies Sri Lanka. He is a distinguished alumni of the Defence Services Staff College, Wellington in India, Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies, Hawaii in the United States of America and the Royal College of Defence Studies in the United Kingdom. He is also an Associate of the Nautical Institute of the United Kingdom and currently the President of the Sri Lanka Chapter.

Jeewanthi Senanayake has been serving the Ministry of Defence, Sri Lanka as an Assistant Secretary since 2007. She holds a BSc (Hons) Degree in Chemistry from the University of Peradeniya and was awarded the Fulbright scholarship to read for a Masters Degree in Chemistry at the Northern Arizona University in 2003. In 2011, she was awarded the Chevening scholarship to read for a Masters Degree in International Public Policy Analysis. She completed the Defence Services Command and Staff College (DSCSC) course in 2014 as the first lady civilian officer of Sri Lanka to follow this highest programme of military learning in the country. Her thesis was recognized as the best research work of the year and was awarded the prestigious 'Golden Pen' award.

Wing Commander Gihan Seneviratne joined the Sri Lanka Air Force in May 1992 and received his initial training at the United States Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, Colorado, graduating with a Bachelor's Degree in Aeronautical Engineering in 1996. He holds an MA in Defence Studies and a BSc in Aero Engineering. He passed Staff College with DSCSC Course 2, distinguishing himself with the Golden Owl award for the first in the order of merit in the Air Wing and the Golden Pen award for the best Commandant's Paper. At present he serves as Staff Officer (Tech) to the Commander and Command Media Officer, Sri Lanka Air Force.

Nilanthan Niruthan is a defence analyst, currently attached to the Bandaranaike Centre for International Studies as a Visiting Research Fellow. He holds an LL.M in International Human Rights Law, specializing in warfare and the laws of war. He has written for security journals such as *Small Wars* and *The Journal of Military Operations*. He is also a contributor to *The Diplomat*, writing on issues such as urban terrorism and hybrid warfare.

Wing Commander Vajira Senadheera joined the Sri Lanka Air Force in 1993 through Kotelawala Defence University. He has obtained his BA and MAS degrees in Defence Studies from the Kotelawala Defence University in 1996 and the University of Kelaniya in 2011 respectively. He completed the Defence Services Command and Staff College (DSCSC) course in 2011 and secured the prestigious Golden Owl Award and the Golden Pen Award. He also had the distinction of being included in the Commandant's Honours List. He is currently serving as a member of the Directing staff at DSCSC.

Nirmali Wijegoonawardana is a senior lecturer at the Department of History, Faculty of Arts, University of Colombo and currently serves as the Head, Dept. of History. She holds a PhD in History from the University of Colombo. She was the recipient of a number of awards including the Swedish scholarship, Swedish International Development Co-operation Agency (SIDA), 2000, American Fulbright fellowship, 1999, and Tikiri Abeyasinghe Memorial Prize for History, University of Colombo, 1993.

Indrakeerthi Siriweera is Emeritus Professor of History at the University of Peradeniya. He was awarded DLit from Rajarata University and DSc from Wayamba University. He was a former Chairman of the University Grants Commission and the former Vice Chancellor of Rajarata University, Sri Lanka.

Sanath De Silva is a lecturer at the Department of Strategic Studies, Gen. Sir John Kotelawala Defence University. He is an alumnus of Asia Pacific Centre for Security Studies (APCSS), Honolulu, Hawaii, and the National Defence University Washington DC. He is presently reading for his MPhil leading to PhD at the University of Colombo.

Apsara Karunaratne lectures and serves as the Assistant Course Director of the Diploma in Advanced English for Administration and Academic Purposes at the Extension Courses in English, Department of English, University of Colombo. She holds a BA degree in English, International Relations, & Demography and an MA in International Relations from the University of Colombo, Sri Lanka. In addition, she heads the Research Division of the SAARC Cultural Centre and is responsible for conceptualizing and implementing research programmes and publications of the Centre. She is also a guest lecturer at the Bandaranaike Centre for International Studies (BCIS).

CORE VALUES OF DSCSC

Learning Organization: DSCSC identifies itself as a catalyst for learning which seeks expansion of knowledge through realizing the full potential of its personnel. It is expected to uphold excellence in staff roles through dynamism, integrity, devotion, and the ability to learn from both mistakes and accomplishments.

Honour: DSCSC expects that all its members will strive to preserve self-respect, honesty and honour in all their deeds. Members are encouraged to put honour to the test by upholding the honour of the College.

Respect: DSCSC values mutual respect and recognizes uncompromising commitment in the achievement of mutual respect by fulfilling official obligations.

Decorum: DSCSC propagates itself as a pre-eminent defence establishment which upholds rules of decorum which is a fundamental core value of the services. Therefore, the College strives to maintain the highest, yet simple and practical standards in military decorum encompassing ethics, customs and traditions.

Excellence: DSCSC strives for excellence in all its endeavours at all levels which will ultimately contribute to the overall accomplishment of the College's objectives.

Innovation: DSCSC believes in pursuing new creative ideas leading to meaningful innovations by its members in conformity with the principles of high standards.

Punctuality: DSCSC holds punctuality as the bedrock of College's core values.

Professionalism: DSCSC holds professionalism in high esteem and fosters highest standards in professionalism within the establishment.

Mission Command: DSCSC encourages mission command at all levels and recognizes its value as a tool for problem solving and optimizing efficiency. Mission Command facilitates commanders at all levels to exercise their initiative.

Pristine Environment: DSCSC subscribes to serene surroundings of the College providing a conducive learning environment for its officers.

DRIVING TENET-Common Sense: Common sense permeates the ideals of the Core Values of the DSCSC and it is a testament to the solid foundation the DSCSC inculcates on its officers.

Published by
Defence Services Command and Staff College
Sapugaskanda, Makola South 11640,
Sri Lanka
Tel: +94-112964218 / +94-112963792
Fax: +94-112962151
Email: dscscsl@gmail.com/dscsc@army.lk

