Defence and Security Journal

CORE VALUES OF DSCSC

LEARNING

HONOUR

RESPECT

DECORUM

EXCELLENCE

INNOVATION

PUNCTUALITY

PROFESSIONALISM

MISSION COMMAND

PRISTINE ENVIRONMENT

DRIVING TENET: COMMON SENSE

Defence and Security Journal

Defence and Security Journal

December 2020
Volume 5
Defence Services Command and Staff College
Sri Lanka

EDITORIAL BOARD

Design & Print: NEO Graphics, 44 Udahamulla Station Road, Nugegoda, Sri Lanka

Defence and Security Journal, Volume 5, 2020

ISSN 2536-8745

CONTENTS

Foreword

Effectiveness of Computer-based Simulated Small Arms Firing Device for Officer Cadet Training in the Sri Lanka Army 01
Major Haritha Pagodaarachchi

Disengagement and De-radicalisation programmes in Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia 16
Marianne Taflinger

Post-Conflict Sustainable Peace in Sri Lanka: A Case Study of Military Occupied Lands in the Northern Province 34
Wing Commander Chamara Weerathunge

Sri Lanka and the Belt and Road Initiative: A Balancing Act in the Indian Ovean Region 47
Anshu N. Chatterjee

Developments in the Use of Force in Maritime Law Enforcement Operations 57
Commodore Kanchana Banagoda

Ascendency of China and Changing Global Geo-Politics: A Historical Perspective 68
Gamini Keerawella

Qatar and the Crisis in the Middle East: Changing Strategic Alliances 88
Commander Junaid Tariq PN

Notes on Contributors 111

FOREWORD

It is my greatest pleasure and delight to unveil the *Defence and Security Journal* of the Defence Services Command and Staff College (DSCSC), Sri Lanka, for the fifth consecutive year. The primary objective of the journal was to encourage young military leaders who were groomed at DSCSC to publish their researches on security and defence with an emphasis on the national security of Sri Lanka.

Amidst impressive technological advances, a noticeable void in the national, regional, and global security architecture has become apparent. This highlights the need for a greater understanding on vital facets of security concerns emanating from conventional and unconventional means. As such, articles published herein provide a gamut of information and insight into security and defence. Apart from the articles published by the student authors, selected papers produced by renowned scholars have been interposed in this journal in order to make it more comprehensive.

In a similar vein, it is heartening to note that the contributions in this issue have taken note of the many changes in the defence and security landscape which extends beyond the purely military aspects to embrace other dimensions such as societal, political, and economic. Furthermore, these contributions discern pronounced effects of instability that undermine cohesion and security that can increase the risk of undesirable impact within and beyond a country. Therefore, I believe, foresight studies of this nature are much needed in defence planning and identifying potential risks.

In a nutshell, Volume 5 of the *Defence and Security Journal* features an array of studies ranging from global security concerns to regional security issues in all spheres. I sincerely believe the readers will be immensely benefitted by the content of this journal.

Whilst welcoming the latest issue of the journal, I wish to extend my sincere gratitude to the members of the Editorial Board, Professor Emeritus Amal Jayawardane, Ms. Apsara Karunaratne and Dr. Bhagya Senaratne, for their untiring commitment and dedication to bringing out this high-quality publication.

DAPN Dematanpitiya ndu psc
Major General
Commandant
Defence Service Command and Staff College, Sri Lanka

EFFECTIVENESS OF COMPUTER-BASED SIMULATED SMALL ARMS FIRING DEVICE FOR OFFICER CADET TRAINING IN THE SRI LANKA ARMY

Major Haritha Pagodaarachchi

ABSTRACT

Sri Lanka Military Academy (SLMA) is the main military institution that facilitates Officer Cadets to improve their firing skills. Yet, the use of live-firing has been restricted due to an array of reasons. Against this backdrop, it is essential to identify the existing limitations of live-firing in induction training and to identify the viability of new technological advancements to overcome those limitations. As there is growing tendency towards the increased use of virtual technologies such as simulator firing, this research explores the feasibility of introducing a computer-based small arms firing simulator device to identify and improve the effectiveness of Officer Cadets training in the Sri Lankan Army. As a data collection method, views were collected from a sample of Officer Cadets, recently passed out Young Officers and weapon training instructors through two questionnaires. The study revealed that weather and environmental problems, logistic requirements, availability of firing ranges, safety issues, availability of limited amount of ammunition, and limited time availability due to compact training schedules have negatively affected on firing skills in induction training conducted by the Sri Lanka Army. Furthermore, the researcher found that cost effectiveness, user friendly environment, correct feedback, safety and limited space for training are advantages of small arms firing simulator. While it is identified that simulator firing is no substitute for live-firing, it is identified that exposure to simulator firing can greatly improve basic marksmanship skills of Officer Cadets. Therefore, the researcher concludes that combined practice of live-firing with simulator firing can be utilised to enhance the basic marksmanship skills among the Officer Cadets at SLMA and KDU.

Keywords: Firing, Marksmanship, Simulator

INTRODUCTION

Accurate firing is an essential competency in any military. Every Army officer or Officer Cadet should improve their accuracy in handling weapons. The proficiency of handling weapons always depends on proper training and the application of basic marksmanship fundamentals. Induction training is generally the opportunity where trainees learn basic marksmanship skills that carry a long way in their careers. In some instances, those who could not acquire the basic skills of accurate firing

during the induction training have never been able to develop this important skill even later on in their careers. Therefore, it is important to implement a proper system to deliver continuous training to the officers throughout their career. However, it should also be compatible with the available resources and time constraints.

Sri Lanka Army provides a number of opportunities for Officer Cadets at Sri Lanka Military Academy (SLMA) and General Sir John Kotelawala Defence University (KDU) to improve basic marksman skills. However, there are limitations in the weapon handling training in Officer Cadet Courses due to an array of reasons. In this study, the researcher focuses on understanding the prevailing limitations of manual firing for Officer Cadets in the present training context at SLMA and KDU, in order to explore the possibility of introducing a small arms firing simulator towards achieving better competency in this area.

According to Galanis et al. (2013), small arms induction training is a vital component in any military. Firing is a skill that requires constant practice to develop or maintain a certain competency level. While routine weapon training practices at SLMA help improve weapon handling skills, it does not provide them an opportunity to recognise their own mistakes. Therefore, the trainees need frequent opportunities to practice firing and check their performances. Existing limitations in manual firing are hard to overcome and is nearly impossible to increase firing opportunities. On the other hand, the training curricula are overloaded, therefore, it has become difficult to allot additional time slots to accommodate firing demands. During an interview conducted on April 22, 2019, the Commanding Officer of the Officer Cadet Wing at SLMA, Colonel AP Wickramasekara stated that the Sri Lanka Army encounters serious limitations on manual firing that negatively impact on the performance of trainees. Wu and Bill (2008) argue that there are many issues that need to be addressed when organising induction training outdoor by using manual platforms. Due to weather and environmental problems, logistic requirements, availability of firing ranges, safety issues, availability of limited ammunition, and limited time availability due to compact training schedule have negatively affected on firing skills in induction training conducted by the Sri Lanka Army.

Therefore, this research attempts to identify the prevailing limitations in the present manual firing platform that in turn would pave the way to explore probable remedial measures to overcome such issues. It also focuses on advantages of introducing computer-based small arms firing simulator devices for enhanced performance in small arms firing skills of Officer Cadets. The study aims at establishing a positive-ended bridge between current issues in the manual firing platform and introducing small arms firing simulators that the author perceives would produce a way towards enhanced firing performance by the target audience. The author is optimistic about the virtual technologies in weapon training due to its many factors such as low risk, low cost which requires no capital expenditure, more

firing opportunities, cost effectiveness, ability to identify weapon handling errors accurately, and environment friendliness.

SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS

The scope of this paper covers the potentialities of implementing a new system for small arms firing training and how it leads to the improvement of efficiency and effectiveness of Officer Cadets in Sri Lanka Army in their inductive military training. During this research the focus was made on the survey methods by involving Officer Cadets of SLMA who have undergone the marksmanship package using computer-based simulated small arm firing training at Marksmanship and Sniper Training School (MSTS) in 2019. As SLMA conducts different types of programmes for different types of entrants, identifying time-based limitations to each programme and their relationship to Officer Cadets' firing performance is assumed to be comparatively complex. At present, only MSTS holds small arms firing simulator devices in which a limited opportunity is given to Officer Cadets, therefore, identifying the effectiveness becomes unclear.

BASIC MARKSMANSHIP SKILLS

Precision firing is an important factor in any military training around the world. Anderson (2014) revealed that it is important to improve the weapon handling capabilities of Army Officer or Officer Cadet. Marksmanship can be defined as a fundamental skill necessary for military personnel that enables an accurate fire practice to reach the desired range of weapon. Nevertheless, marksmanship is a basic component of cadet training within the Army worldwide. Generally the marksmanship training is conducted on live-firing ranges and live-firing performances indicate the training competency (Chung et al., 2011). Aiming, breath control, movement control, trigger control, follow-through are five fundamental elements in marksmanship training. All of these elements work together as one process and should be practiced together in the following ways (Chung et al., 2011).

Table 1: Fundamentals of Basic Marksmanship Skills

SER	TOPIC	SUB TOPIC
1.	Breath control	Breathing control, natural respiratory pause, and natural aiming point.
2.	Trigger control	Bucking, finger placement, flinching, firm grip and grip of firing hand, trigger control and squeeze.
3.	Aiming	Accuracy, aiming process, follow-through, eye on front sight post, sight adjustment, sight alignment.
4.	Position	Body placement, bone support, eye relief, feet placement, finger placement, firm grip, forward elbow placement, forward hand placement, leg placement, muscular relaxation, muscular tension, rifle butt placement, stable firing position, stock weld placement.
5.	Other	Consistency, distance effects, weapons safety.

Source: Chung et al., 2011

Apart from these basic fundamentals, adapting to the different environmental conditions is also an important factor in making a competent shooter in the battle field. Weather is the most considering factor that can affect shooter target. According to Scribner et al., (2007) weather affects the round that leaves the barrel, especially when taking targets over 600 meters distant. Wind, light, humidity, and temperature are four types of weather conditions affecting the manual firing target. Wind can change the target drastically and the round is affected by wind from left and from right at right angles. Humidity is the amount of vapor in the air per square foot. High density resists the motion of the bullet and in the group, the mean point of intact is lower than the point of aim (Scribner et al., 2007). Light will affect the shooter's visibility and move the round away from the group target. In contrast, marksmanship fundamentals provide foundation to create a competent shooter. Live-firing is the commonly used method in the field for delivering marksmanship fundamentals. However, with the technological evolution, simulator based training is increasingly being used for sharpening the skills of shooters.

MARKSMANSHIP TRAINING FOR OFFICER CADETS

Sri Lanka Military Academy (SLMA) is the main institution of military training for Officer Cadets in the Sri Lanka Army. There are a number of Officer Cadet training programmes conducted by SLMA as directed by the Army Training Command and Directorate of Training (Directorate of Training, 2019). The basic summary of the programmes are as follows:

Table 2: Course Curriculum of SLMA

SER	COURSE	DURATION	NUMBER OF PERIODS
1.	Officer Cadets Degree Course	Two years and nine months	270 day periods and 25 night periods
2.	Volunteer Officer Cadets Course	One year and six months	188 day periods and 16 night periods
3.	Lady Officer Cadets Course	One year	104 day periods and 2 night periods
4.	Intensive Course for KDU Officer Cadets	Six months	116 day periods and 2 night periods
5.	KDU Officer Cadets Course	One year	178 day periods and 6 night periods
6.	Direct Enlist Officer Cadets Course	Four months	43 day periods and 8 night periods

Source: SLMA, 2019

A perusal of the SLMA course syllabus would reveal that sufficient time periods are not allocated for weapons training. Weapons training periods are also divided into practical, theory and site preparation. Therefore, very limited time period is allocated for small arms firing training.

Basic Marksmanship Course at MSTS is another opportunity for Officer Cadets to obtain mastery in small arms firing. This package enables Officer Cadets to go through a comprehensive firing practice to improve their firing skills, correct their firing positions and simulator training. The course which is conducted for a duration of 12 days consists of 111 periods dedicated to both theory and practical sessions. This is a good opportunity for Officer Cadets to improve their marksmanship skills and identify their mistakes due to the close supervision and feedback provided by weapon training instructors to ensure complete and thorough understanding of the training (MSTS, 2019). Moreover, Officer Cadets of KDU get the opportunity to practice live-firing during KDU degree programme period. They have two live firing sessions annually during their cadet period at KDU and they are allocated with weapon training session periods in their provisional programmes to improve their marksmanship skills.

Apart from that, Sri Lanka Army's young officers are given an opportunity to train in small arms firing and live-firing sessions at the Infantry Training Centre at Minneriya and Army Training School (ATS) at Maduruoya during their Young Officers Course. Marksmanship skills and knowledge gained by officers during their cadet period can be practically exercised during these live-firing sessions.

SIMULATOR AND SIMULATION

Simulator is a computer system, device and programmable machine to direct training and monitor human action in a systematic way. In addition, simulation is a systematic process to control in a physical, mathematical, or otherwise logical representation of a system. According to the US Department of Defence (2011), there are three types of simulation methods named as virtual simulation, live simulation and constructive simulation. Among those, virtual simulation is the well-known method practice in marksmanship training.

SIMULATION-BASED TRAINING

Simulation technology has a long history in the field of marksmanship training. It delivers a technological substitution that resolves the resource sharing problem by creating a virtual environment for satisfying the demand. Some well-known simulator types are Extended Reality (XR), Mixed Reality (MR), Augmented Reality (AR) and Virtual Reality (VR). The MSTS firing simulator can be categorised as Mixed Reality (MR). Simulation-based training uses computer-based virtual environments to expand or replace percentages of the real environment. This helps to reduce the risk and damage to the participants and environment while reducing the overall training cost (National Training and Simulation Association, 2011).

USE OF SIMULATORS IN MILITARY TRAINING

In a review research by Orlansky et al. (1994) on aircraft simulators, they conclude that a combination of real equipment and simulators for training are always effective than the use of actual equipment alone. For example, one hour of aircraft simulator training was equivalent to 48 hours of actual aircraft time. In addition to that, the simulator averaged about 10% of operating costs of the actual aircraft. A review by Hays et al. (1992) and Caretta and Dunlap (1998) stated that the use of both simulator and actual aircraft for jet aircraft training consistently results in better performance rather than the use of an aircraft alone. Using simulators for training does not have a long history in Sri Lanka and marksmanship training is traditionally conducted on live-fire ranges. However, the cost of live ammunition, the availability and accessibility of live-fire ranges, and administrative overheads associated with planning and conducting live-fire practices make the use of simulators an attractive alternative for marksmanship training. Sri Lanka Army has been using simulators since 2017 for marksmanship training. Similar systems are currently being employed by Sri Lanka Navy for their marksmanship training.

EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF MARKSMANSHIP ON SIMULATORS

According to the Stephens and Temby (2014), marksmanship simulators are believed to be effective environments for trainees to become familiar with different weapon systems, as well as learning the principles of marksmanship and receiving instructions. This is because marksmanship simulators are generally more accessible than live-fire ranges, and also provides a gentle environment in which to learn, particularly for trainees with limited or no experience with live-fire weapons. However, Thomason (2013) expresses the importance of having battle conditions in the simulator. The latter aspect is believed to lead to faster skill acquisition and hence, more efficient training during the early stages of learning. Overall, marksmanship simulation appears to be viewed as an effective supplement (but not replacement) for live-fire, when used in conjunction with marksmanship coaching.

There are few studies that provide empirical data regarding the effectiveness of marksmanship training conducted through the simulators. Several studies have shown that firing performance is generally poor in the simulator compared to live firing (Keefe and Tikuisis, 2003). In addition, there is considerable variation in the correlation between simulator and live-fire scores, with values of the correlation coefficient (r) ranging from 0.17 (low) to 0.68 (high) (Smith, and Hagman, 2003). For the majority of these studies, correlation coefficient value was found as low to moderate values. In these cases, simulator performance was not a useful predictor of live-firing performance and it was not possible to reliably predict live-fire qualifications.

Stephens and Temby (2014) concluded that the combination of simulator and live-fire training, achieved significantly higher scores in firing. It was concluded that the blended training method allowed cadet trainees (with minimal live-fire experience) to focus on learning the basic firing techniques and gaining familiarity with the weapon system on the simulator whilst conducting simple marksmanship practices.

COMPARISON OF MANUAL FIRING AND SIMULATOR FIRING

Table 3: Comparison of Live-Firing and Simulator Firing

SER	LIVE-FIRING	SIMULATOR FIRING
1.	Accommodate comparatively high training time and time for preparation.	Reduce live training time and ammunition usage (Indracompany.com, 2019).
2.	Safety issues arise when using for the first time.	Simulator can potentially be used to determine readiness for live-fire qualification (Stephen and Temby, 2014).
3.	Helps to improve army marksmanship training from different angles such as target type, shot distance, light and weather condition.	Only some parameters such as distance and light can be changed through the computational system (Indracompany.com, 2019).
4.	It is not easy to adjust for the desired training conditions.	Simulators can be adjusted as per the training conditions and the instructor's requirements (Stephen and Temby, 2014).
5.	Training conducted in the natural environment with natural disturbances. However, there is no proper mechanism to detect incorrect handling positions.	Aim point detection technology, realistic weapon handing technology, navigation and 3D geo-specific training environments can be seen in the simulator system (Esigma-systems.com, 2019).

Source: Ashley, 2014

According to Thomasson (2013), it is fairly well-established that varying levels of simulation can be effective tools in the practice and perfection of skills in the context of shooting as well as the improvement of other skills. In the firing, for instance, instructors rely on simulation as a useful training method for multiple reasons. Practice incorporating increasing levels of likeness to competitive situations has become common place at virtually all levels of shooters. Additionally, it must be noted that although it is difficult to perfectly simulate an actual scenario, training for the addition of various qualitative characteristics can still be useful during preparation.

An example of an increasingly prevalent method of simulation in practice for gunners of all levels, for instance, is the use of artificial noise during practice in order to prepare for battle field or arena. Most notably, the practice of trying to simulate external conditions, such as crowd noise, weapon noise can be found

with gunners due to the significant effect that artificial noise can have on a team's level of play. Although this method of simulation only provides one qualitative parallel to actual competitive situations, it has become popular in order to allow for preparation of a salient element of shooting performance. The example of using artificial noise to simulate battle conditions is a prime representation of a way in which simulation can be presented employing only one element to ten competitive situations in a more genuine fashion. However, more than just simulating sound, visual experiences will have added importance for training (John, 2013).

METHODOLOGY

Primary data for the study was collected from a sample size of 230 respondents that included 144 Officer Cadets, 56 recently commissioned young officers and 30 weapon training instructors of Sri Lanka Army using a structured questionnaire. These Officer Cadets, young officers and weapon training instructors were selected based on the criteria of convenience of the researcher in regard to the data collection. As participants of the research questionnaire are representative of all Officer Cadets and weapon training instructors of Sri Lanka Army, the collected data and its results can be generalised to the entire community. The close-ended positive questions were designed with five-point Likert scale in order to examine how strongly factors are agreed or disagreed.

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

Research data collected from sample population comprising 230 respondents reveal the possible correlations among the developed variable through the conceptual framework. Relation of mediating variable; introduction of small arms firing simulators on induction training, with independent variables; number of rounds per individuals, availability of firing ranges, cost, heavy logistic requirements, safety, environmental effects, level of acquisition of skills by the students are facts to consider. Majority have disagreed that they received adequate live and training ammunition under manual firing. The conclusion is that the respondents did not receive adequate training and live ammunition due to various constraints and training designs. Responding to the question on ease at which live-firing ranges for Officer Cadets at SLMA is reserved, majority disagreed with the statement and a few respondents provided neutral answers. Presently SLMA does not have a firing range on its own and all the firing ranges are under the control of the MSTS. SLMA training wing staff finds it extremely difficult to reserve firing ranges according to the SLMA training schedule as MSTS, too, conducts a number of marksmanship courses and competitions. The majority agreed that safety level in simulator firing is higher than live-firing. As safety is an essential factor at any training establishment; simulator firing can reduce risks to a greater extent. When Officer Cadets go through simulator firing sessions over a period of time they can

adopt best practices that can be applied to a live-firing environment to ensure better safety. The majority agree on bad weather and environmental factors negatively affecting their groupings in firing. Therefore, it is evident that evaluation and on-site correction of individual defects is difficult during induction training. The majority of respondents tend to favour simulator firing due to its maintainability with little repair and also due to the device's ability to detect the mistakes of the firer which helps them in making corrections in the simulator firing device. Officer Cadets are of the opinion that their individual skills can be sharpened by using simulation technology-based firing sessions. Although majority agreed with simulation-based training as more interesting than manual firing training, this result indicates the necessity of simulator training for Officer Cadets during their induction training that will greatly assist them in perfecting their firing skills.

Correlation between effectiveness of simulator training with live-firing accuracy, less time restrictions for training and user friendliness under small arms simulator shows that there was positive correlation between variables. There was negative correlation between effectiveness of simulator training with the environment and weather conditions. Therefore, the researcher has identified that environmental and weather conditions do not affect simulator training sessions as per the survey results. On the other hand, correlation output shows that there was negative correlation between simulator training and risk factor which indicates that simulator firing systems that are safer than manual firing ranges. There was a positive correlation when it comes to the deployment of small firing simulators enhanced combat efficiency and effectiveness of the Officer Cadets with achieved good marksmanship skills during induction training. It also proved that simulator firing sessions are more supportive than manual firing in achieving marksmanship skills and positively affected weather constraints, reduced ammunition costs and other operational expenses.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Based on the results of the survey, a conceptual framework for this study was devised as follows:



Figure 1: Conceptual Framework
Source: Developed by Author, 2019

EXISTING MANUAL FIRING COURSE CURRICULUM

In this study, the researcher found the effectiveness of simulator firing to improve basic marksmanship skills among Officer Cadets at SLMA and KDU. Therefore, the researcher arrived at the following conclusions through the data analysis and the data presentation. The majority responded that the Officer Cadets do not receive sufficient live and training ammunition for firing due to various constraints. Furthermore, Officer Cadets expect more weapon handling and live firing sessions to develop their basic marksmanship skills as most of the participants in the survey expressed their discontent on the unavailability of such training. On the other hand, this result suggests that the present course curriculum needs to be upgraded to allocate adequate live firing sessions. In addition, wasting of time on different non-training purposes is inevitable during manual firing sessions at firing ranges; thus, it is worthwhile to explore remedial measures to curtail the waste and utilise that time purposefully.

WEAPON HANDLING AND FIRING

The majority of the survey participants were of the opinion that accuracy in live firing depends on individual skill level and external factors. Accuracy in live firing depends on individual's aiming, trigger squeeze quality, steadiness, control of breathing, body relaxation, confidence, quality of the weapon, wind direction and speed, temperature and humidity whereas accuracy is least dependent on the condition of ammunition. Therefore, it is essential to identify individual weaknesses and improve individual firing skills. However, in manual firing it is difficult to identify individual weaknesses due to the impact of external factors. Therefore, to

improve individual errors an environment free of external impacts should be made available during induction training.

SIMULATOR FIRING

In this study, the researcher identified that deployment of firing simulators at SLMA and KDU has the potential of rectifying most of the limitations that the manual firing has. According to the National Training and Simulation Association (2011), firing simulators reduce the risk and damage to the participants and environment while reducing the overall training cost. Majority of the participants accepted that simulator firing can reduce risks to a greater extent. Furthermore, a majority of the participants agreed with cost effectiveness of simulator training considering less repairs and damages. According to Stephen and Temby (2014), marksmanship simulators are generally more accessible than live-fire ranges and also provides a gentle environment to learn. As per the view of the majority of participants, simulation-based training is more interesting than manual firing training and also user-friendly devices offer a unique feedback and are easily acclimatised. However, the majority is of the opinion that they achieved marksman skills during their exposure to simulator firing. Therefore, the researcher demonstrates that simulator firing training programmes are effective in firing practices. Orlansky et al., (1994), Hays et al., (1992), and Caretta and Dunlap (1998) reviewed that a combination of real equipment and simulators for training are always effective than the use of the actual equipment alone. Although simulator firing is not at all a total replacement for live-firing, it provides greater opportunities for trainees to identify their weaker areas and seek the professional assistance of instructors. Similarly, instructors can better facilitate the trainees in a simulated environment prior to exposing them in live-firing environments.

CONCLUSION

Simulator firing in present day context is not an alien experience for young school leavers joining the Army. Certainly they have been exposed to similar commercial apparatus as youngsters. This foundation is worthwhile developing to inculcate one of the most important skills for military personnel that will remain right throughout their career.

In this study, the researcher mainly focused on the effectiveness of introducing firing simulators to enhance basic marksmanship skills among Officer Cadets at SLMA and KDU during their induction training. The survey results have amply proved that simulator firing practices are more effective due to prevailing constraints in live firing. The researcher identified that simulator firing is not a total replacement for live-firing due to obvious reasons; however, Officer Cadets' exposure to simulator firing can greatly improve their basic marksmanship skills. Therefore, the researcher

concluded that combined practice of live-firing with simulator firing enhance the basic marksmanship skills among the Officer Cadets at SLMA and KDU.

The research outcomes suggest that the introduction of small arms firing simulators enhance basic marksmanship skills among Officer Cadets at SLMA and KDU. Furthermore, the use of firing simulators has the potential to overcome certain inherent limitations in live-firing, such as the scarcity of time, and the ability to reserve firing ranges. Accuracy, instant feedback to trainees and low maintenance cost provide potent justification for the need of computer-based small arms simulator for induction training.

It is recommended to introduce firing simulators during induction training at SLMA and KDU. Hence, Officer Cadets must be exposed to simulator environment prior to live-firing and provide them with the opportunity to rectify their shortcomings. Weapon training instructors should go through an orientation training capsule on simulator firing before employing them on instructor assignments. This instructor trainee relationship in a simulator firing environment can produce quality training for Officer Cadets. Officer Cadets receive better opportunities in simulator firing to correct their handling errors in the simulated environment as external factors cause minimum impacts. Once Officer Cadets are acclimatised with simulator firing to enhance weapon handling skills, they are better prepared to undertake live firing.

The small arms firing simulator reduces the live firing sessions. The live firing restricts to conduct individual assessment of trainees. Therefore, Small Arms Firing Simulator can be recommended for conducting orientation and marksmanship lessons during small arms training. Sequential progress of Officer Cadets can be better monitored in simulator firing. Therefore, Officer Cadets have the liberty to maintain their own records to have an idea on their progress.

REFERENCES

Anderson, M. (2014) 'Small arms training simulators in the New Zealand defence force', *4th International Defense and Homeland Security Simulation Workshop 2014: conference proceedings*. Defence Technology Agency, New Zealand Defence Force, pp. 7–12 [Online]. Available from: http://www.msc-les.org/proceedings/dhss/2014/DHSS2014_7.pdf [Accessed 6th February 2019].

Carretta, T.R. and Dunlap, R.D. (1998) Transfer of training effectiveness in flight simulation: 1986 to 1997. *United States Air Force Research Laboratory* [Online]. Available from: https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a362818.pdf [Accessed 10th February 2019].

Chung, G.K.W.K., Nagashima, S.O., Delacuz, G.C., Lee, J.J., Wainess, R. and Baker, E.L. (2011) Review of rifle marksmanship training research (CRESST Report 773). *University of California* [Online]. Available from: https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED520427.pdf [Accessed 10th February 2019].

Directorate of Training (2019) *Army training directive*. Colombo: Directorate of Training.

Esigma Systems GmbH (2019) Small arms shooting and mission training systems. *Munich: Esigma Systems GmbH*. [Online]. Available from: https://www.gladio-sim.com/Product_sheet_GLADIO.pdf [Accessed 10th February 2019].

Galantis, G., Sottilare, R., Best, C. (Ed). (2013) *Fundamental issues in defense training and simulation*. London: CRC Press.

Hays, R.T. Jacobs, J.W., Prince C. and Salas, E. (1992) 'Flight simulator training effectiveness: a meta-analysis', *Military Psychology*, 4(2), pp. 63–74 [Online]. Available from: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/hmlp20 [Accessed 16th April 2019].

Indracompany (2019) Small arms training simulator. *León: Indracompany*. [Online]. Available from: https://www.indracompany.com/sites/default/files/indra_sac.pdf [Accessed 10th February 2019].

Keefe, A.A. and Tikuisis, P. (2003) A comparison of target detection and rifle marksmanship during live and simulator firing with and without caffeine consumption: technical report (DRDC Toronto TR 2003-003). *Defence Research and Development Canada* [Online]. Available from: https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a414470.pdf [Accessed 10th February 2019].

Marksman and Sniper Training School. (2019) Course syllabus of basic marksmanship course. [Unpublished document]. Marksman and Sniper Training School.

National Training and Simulation Association (2011) 'A Primer on Modeling and Simulation: The World of M&S'. *Arlington: National Training and Simulation Association* [Online]. Available from: https://www.trainingsystems.org/-/media/sites/ntsa/homepage/miscellaneous/ms-primer.ashx?la=en [Accessed 15th March 2019].

Orlansky, J., Dahlman, C.J., Hammon, C.P., Metzko, J., Taylor, H.L. and Youngblut, C. (1994) *The value of simulation for training. Institute for Defense Analyses*. [Online]. Available from: https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA289174.pdf [Accessed 10th February 2019].

Scribner, D.R., Wiley, Patrick, H. and Harper, W.H. (2007) A comparison of live and simulated fire soldier shooting performance (ARL-TR-4234). *Human Research and Engineering Directorate, U.S. Army Research Laboratory* [Online]. Available from: https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA471786.pdf [Accessed 10th February 2019].

Smith, M.D. and Hagman, J.D. (2003) Using the Laser Marksmanship Training System to predict rifle marksmanship qualification (Research Report 1804). *U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences*. [Online]. Available from: https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a415716.pdf [Accessed 10th February 2019].

Sri Lanka Military Academy. (2019) Course curriculum. [Unpublished document]. Sri Lanka Military Academy.

Stephens, A. and Temby, P. (2014) Evaluation of the effectiveness of simulation for M4 marksmanship training (DSTO-TR-2950). *Defence Science and Technology Organisation, Australian Government Department of Defence* [Online]. Available from: https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a615318.pdf [Accessed 10th February 2019].

Thomasson, J. (2013) An analysis of firearms training performance among active law enforcement officers in the USA. Doctor of Philosophy in Kinesiology. University of Arkansas, Fayetteville.

U.S. Department of Defense (2011) 'DoD Modeling and Simulation (M &S) Glossary'. *Alexandria: Modeling and Simulation Coordination Office* [Online]. Available from: http://www.acqnotes.com/Attachments/DoD%20M&S%20Glossary%201%20Oct%2011.pdf [Accessed 10th February 2019].

Wu, P.K. and Bill, R.G. (2008) 'Comparison of simulated wet bench fires with small and intermediate scale fire tests', *Fire and Materials: An International Journal*, 32(8), pp. 445–456 [Online]. Available from: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1002/fam.975 [Accessed 10th February 2019].

DISENGAGEMENT AND DE-RADICALISATION PROGRAMMES IN INDONESIA, SINGAPORE AND MALAYSIA

Marianne Taflinger

ABSTRACT

A decade of peace followed Sri Lanka's long war with Tamil separatists, but the country faced new and unanticipated Muslim extremist threats with 2019's Easter bombings. Muslim majority and minority countries in South Asia have faced similar security problems with foreign fighters from Afghanistan, Syria and Iraq, as well as domestic recruits. These common challenges warranted exploration of the extent to which these countries' de-radicalisation efforts might inform adaptations of Sri Lanka's existing programmes of rehabilitation. Accordingly, this study closely examined literature on terrorist disengagement and de-radicalisation and derived criteria by which to assess programmes implemented in Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia. The analysis suggests that despite some successes, disconnects between programme goals, delivery, and evaluation often limit these programmes. Although the literature on disengagement argues for multiple paths, many unrelated to ideology, the selected Southeast Asian programmes heavily emphasise correcting wrong interpretations of Islam possibly overweighting this component over other dimensions relevant to de-radicalisation. A majority of programme participants credit factors such as family, financial incentives, and realisation of harm to civilians for their change of heart over the programmes. Certain programmes, particularly those that used community engagement to articulate interpretations of Islam that bolster non-violence, may offer valuable models for Sri Lanka. However, Sri Lanka's existing rehabilitation programmes are in many ways more comprehensively developed. Sri Lanka's way forward might consider its local context and individualise the programme with the help and guidance of psychologists, social service and civil society.

Keywords: Disengagement, De-radicalisation, Rehabilitation, Extreme Islamists, Terrorist Detainees

INTRODUCTION

This article analyses the de-radicalisation programmes in Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia for strengths and weaknesses in effecting change and recommends how to best neutralise the threat to the Sri Lankan nation. In the past decade, Sri Lanka and other South Asian countries have faced veteran fighters returning from Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria, as well as those who have been educated abroad and might have become radicalised there. As of 2016, ISIS had recruited fewer than 100

youth to fight in Iraq and Syria, but the Easter Sunday bombings demonstrated that a small number of people can successfully plan and carry out a devastating attack (Nanjappa, 2016; Al Jazeera, 2019). According to the United States 2015 Country Report on Terrorism, "countries in the East Asia and Pacific Region faced the threat of terrorist attacks, flows of foreign freedom fighters to and from Iraq and Syria, and groups and individuals espousing support for the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)" (U.S. State Department, 2015, p.3). If border control systems are slow to adopt new technologies, it may mean that such individuals will continue to enter the country and will be difficult to distinguish without community help (Sayakkarage, 2016).

Programmes to change behaviour and attitudes of those identified as extremists represent a promising way to address this problem. Neither an intelligence push nor an armed effort alone will ever completely eradicate extremist ideas, as Sri Lanka is aware from fighting a 30-year separatist war with the Tamils. As a result of this conflict, Sri Lanka developed programmes and approaches for de-radicalisation and rehabilitation and in facing emerging threats it will be able to draw from the best of its own experiences with the rehabilitation of 11,664 Tamil fighters in 2009 (Hettiarachchi, 2013, p.4). However, the rehabilitation of Muslim extremists may pose a unique set of defence challenges that Sri Lanka has not faced before.

Thus, this research explored the extent to which Sri Lanka may benefit from the experiences of neighbours that have instituted different types of de-radicalisation programmes: Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia. This study closely examined literature on terrorist disengagement and de-radicalisation to derive criteria by which to assess programmes implemented in these three countries. These countries serve as appropriate comparisons to Sri Lanka based on three criteria. First, Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia all represent multicultural societies in Southeast Asia, similar to Sri Lanka. Second, all three countries face domestic terrorism as a consequence of citizens returning as trained fighters from Muslim conflicts in the Middle East. Third, these three countries had established disengagement/de-radicalisation programmes described in enough detail for analysis. However, it is worth noting some divergences. Unlike Sri Lanka, these countries have multiple Muslim extremist groups competing for dominance against one another as well as the state. And unlike Sri Lanka, all three share a Pan-Asian terrorist group that strives toward a regional caliphate in addition to ISIS-inspired actions, if not branches. But, in perhaps the most striking similarity with Sri Lanka, these insurgent conflicts have been characterised by massive bombings and other violence targeted at the civilian population, as much or more than the state itself.

The results of this analysis suggest that, despite some successes, the disconnects between programme goals, delivery, and evaluation often limit programme success. Although the literature on disengagement argues for multiple paths, many unrelated to ideology, the selected South Asian programmes overemphasise

correcting wrong interpretations of Islam at the expense of equally important dimensions relevant to de-radicalisation. A majority of programme participants credit factors such as family, financial incentives, and realization of harm against civilians for their change of heart over the programmes. Certain programmes do offer valuable models, particularly Singapore's use of community engagement to articulate interpretations of Islam that condemn the use of violence. However, Sri Lanka's existing rehabilitation programmes are, in many ways, more systematic and thorough in design and delivery. Based on the findings, Sri Lanka might consider a disengagement/de-radicalisation programme that separates the terrorists from prison, tailors the religious component to local and individual needs, and reintegrates ex-terrorists into the community with the help of psychologists, social services, and civil society.

DISENGAGEMENT, REHABILITATION OR DE-RADICALISATION?

In assessing programmes designed to reintegrate former terrorists into society, the first step is to distinguish whether a programme constitutes an effort towards rehabilitation or de-radicalisation. If terrorism in many scholars' judgement encompasses the pursuit of religious, political, or social goals through violence, then this goal in the case of Muslim extremists is to set up an Islamic state (Aslam, 2018, pp.90-91). De-radicalisation has been variously defined as "persuading extremists to abandon the use of violence," to restore a former terrorist to society as a holistic individual both mentally, emotionally, economically, and socially," through individual or group efforts across human resources, economic, social, psychology, or education endeavours (International Crisis Group, 2007, p.1). De-radicalisation describes the process of re-engaging an ex- or detained terrorist with mainstream society and its religious beliefs, including men, children, women and supporters of terrorism (Rabasa et al., 2010, p.96). In this way, de-radicalisation and rehabilitation programmes pursue "hearts and minds" campaigns to change specific behaviours and patterns of thought.

Rehabilitation encompasses not only cognitive reappraisal of religious beliefs and ideology but also psychological change, as well as community and social involvement including the family (Rabasa et al., 2010, p.96). Furthermore, according to some sources, the rehabilitation process consists of "continuous monitoring" of released prisoners to prevent re-radicalisation (Jani, 2017, p.8). For the purposes of this paper, de-radicalisation and rehabilitation refer only to an individual's, not a group's change in thinking and behaving. "Disengagement" is another useful term and concept used in the literature to describe a distancing of the individual from the group and its goals. This distancing of disengagement is not necessarily a complete renunciation of violence in all contexts; for example, violence in the perceived self-defence of Muslims from hostile groups in other countries might still be seen as legitimate.

APPROACHES TO DISENGAGEMENT AND DE-RADICALISATION

Despite multiple approaches to disengagement and de-radicalisation, all programmes to socially reintegrate former terrorists assume the possibility of individual change. Voluntarily leaving terrorism behind entails many different motives for individuals (Barrelle, 2015, p.132). In this context, Bjørgo (1997, p.31) identified push and pull factors that make detachment more likely, with the "push" of motivators to split with the organization, such as disillusionment, and the "pull" of attractions outside the group. Altier, et al. (2017, p.305) asserted that not pull but push factors, especially dissatisfaction, disagreements, and disillusion, more strongly influence leaving. Building on this concept, Hwang (2017, p.278) outlined the specific factors driving disengagement with reinforcement loops that lead either to disengagement or reradicalisation. In turn, Chalmers (2017, p.132) built on Hwang to further delineate the disengagement-to-de-radicalisation process. By the same token, Silke (2017, p.2) argued that stopping violent behaviour should trump any attempts to de-radicalise or change the world view.

Horgan and Braddock (2010, p.286) reflect this practical school of disengagement, and Bjørgo and Horgan (2009, p.3) asserted that the assumed attitude to behaviour (changing attitudes automatically shapes behaviour) link greatly oversimplify the true patterns. In the same way, Porta and LaFree (2011, p.6) contended that de-radicalisation and disengagement need to consider the micro (individual), the meso (group level), and the macro (political opportunity structures), and how these levels interact. Dalgaard-Nelson (2013, p.1) went further than others by prescribing that intervention programmes should use behaviour change to influence attitudes, use narratives as indirect influence, and employ the terrorists' own motives to exert subtle influence.

Other scholars have argued about the centrality of ideology and delved into the psychological processes involved in such ideology as Rabasa et al., (2010, p.27). Similarly, Guranatna (2011, p.68) echoed this view and the necessity to restore such detainees to a more moderate version of Islam before releasing detainees back to the community. Kruglanski et al., (2011, p.203) argued that a search for individual meaning in the face of meaninglessness becomes transformed into the adoption of a collective cause that causes sacrifice up to and including suicide bombing. Thus, rehabilitation requires extensive reframing to reduce the threat to society posed by violent goals. Based on the thorough review of the literature, the three cases have been examined for the approach to behaviour change, the attention paid to pull and push factors, and the level of disengagement achieved.

INDONESIA'S PROGRAMME OF DE-RADICALISATION

Despite being the most populous Muslim nation on Earth, as a secular state, Indonesia champions unity of its racially and ethnically diverse peoples. Its population is 87% Muslim, 7% Protestant, 3% Roman Catholic, and 2% Hindu, and includes (among others) Javanese, Sundanese, and Malay ethnic groups (Central Intelligence Agency, 2020). Likewise, several terrorist groups flourished in the country, including local Pan-Asian terrorist group Jemaah Islamiah, along with al Qaeda and an ISIS affiliate. All of these groups have committed terrorist acts on the nation's soil. Accordingly, Indonesia has the deepest experience in de-radicalising extremists responsible for the Bali bombings that killed a few hundred civilians and a series of Jakarta suicide bombings (in 2003, 2009, 2016, and 2018) that targeted Western hotels, killing civilians, acts on the same scale and ferocity as the Easter bombings in Sri Lanka in 2019.

Ten years after the Bali bombings, Indonesia had detained 900 terrorists, who were responsible for killing more than 200 people (Sukabdi, 2015, p.36). Of those detained, less than 200 represented Jemaah Islamiah's Jihadi prisoners (some from smaller terrorist groups), and a few were veterans of the Soviet-Afghanistan conflict (Schulze, 2008, p.2). In 2013, 110 Indonesians joined al-Nusra, a group linked to al Qaeda, and some trained with ISIS in Syria (Jones, 2015, p.2). In 2014, the presence of these hardened fighters on Indonesian soil worried the government as did an ISIS YouTube challenge by a particular fighter, Bahrum Syah (Jones, 2015, p.2). Since only a few of the prisons and detention centres across Indonesia had a core constituency of terrorists, the government focused its de-radicalisation efforts on key prisons and on Jemaah Islamiah, which represented half of these detainees (International Crisis Group, 2007, p.2).

Purpose and Scope

Indonesia employs both a hard and a soft approach to counterterrorism. The soft approach includes de-radicalisation efforts. After the Bali bombings in 2002, Indonesia set up a police counterterrorism unit, Detachment 88 to acquire intelligence and prosecute terrorists (Allard, 2016). Allard's 2016 reporting praised the unit for breaking up 54 plots as of 2010, but pilloried its flagrant violations of human rights. The country neutralised immediate threats by detaining terrorists. The police made arrests in Indonesia, but the military took over the de-radicalisation programme in prisons in 2010 as a wing of the National Counter Terrorism Agency (Indonesian: Badan National Penaggulangan Terorisme abbreviated as BNPT) (Jones, 2015, p.3). The police initially aimed to acquire intelligence, to leverage Jemaah Islamiah's conflicts over the legitimacy of using violence to obtain its goals and decapitate the organisation by removing its leaders from prison (International Crisis Group, 2007, p.12; Schulze, 2008, p.1; Rabasa et al., 2010, p.92).

The BNPT defined de-radicalisation as "any effort to transform radical beliefs or ideology to non-radical ones," and mapped out four stages: "identification, rehabilitation, re-education and resocialization" (2013, p.7). This document laid out Indonesia's "soft approach" to de-radicalisation: a "person-to-person" effort to challenge Jihadi beliefs toward government as thought (anti-Islamic) by establishing a respectful, trusting relationship with the prisoner. According to Sumpter (2017, p.119), another overriding goal of the BNPT was to replace Muslim extremist ideas with Indonesian nationalist principles of Pancasila (one God, one nation, one humanity, justice for all, and government by the people). To Sumpter and several other scholars, this programme presumed that ideology drives terrorism and misguided ideas needed to be replaced or altered to disengage these individuals from violence. Furthermore, the programme also assumed that demonstrating the personal warmth of government officials toward Muslims through a kindness offensive would create greater trust in the state (International Crisis Group, 2007, p.13). The disengagement approach in prison becomes one of engaging the detainee in a process of personal change.

Programme Components: Relationships, Cultural Approach, and Incentives

In the Indonesian programme, staff became the key agents of change. The Indonesian Army's efforts with Darul Islam, the precursor to the Jemaah Islamiah, had achieved mixed results using "compassion, conciliation and business concessions" to change attitudes (International Crisis Group, 2007, p.14). With Jemaah Islamiah, police acted as change agents and if the detainee showed a willingness to change, the next phase employed Islamic scholars to engage in debates and dialogues to "correct" Jihadis' understanding of Islam (International Crisis Group, 2007, p.12). Eventually, the programme used staff exclusively, dropping the Islamic clerics, who were not respected by the fundamentalist terrorists (Rabasa et al., 2010, p.107). In this way, programme staff exclusively, not representatives from civil society, administered this programme.

In the education and rehabilitation phases, staff worked one-on-one with prisoners, establishing trusting relationships and using a variety of incentives to shape attitudes and behaviour. That is, detainees showed greater respect and inclination to listen to those who knew the group through arrest and detention (Rabasa et al., 2010, p.107). Originally administered by Detachment 88 to acquire intelligence, this function later fell to BNPT in 2010 as a part of its prevention of terrorism (Suratman, 2017, p.141). Before and after the Jakarta bombings in 2009, the programme depended largely on personal relationships, private rather than government monies, and the use of financial, familial, and social incentives to turn the detainees away from violence (Rabasa et al., 2010, p.94,97,108). Such incentives included things like paying school fees for children, paying medical bills for spouses, paying travel to allow family to visit, providing food, extending

privileges such as furlough, and identity cards and papers upon release from prison (Schulze, 2008, p.1). In the assessment of one senior officer, these economic tools always trumped ideology, a view echoed by an ex-terrorist interviewed who mentioned the need for an "economic Jihad;" however, the majority of programme participants credited their transformation to an awakening to the consequences of their actions (International Crisis Group, 2007, p.13; Sukabdi, 2015, p.42). The success of such incentives seems to support the position that disengagement follows different paths in cascades of awakening, not a single one.

In the re-education phase, which is not made clearly distinct from rehabilitation in the BNPT document, staff engaged with the inmates in a "cultural interrogation" approach to subtly engage in dialogue about Islam to change ideas. The outcome or effectiveness of such an approach depends on the staff's knowledge of Islam, not to mention that of the detainee. Unfortunately, neither the BNPT Blueprint nor the documents written about the programme detail what "cultural interrogation" as opposed to religious dialogue consists of. On the one hand, Police Brigadier General Surya Dharma, former commander of the Bali Bombing Task Force, championed returning these detainees to the "true Islam", yet on the other, the BNPT documents emphasised achieving greater loyalty to Indonesian nationalism (National Center Terrorism Agency, 2013, p.35). In the view of the International Crisis Group (2007, p.15), rehabilitation efforts should avoid religious challenges to Jihad and should instead encourage rethinking the costs/benefits of specific actions. Furthermore, "structured discussions" achieve better results than "informal conversations" (International Crisis Group, 2007). The same document goes on to detail how religious dialogue outside of prison between traditionalists and salafis, or more extreme Islamists, on Radio Hang worsened tensions between the two groups, rather than providing insight. Despite achieving some success, this re-education phase, too, seems ad hoc rather than systematic and opaque given the lack of detailed outlines or protocols for such interrogations.

Using Ex-Terrorists to Disengage Others

Finally, an additional element of the Indonesian de-radicalisation programme was the use of ex-terrorists to convince detainees to give up violence. The programme approached Malaysian Nair Abas and Ali Imron, two key Jemaah Islamiah leaders, and gave them a set of special privileges, then sent them out to talk with other prisoners (Rabasa et al., 2010, pp.111–113). Abas had fought in Afghanistan against the Soviets, returning to Malaysia when Muslims began fighting each other and served in a variety of roles in Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia. He denied involvement in the Bali bombing. Abas claimed to be conflicted about the civilian loss of lives in the Christmas 2000 bombing and questioned its effectiveness in advancing the cause (Rabasa et al., 2010, p.111). The same account documents the surprise Abas felt at the kindness showed to him in his first meeting with a Christian interviewer, and a similar impression of a task force commander who met

with him alone in a cell without handcuffs. Furthermore, the fact that he was not tortured played a role in his attitude change (Horgan and Braddock, 2010, p.288). He urged current Jemaah Islamiah members to make a "return to the right path of Islamic teaching" (Taylor, 2006). Additionally, he readily agreed to assist the police to prevent what he deemed sins against unarmed people and went on to participate in interrogations and attend police raids of former comrades. Although difficult to believe, Martin Abbugao (cited in Abuza, 2000, p.198) reported that a week before police could interview captured Jemaah Islamiah members, Bin Abas engaged them in personal conversations about violence against civilians. Furthermore, he has helped police at many levels from investigations to arrests, to rehabilitation, and larger engagement with society. He claims to have worked with 150–200 detainees with mixed success (Rabasa et al., 2010, p.113).

Ali Imron, one of the Bali bombers, also chose to help the police. Although originally denying his involvement in the event, he eventually confessed to making the bombs, training the suicide bombers, and delivering them to their destination, planting a bomb at the U.S. Consulate, and escaping by motorbike (Counter Extremism Project, 2020). In September 2007, he shared these thoughts in a radio interview in Jakarta:

> I help the police because I know what the terrorists think. I know how they will try to get their weapons and explosives. I know what kind of place they will target for what kind of action and I know how they would carry that out. I know how to hide from the police on the run, how the terrorists recruit new members and who is most vulnerable to the radical message. I am giving all this information to [the] police so I can help stop violence and terrorism (Martin, 2007).

Although this quotation seems to reject violence, other sources interpret Imron's rationale as more instrumental than moral. According to the International Crisis Group (2007), he did not attribute his change to rethinking Islam, but to the public's disapproval of Jemaah Islamiah's violent tactics. Furthermore, Imron believed that Indonesia's "immorality" made it a legitimate target of attacks (International Crisis Group, 2007). At the trial, he testified that the West had been the target of the attacks because of its treatment of Muslims (Counter Extremism Project, 2020). Yet Imron sought forgiveness from victims of the bombings in face-to-face meetings in 2016, fourteen years after the attacks (O'Brien, 2007). In these meetings, he attributed his previous violent behavior to "obeying his leaders" (Cockburn, 2016). In a meeting with a son who lost his father, he asked for forgiveness and said that Jemaah Islamiah leaders had assured him that killing Americans was in keeping with Islam (Henschke and Nurdin, 2020). Reportedly, Ali Imron's mentee Arif contended that while bombing civilians was improper, violence could still be a legitimate tactic (Hwang, 2017, p.279), but it is unclear whether this was an opinion that Imron shared. Whatever Imron's level of disengagement, in his rehabilitation efforts he intervened directly and indirectly: working with detainees, pleading with family and friends,

and creating cassettes and books to influence others (Horgan and Braddock, 2010, p.273). Interestingly enough, an NGO featured him in a book, When Conscience Speaks, as a comic book character advising young people (Murphy and Sari, 2010). Indonesian officials hailed his efforts as evidence of successful de-radicalisation. However, his conflicting statements suggest that successful disengagement from violence against the state may not require a complete repudiation of ideology.

Programme Evaluation

Despite certain successes, external evaluations of Indonesia's Detachment 88 disengagement programme pinpoint more weaknesses than strengths. First, terrorists had to be held apart from the general population, either in prison detention centres or in police prison wings with privileges, because including them with the general population was expected to breed more terrorist activity (International Crisis Group, 2007, p.7). Second, the presence of gangs and pervasive corruption in the prisons made it difficult to administer the programme without undue influence. Third, originally members of the Detachment 88 counterterrorism unit worked with the terrorists, but as the numbers grew, programme staff took over. Unfortunately, the most well-trained graduates of the Corrections Science Academy chose not to work in prisons, and few guards had the social science background to work with terrorists (International Crisis Group, 2007, p.6). Furthermore, numerous articles have described the Indonesian approach as ad hoc because it does not follow a set of systematic steps, does not include a pre- or post-assessment, and lacks either an objective set of measures to gauge change or a long-term follow-up with graduates of the programme (Schultz, 2008, p.2; Rabasa et al., 2010, p.8; International Crisis Group, 2007, p.16). Sumpter goes even further to say: "If programmes are to have any chance of success, they need to be structured, persistent, and highly personalized" (2017, pp. 129–30). Such an approach seems hard to replicate across prisoners and prisons, let alone countries.

Likewise, the Indonesian programme never systematically evaluated how many ex-Jihadis were integrated into the community, or with what results. The absence of high-profile terrorist events in Indonesia since the programme's inception has been used as the only metric for success, but the lack of such events may be the result of many other factors (Jones, 2015, p.3). To critics, the programme merely identified and incentivised those already rethinking violence, not the most committed jihadis (Schulze, 2008, p.1). Sukabdi's prisoner interviews (2015, p.43) confirmed this finding: prisoners attributed change not to the programme but life events. Of those interviewed, 97% credited an awakening to war, the impact on family, being arrested, or meeting bombing victims. Only 19% credited the programme. Unfortunately, these interviews were not taped or documented in written form. Only detainee questionnaires remain, with no opportunity for deep engagement or detailed notes; this self-report lacks in-depth qualitative analysis and the validation of follow up post-release. Likewise, Hwang's interviews with 50 prisoners were also

all self-reported and could not be triangulated with subsequent arrest records or measures of community acceptance to verify the changes that the prisoners claimed. The highly personalised, ad hoc nature of this programme seems quite puzzling, given the large number of subjects, the military involvement, and the high stakes of releasing bombers back into the population.

SINGAPORE'S DE-RADICALISATION PROGRAMME

Singapore represents a multi-ethnic state with 74% Chinese, 13% Malays (including Indonesians), 9% Indians and Sri Lankans; the country is 14% Muslim (Central Intelligence Agency, 2020). In its pursuit of a Pan-Asian state, Jemaah Islamiah has launched attacks on Singaporean soil, and ISIS has established affiliates that threaten state security (Central Intelligence Agency, 2020). The country has disrupted terrorist plots made up of professionals, both scientists and businessmen, some of whom had been trained in Afghanistan by al-Qaeda, possessing advanced training in bomb-making, sniper tactics, and assassination (Rabasa et al., 2010, p.110). By the same token, in its pursuit of a Pan-Asian state, Jemaah Islamiah has launched attacks on its soil, and ISIS has established affiliates that threaten state security (Central Intelligence Agency, 2020). Singapore's detention of an adherent of Zahan Hashim, whom Sri Lanka identified as the imam plotter of the Easter bombings, link the county most closely to Sri Lanka's extremist violence (U.S. Department of State, 2019, p.1). Likewise, Singapore's emphasis on preventing and disrupting terrorist plots might bear the closest analogue for Sri Lanka at this time.

Like the Indonesian programme, Singapore's programme uses close relationships with case officers to help prisoners process their own attitudes and feelings. This stage of trust-building aims to let detainees move through a process akin to grief: denial, anger, and finally acceptance of their situation, perhaps questioning the tactics and goals of the terrorist group (Rabasa et al., 2010, p.97). But since Singapore's law supports "preventive detention," people who pose a threat may be detained without charges indefinitely (Rabasa et al., 2010, p.96). Thus, those who are resistant to change can be held away from society.

Unlike Indonesia, the government of Singapore partnered with the Religious Rehabilitation Group, composed of volunteers, university scholars, and Muslim leaders to design an approach to changing the thinking of terrorist detainees, requiring these staff members to undergo additional training (Ramakrishna, 2009, p.2). Assuming wrong ideas about Islam needed to be corrected, the programme staff reviewed the Jemaah Islamiah Jihad Manual to better understand the ideological challenge. Ultimately, some hard-core adherents proved too difficult to rehabilitate even as others embraced a second chance.

In Singapore's programme, social service agencies, not guards, delivered social welfare to families: paying utility bills, finding them jobs, arranging education for the children (Ramakrishan, 2009, p.3; Rabasa et al., 2010, p.99). As with Indonesia, the programme established no metrics with which to analyse its success other than a lack of attacks as an indicator. Furthermore, academics contend the lack of coordination between the police and the military puts them at cross purposes: suppressing crime vs. protecting territory (Suratman, 2017, p.150). With only a handful of terrorists ever detained, the ability to hold detainees indefinitely, and the strong civil society engagement, it seems the most successful of the three.

MALAYSIAN DE-RADICALISATION PROGRAMME

Although Malaysia is a diverse society, ethnic Malays possess greater citizenship rights than residents who are ethnic Chinese or Indonesians. One can only be a citizen if born to a Malaysian and "by law, all Malays are Muslim" (Lockhard et al., 2020). Yet despite this privileged position, 116 Malaysians left for Syria and Iraq (Hanschke and Nurdin, 2020). Like Indonesia and Singapore, Malaysia is challenged by the Pan-Asian group, Jemaah Islamiah, as well as ISIS branches or affiliates, and the population has been a source of support for al Qaeda (Central Intelligence Agency, 2020). Since 2001, the country claims a success rate of 97% in rehabilitating terrorists, based only on whether those released conducted terrorist plots (Hanschke and Nurdin, 2020).

Malaysia's programme diverges from and echoes some of the elements in the Indonesian and Singaporean cases. As a Muslim-majority state with a dual civil and shariah court judiciary, an NGO leads prisoners in monthly religious training in conjunction with psychologists and the Islamic Affairs department (Rabasa, 2010, p.105). Those prisoners who express sympathies with programme-approved interpretations of Islam progress to a second phase of religious dialogue (Aslam, 2018, p.95). As shariah law already governs parts of Malaysia, the state underscores its status as an Islamic state (Rabasa et al, 2010, p.105). Since detainees eventually re-join families, the programme involves spouses, too. As with Indonesia and Singapore, Malaysia also provides financial assistance to detainees and families, including a stipend upon release (Kamaruddin et al., 2017, p.45).

Of those scholars who have attempted to evaluate the programme, some found the task of assessing the programme's effectiveness to be difficult, while another suggested specific tweaks. In 2010, prisoners could not be interviewed, but by 2017, ex-terrorists' answers reflected a range of responses on a hard vs. a soft approach: some recommended punishment, others more humanitarian efforts, and yet others a tailor-made approach. As with Hwang's study, Kamaruddin et al. (2017) depend on self-report, with no comparison to later behaviour or measures of community acceptance. Disentangling whether the lack of new terrorist plots

in Malaysia stems from good intelligence, people's natural disengagement, or the effectiveness of its programme is difficult to ascertain. Malaysia's status as a Muslim-majority state represents a decided strength because it understands the differing interpretations of religious texts and how to talk about them.

DISCUSSION

Sri Lanka's own rehabilitation and disengagement programme with LTTE soldiers in 2009 contained far more systematic elements than the Indonesian, Singaporean, and Malaysian programmes reviewed above. It benefited from a detailed programme design based on psychologist input, clearly spelled out levels of programming, and extensive education and rehabilitation elements. In my view, Sri Lanka stands to learn more from its own past efforts than it does from these three programmes from abroad.

This paper's survey of programmes provides several insights for rehabilitation efforts in Sri Lanka's current context. First, the analysis of the Indonesian, Singaporean, and Malaysian programmes suggests that programme goals should emphasise disengagement from violence, rather than de-radicalisation that may take decades to complete. Additionally, the empirical studies of terrorist attitudes in Indonesia and Malaysia suggest that people disengaged from terrorism for multiple, multi-layered reasons, beyond purely ideological ones. This latter point suggests that future programmes should focus on engagement in society, and not overemphasise ideology. Programme design should also address attitudes toward war, individual responsibility to others, and one's place within the family. Sri Lanka might take all of these lessons into account in the future.

Although all three programmes have had some successes in "disengaging" terrorists, pinpointing exactly which aspects of the programme work best, and how to replicate them proves difficult, given the highly personal nature of the Indonesian programme and its use of ex-terrorists, the extensive use of the Religious Rehabilitation Group in Singapore, and the use of multiple players of civil society in Malaysia's programme.

Despite the conflicting scholarship about the variety of "push" and "pull" factors and their role in disengagement/de-radicalisation, all three countries put ideology at the centre of their programmes. Indonesia aimed to disengage terrorists from violence and replace their extremist ideology with a renewed belief in the secular values of the nation. The documents suggest that the nation did not demand rejection of all extremist beliefs, but instead emphasised rejection of extremist behaviours. Singapore presumed that replacing or correcting the wrong ideas about Islam would disengage terrorists from violence (Rabasa, 2010, p. 96). Likewise, Malaysia also focused on the re-education of prisoners to alter their religious interpretations

and political ideas (Aslam, 2018, p. 94). Yet the interviews by Hwang in Indonesia and by Sukabdi in Singapore suggest many different drivers and an individualised process of disengagement that may or may not reach full de-radicalisation, supporting a more tailored approach that pays attention to many aspects.

Indonesia's experience demonstrates that engaging a change in ideology demands identifying a credible messenger that the terrorists can respect, someone with in-depth knowledge of the religion. Following from this, in the context of a mixed society such as Sri Lanka that has not completely reconciled its three communities Sinhalese, Tamil, and Muslim it may be valuable to consider incorporating and involving the local Muslim community and civil society in any formal programme. Identifying credible messengers and civil society organisations would require those who know the community well to work in conjunction with professionals skilled in assessment and evaluation. A professionally designed programme that employs civil society and social service staff could assure the choice of a credible messenger regarding Islam within Sri Lankan society.

In programme delivery, Indonesia used strong personal relationships just as Singapore did. Whereas, in Indonesia, this relationship remained in force up to and including release, in Singapore, this relationship was an entry point before exposing the detainee to different people and ideas in dialogue. For both, a "kindness offensive" was applied with the goal of changing detainee attitudes toward government, and it seemed quite successful for both. Singapore's Religious Rehabilitation Group and its civil society components systematically engage the detainee in ways not done in Indonesia. Singapore delivers far more training for these volunteers than Indonesia does for its staff. Sri Lanka might consider combining elements of both of these models: use a key case officer throughout the process, and vigorous civil society engagement. The officer would establish continuity and help the client feel supported throughout the process, while the local community involvement would ensure greater integration and validation within the community itself.

Indonesia's use of ex-terrorists to dissuade prisoners from violence bears examination for Sri Lanka. Although its two stars, Abbas and Imron, did not abandon all of their extremist beliefs, judging from contradictory statements in the record, they successfully disengaged a number of terrorists in custody and within society. Indonesia employed this strategy because these leaders had greater credibility with terrorists than moderate Islamic scholars in Indonesia, but the strategy may be time-limited and selectively rather than universally applied. Imron's meetings with victims seemed successful for both sides, but such experiences were not universal.

In Indonesia, these two former terrorists had been leaders for decades and inspired a following for their high-profile bombings. Sri Lanka might evaluate the potential of using disengaged or rehabilitated individuals, even those without such influential backgrounds, as candidates to educate youth who might be attracted to the cause.

Following Indonesia's model, such people should first meet their victims face-to-face for professionals to judge their depth of regret. With this experience and other evaluations, the professional psychologists could identify likely "influencers," and the local civil society organization would need to approve them. More tangible hope for a place in Sri Lankan society would also be required to dissuade at-risk youth from extremism.

All three Southeast Asian programmes offered financial assistance and different levels of job skills and job placement to these former terrorists. Singapore offers the best model of this programme element because it was done more systematically and involved continuous communication between civil society organisations and the social service staff instead of dependence on a single individual as in Indonesia. Paying ex-terrorist's expenses is difficult to justify to the broader public, given the harm done, so a serious evaluation of how to offer and evaluate such assistance would seem well-advised for Sri Lanka. By the same token, adopting Malaysia's "continuous monitoring" with both formal and informal check-ins would support successful reintegration and dissuade reengagement with terrorism.

Evaluation seems lacking in all three programmes. The Indonesian programme does not clearly distinguish education from rehabilitation, have any formal intake or release evaluations or metrics with which to measure success. Singapore does not fare much better on this score either, although its programme is more systematic, with a phase 1 and a phase 2 for re-education in Islam, depending on an evaluation (not specified) of the prisoner's progress. Malaysia has one aspect in its favour and that is "continuous monitoring" once detainees have been released back into the community. In this way, Sri Lanka needs to adhere to its own best practices for evaluation for success because its systematic approach exceeds those used by its neighbours.

Considering all of these elements, the findings of Hwang, Horgan, and others who interviewed ex-terrorists in Indonesia demonstrate that the "change of heart" must balance justice for the victims with restoring these ex-terrorists to the community. Detaining most of them indefinitely creates resentment and breeds greater resistance, but letting them out without creating job skills, and preparing the community to accept them would guarantee a repeated cycle of violence. The high stakes for society demand that any future rehabilitation programme be carefully designed and recorded, properly weighting push and pull factors beyond ideology alone, triangulating formal and informal evaluations that are documented, and conducting continuing surveillance and support post-release.

REFERENCES

Abuza, Z. (2000), 'The rehabilitation of Jemaah Islamiyah detainees in Southeast Asia: A preliminary assessment' in Bjørgo, T. and Horgan, J. (ed.) *Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement*. New York: Routledge, pp. 193–211.

Aljazeera (2019), 'Sri Lankan investigator: No ISIL link to Easter bombings.' *Aljazeera*, [online]. Available from: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/7/24/sri-lankan-investigator-no-isil-link-to-easter-bombings [Accessed 2 February 2020].

Allard, T (2016), 'Fighting back: How Indonesia's elite police turned the tide on militants,' *Reuters*, 23 December 2016 [online]. Available from: https://fr.reuters.com/article/uk-indonesia-security-idUKKBN14C0Y0 [Accessed 8 February 2020].

Altier, M.B, Boyle, E.L., Shortland, and Horgan, J (2017), 'Why they leave: An analysis of terrorist disengagement events from eighty-seven autobiographical accounts', *Security Studies*, 26 (2), pp. 1–4.

Aslam, M.M. (2018),'A Model of Deradicalisation in Malaysia' in Gunaratna, R., and Hussin, S.M. (ed.), *International Studies of Terrorist Rehabilitation*. London: Routledge, pp. 90–104.

Barrelle, K. (2015), 'Pro-integration: Disengagement from and life after extremism', *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression*, 7(2), pp. 305–32.

Bjørgo, T. (1997), *Racist and right-wing violence in Scandanavia*. Oslo: Tano-Aschehoug.

Bjørgo, T. and Horgan, J.M. (2009), *Leaving terrorism behind*. Abington, Oxon, UK: Routledge.

Central Intelligence Agency (2020), 'Singapore', *The World Factbook* [online]. Available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sn.html [Accessed: 27 April 2020].

Chalmers, I. (2017), 'Countering violent extremism in Indonesia: Bringing back the Jihadist', *Asian Studies Review*, 4(3), pp. 331–51, doi:10.1080/10357823.2017.1323848.

Cockburn, P. (2016), 'Face to face with a terrorist: Bali bomber Ali Imron meets victims' friends and families in Jakarta jail', *Australian Broadcasting Company*, 3 January 2016 [Online]. Available at: https://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-08-04/victims-relatives-come-face-to-face-with-bali-bomber/6668596 [Accessed 26 April 2020].

Counterextremism Project (2020) 'Ali Imron'. Available at: https://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/ali-imron [Accessed 26 April 2020].

Dalgaard-Nielsen, A. (2013) 'Promoting exit from violent extremism: Themes and approaches', *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 36(2) [online], doi:10.1080/105761 0X.2013.747073.

Guranatna, R. (2011), 'Terrorist rehabilitation: A global imperative', Journal of Policing, *Intelligence and Counter Terrorism*, 6(2), pp. 65–82. https://doi_org.libproxy.nps.edu/10.1080/8335330.2011.553182

Henschke, R. and Nurdin E. (2020), 'What would you say to the men who killed your mum?' *BBC News*, 17 February 2020 [online]. Available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/stories-51502032 [Accessed 27 April 2020].

Hettiarachchi, M. (2013), 'Sri Lanka's rehabilitation program', *Prism: A Journal of the Center for Complex Operations*, 4(2), pp. 4–8.

Horgan, J. and Braddock, K. (2010), 'Rehabilitating the terrorists: Challenges in assessing the effectiveness of deradicalization programs', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 22(2), pp. 267–291. https://doi_org.libproxy.nps.edu/10.1080/09546551003594748.

Hwang, J.C. (2017), 'Disengagement of Islamic Jihadists: Understanding the pathways', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 29(2), pp. 277–295, doi:10.1080/09546553.2015.1034855.

International Crisis Group (2007), 'Deradicalisation' and Indonesian prisons', *Asia Report*, no. 142. New York: International Crisis Group.

Jani, M. H. B. (2017), 'Countering violent extremism in Malaysia: Past experiences and future prospects', *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses*, 9(6), pp.6–10.

Jones, S. (2015), 'Counter-terrorism and the rise of ISIS in 2014', *Tempo*, 5 January.

Kamaruddin, M.N., Noordin, N.N.M., and Rahman, A.R.A. (2017), 'Terrorist deradicalisation programme in Malaysia: A Case Study', *Journal of Media and Information Warfare*, 10, pp.25–47.

Kruglanski, A.W., Gelfand, M. and Gunaratna, R. (2012), 'Terrorism as a means to an end: How political violence bestows significance' in Shaver, P.R. and Mikulincer, M. (ed.) *Meaning, mortality, and choice: The social psychology of existential concerns*. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, pp. 203–12, doi.org/10.1037/13748-011.

Lockhard, C.A., Ahmad, Z. B., Bee, O. J., Leinbach, T. R (2020), 'Malaysia: Religion' in *Encyclopædia Brittanica* [online]. Available at: https://www.brittanica.com/place/Malaysia [Accessed 30 June 2020].

Martin, D. (2007), 'Bali bomber now campaigns to stop terrorism', *Australian Broadcasting* Company News, 20 September.

Murphy, Z. and Sari, Y. (2010), 'Bali bomber Ali Imron becomes comic book character', *BBC* News, 6 August [online]. Available at: https://bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-10938889 [Accessed 13 March 2020].

Nanjappa, V. (2016), 'Is the ISIS threat catching up to Sri Lanka?' *Sri Lanka Guardian*, 2 February [online]. Available at: http://www.slguardian.org/2016/02/is-the-isis-threat-catching-up-to-sri-lanka/ [Accessed 2 February 2020].

National Counter Terrorism Agency (2013), 'Blueprint for deradicalisation', pp. 1–38.

O'Brien, N. (2009), 'Terrorists who say no to terror', *Australian*, 6 June [online]. Available at: http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,,226233960-287737,00.html [Accessed 4 April 2020].

Porta, D.D. and LaFree, G. (2011), 'Guest editorial: Processes of radicalization and de-radicalization', *International Journal of Conflict and Violence*, 6(1), pp.4–10.

Rabasa, A., Pettyjohn, S.L., Ghez, J., and Boucek, C. (2010), *Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND.

Ramakrishna, K. (2009), 'A holistic critique of Singapore's counterideological program," *CTC Sentinel*, 2(1), pp.1–4.

Sayakkarage, S.S.P. (2016), *Immigration and its effects on the national security of Sri Lanka*. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School.

Schulze, K.E. (2008), 'Indonesia's approach to Jihadist deradicalization', *Combating Terrorism Center*, 1(8), pp. 1–3 [online]. Available at: https://ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/Vol1Iss8-Art3.pdf [Accessed 3 March 2020].

Silke, A. (2017), 'Disengagement or deradicalization: A look at prison programs for jailed terrorists', *CTC Sentinel*, 4(1), pp. 1–4.

Sukabdi, Zora A. (2015), 'Terrorism Indonesia: Review on rehabilitation and deradicalization' *Contemporary Voices: St Andrews Journal of International Relations*, 6(2), pp.36–51, doi:10.15664/jtr.1154

Sumpter, C. (2017), 'Countering violent extremism in Indonesia: Priorities, practice, and the role of civil society', *Journal for Deradicalization*, 11, pp.112–46.

Suratman, Y.P. (2017), 'The effectiveness of de-radicalization programs in Southeast Asia: Does it work? The case of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore' *Journal of ASEAN Studies*, 5(2), pp. 135–156.

Taylor, P. (2006), 'The Jihadi who turned 'Supergrass', *BBC News*, 13 September [online]. Available at: http:news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/5334594.stm [Accessed 15 April 2020].

United States Department of State (2015), Country Reports on Terrorism. Washington, DC: *Department of State* [online]. Available at: https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2015/257515.htm [Accessed 4 April 2020].

United States Department of State (2019), *Country Reports on Terrorism: Singapore*. Washington, DC: Department of State [online]. Available at https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2019/singapore/ [Accessed 4 April 2020].

POST-CONFLICT SUSTAINABLE PEACE IN SRI LANKA: A CASE STUDY OF MILITARY-OCCUPIED LANDS IN THE NORTHERN PROVINCE

Wing Commander Chamara Weerathunge

ABSTRACT

The internal armed conflict in Sri Lanka came to a military end in 2009, with the Sri Lanka armed forces defeating the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) through a humanitarian operation. During the armed conflict and aftermath, the military forces increased the establishment of military installations and High Security Zones (HSZs) in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. The people in the affected areas expected that the military occupied private lands would be completely released after the conflict. Nevertheless, the continuous military occupation in some private lands, created problems. Following a case study method, this study defines the relationship between post-conflict sustainable peace and the military occupied lands in the Northern Province of Sri Lanka in the context of relative deprivation theory. It was identified that the military occupied land issue is closely associated with national security on one hand and the aspiration of the affected people on the other. The paper recommends that the military occupied lands in the Northern Province is strategically important to the country's national security, therefore, should not be released. However, the rightful owners of these lands need to be compensated not only considering the economic value but also historical value and livelihood opportunities of the land. Finally, this study provides policy recommendations for the authorities to release the remaining occupied lands which are not strategically important for the national security.

Keywords: Armed conflict, High Security Zones (HSZs), Military occupied lands, Reconciliation, Sustainable Peace

INTRODUCTION

Prolonged and fierce military offensive of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was terminated by the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) in May 2009. The conflict caused perpetual damage to all the Sri Lankans irrespective of their socio-economic background. The intangible damages such as decrease in trust, mutual understanding, relationship and mutual respect the conflict generated are far greater than the tangible damages such as destruction of infrastructure, livelihoods, and other social-economic factors.

During the armed conflict and its aftermath, the government established its control in the Northern and Eastern provinces, by establishing military institutions. From the mid-1980 onwards, the government created High Security Zones (HSZs) in strategically important locations around key military bases, and areas adjacent to the military institutions and the main economic centres in the country. In addition to the military establishments that had been in the government controlled areas prior to the outbreak of the conflict, a great number of new military establishments were built in the areas captured from the LTTE.

With the end of the armed conflict, the people in the area expected that the HSZs and military occupied private lands would be released and withdrawn by the authorities. But the continuation of military presence in both public and private properties and failure to return them, created a variety of problems in the former conflict affected zones. This includes a significant delay in the post-conflict recovery process for affected communities and diminishing of confidence and trust, particularly in the post-conflict context.

Since a considerable period of time has elapsed since the ending of the conflict, critiques have pointed out that the obligations and the political drive that was initiated by the stakeholders are not potent enough to restore positive peace in Sri Lanka. At present, the GoSL is trying to address the grievances of all conflict affected stakeholders. However, some argue that the efforts made by the government is only a ploy to avert international pressure. Even though the government's process in releasing land is conducted at snail's pace, it is understood that the government has no intention of seizing civil lands permanently (Colombo Page, 2018). Tamil politicians and Tamil diaspora are in solidarity with the rightful owners of the land, blaming Sri Lankan military for forcing people to resettle in alternative lands, instead of allowing them to return to their traditional lands (Human Rights Watch, 2018).

Even though, it has been a decade since the eradication of terrorism by the military, it was found that the Tamil community in the Northern Province still has antipathy towards the military establishments, especially towards those occupying their land. The local community in the formerly conflict-affected areas in the Northern Province staged a series of protests demanding the release of lands, occupied by the military (Fuller, 2019). Struggles against the military land occupation and claiming the remaining military occupied lands are still an on-going process. However, the antipathy that they display during the protests is not visible when they are helped by the military forces during natural calamities such as droughts and floods. On these occasions, the military presence in those areas has been welcomed and appreciated highly by the local community (Atapattu, 2019).

There are signs that the GoSL, NGOs as well as international actors are keen on dealing with the land issue in conflict-affected areas in the North and the East as

a component of the reconciliation process. However, they are not very clear about the most suitable approach that should be adopted. Military land occupation has denied owners from accessing their own land, thus creating the displacement of people in the conflict-affected areas. The land ownership and the access to their own lands, play a vital role in post-conflict recovery and sustainable peace.

In the post-conflict transition for sustainable peace in the Northern Province, the land issue is identified as a significant and emerging challenge (Human Rights Watch, 2018). Land in the North is a complex issue, since this has been made complicated by various political actors and other interested people such as the Tamil diaspora. Though the land issue is very complex, it is a prerequisite to promote national reconciliation, economic development and post-war recovery. Therefore, objective of this paper is to examine how military occupied lands in the post-conflict context affects sustainable peace in Sri Lanka. Keeping this objective in view, the author chose to follow the case study research approach, determining the land issue in the Northern Province as one case. Thus, a qualitative research method was deemed more appropriate for the study. The author selected the Relative Deprivation Theory as a conceptual model to analyse the issue related to the study.

Both primary and secondary data were used during the study. The researcher used secondary data that are available in Sri Lankan and foreign newspapers, journal articles and web articles. Additionally, primary sources were the structured interviews with internal and external actors and the stakeholders at different levels such as grassroots level leaders of the military-occupied land, claimants in Northern Province, military leaders, experts in the field of reconciliation and policy makers.

IMPERATIVES FOR SUSTAINABLE PEACE

The conclusion of a protracted armed conflict either via peace negotiations or military endeavor does not really mean an achievement of sustainable peace (Licklider, 1995). Galtung (1969) argued that, the end of conflict does not make sustainable peace and reconciliation until it answers the root causes of the conflict. Likewise, David (1999) defines post-conflict peacebuilding as strategies designed to promote secure and sustainable peace in which the basic human needs of the population are met and violent conflicts do not recur. This definition incorporates the objectives of both negative peace (absence of direct violence) and positive peace (absence of structural violence) outlined by Galtung (1969).

Galtung (1969) further differentiates negative peace as the consequence of efforts to end the direct or personal violence (physical violence) and positive peace as the end result of preventing structural and cultural violence (indirect violence) that obstruct the economic, political, social and cultural well-being and identity of individuals and societies. The objective of positive peace involves the elimination

of the root causes of conflict and the conscious attempt to build a society with the collaboration of various internal and external actors. Negative peace may not be able to bring the structural violence of society to an end, since it is not possible to change prevailing social structures which deprive the basic needs of the people in a society. Establishing and restoring relationships is highly essential to eliminate structural violence in a society. Galtung (1969) highlighted that deprivation of basic human needs such as food, health, shelter, livelihood, education, social dignity and lack of opportunities to contribute to social, cultural and economic activities would cause direct and structural violence.

LAND AND CONFLICT

Land can be recognised as properties and resources which have by far been the most important asset in the post-conflict landscape. Mabikke (2016) stated that land is a social, cultural and ontological resource which contributes as a significant factor in the rebuilding of social identity through the development of livelihood.

Land accessibility is an essential factor for food security and it is a source of income for many households. Also, land would be a very important household property to be transferred to future generations. Further it is an essential safety net for poor households and a source of identity. Land and identity are mutually linked in many societies. Land accessibility confirms the affiliation in a society at the household-level. The physical security of households would be in danger without access to land. Therefore, land is an essential source of authority since it has economic, social, cultural and emotional prominence (Fonseka and Raheem 2011).

Wehrmann (2005) further illustrates the land conflict as a social component in which two or more parties are involved and having different root causes of various needs and interests over land and the property. Land conflicts can be further illustrated as a misapplication, limitation or disagreement over property rights to land.

POST-WAR LAND CONFLICT IN THE NORTHERN PROVINCE

Land is a highly sensitive issue in the Northern Province. The return of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) who left the area during the conflict and the land users are the crucial issues in the post-conflict context in the Northern Province. This issue has created a variety of governance complications in a post-conflict context including legal, administrative, policy issues and the post-conflict development of the province (Fonseka & Raheem, 2011).

Establishment of sustainable solutions for the displaced persons should be implemented as a major portion of reconciliation process. Land ownership is thus

recognised as alleviation of poverty and will give an opportunity to reconstruct the lost livelihoods of the displaced (International Organization for Migration, 2016).

Military occupation in the Northern Province still continues despite the repeated promises given to the international and national community assuring to reduce the military presence gradually from the province (Fuller, 2019). Some actions have been taken by the GoSL to affect these promises, but it seems that the military forces have consolidated their presence by constructing new military establishments and expanding their presence in the area. This creates a tense situation where the original owners are returning to claim their ownership of the military occupied lands. In this context, the long-term peace or positive peace and post-conflict recovery may not be executed successfully, unless the military occupied land issue in the Northern Province is properly addressed.

LAND RESTITUTION AND RECONCILIATION

Compensation/restitution plays a vital role in reparation and has direct relationship with reconciliation. Restitution can be defined as the "restoration of liberty, legal rights, social status, family life and citizenship; return to one's place of residence and restoration of employment and return of property" (Fonseka, 2016). In the post-conflict context, land proprietorship provides an opportunity for displaced communities to escape from extreme poverty and reconstruct their lost livelihoods. In this context, the land issue can be seen as an important aspect of one's identity and belongings, especially in the Northern Province. Therefore, the link between the land and the community is difficult to be quantified (Raheem, 2013).

Pinheiro Principles, which are known as the Principles on Housing and Property Restitution for Refugees and Displaced Persons, were introduced by the United Nations Organization in August 2005. It indicates that "All refugees and displaced persons have the right to have their housing land or property restored to them, from which they were arbitrarily or unlawfully deprived". Article 12 of the Fundamental Rights Chapter of the Constitution of Sri Lanka, the Resettlement Authority Act of 2007 and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) Act of 2007 provide better protection for those who have returned to the their land and houses. The provisions for the compensation for the private lands used for public purpose are provided by the Land Acquisition Act (Raheem, 2013). Almost thirty or less years of displacement created a great disturbance of social life of the people in the Northern Province. Further, the people of the oppressed caste had less opportunity to own a land and build a permanent house due to social background in the region. Restriction over access to the military occupied lands has significantly decreased their personal and economic security which directly affects the reconciliation process (Human Rights Watch, 2018).

RELATIVE DEPRIVATION AND SOCIAL STIGMA

Relative Deprivation was first introduced by Stouffor B. *et al.*, (1949). They define Relative Deprivation as: "Differences between people's actual interest, their value, anticipations and what they actually gain through their value accruing capabilities" (Stouffor *et al.*, 1949, p.282). Further, they stated that "the intensity of relative deprivation varies strongly in terms of the average degree of perceived discrepancy between value expectation and value capabilities" (Stouffor *et al.*, 1949, p.283).

Accordingly, this paper focused on the three steps of the Deprivation Theory to build logical structure to analyse and construct the possible answers for research problem. These steps exhibits as: "There must be comparisons made by an individual, there must be a cognitive appraisal that leads the individual to perceive that the individual or his/her in-group is at a disadvantage and the perceived disadvantage must be viewed as unfair" (Stouffor *et al.*, 1949, p.287).

Some people in the conflict affected area in the Northern Province lost their land ownership due to military occupation during the conflict and its aftermath. But they see, others in the same cultural and social identity have been facilitated with their own lands and have been enjoying the basic needs. In this paper, Relative Deprivation Theory incorporating the Human Needs Theory was utilised to analyse the land issue in the Northern Province and ascertain sustainable solutions.

NATURE OF THE LAND ISSUE IN THE NORTHERN PROVINCE

Throughout the period of armed conflict and its aftermath, military forces acquired considerable amount of private and public properties in the Northern Province. Furthermore, they made restrictions over some specific areas in the Northern Province. These restrictions have created more difficulties to the inhabitants' access on income generation activities such as fishing, paddy cultivation and grazing animals. Towards the end of the conflict in May 2009, military had occupied 96,756.6 acres (67,157.6 acres of State lands and 29,599 acres of private lands) in the Northern Province (Military Spokesman, 2019).



Figure 1: Land Occupation in the Northern Province by the Armed Forces as at May 2009 (in acres)

Source: Compiled by the author with the statistics provided by the Ministry of Defence, 2020

Most of the restrictions which affected the livelihood of people have been lifted after a few months of the military liberation, giving opportunity to accelerate the post-conflict economic recovery. With that, most of the private properties adjoining military establishments have been gradually released. According to the data analysed, GoSL has already released a total of 80,210.7 acres of land in the Northern Province, except the lands which have strategic value to the National Security (54,635.1 acres of state lands and 25,575.6 acres of private lands) indicating 86% of the occupied private lands and 81% (83% of total lands) of state lands which they occupied since the conflict ended in May 2009 (Military Spokesman, 2019).



Figure 2: Comparison of total military occupied and released lands in the Northern Province (in acres)

Source: Compiled by the author with the statistics provided by the Ministry of Defence, 2020

As per the data collected by the interviews, it was revealed that a considerable amount of remaining private land claimants have claimed their lands without actual needs, under the influence of various secondary actors. According to the data available at the Jaffna District Secretariat, there are 646.5 acres of private lands available within the Sri Lanka Air Force Station Palaly premises and possession of these land plots were distributed among 581 owners, but only 24 of them have been identified during the last nine years. Furthermore, 173 owners who owned private lands within the Security Force Headquarters (SFHQ) Jaffna are yet to be identified. Some inhabitants claim these lands without possessing any legal document to prove their ownership. Moreover, some of the owners identified live overseas.

Furthermore, a large segment of the land owners were provided with alternative lands in the model villages. The crucial dilemma in the problem of military occupation in the post-conflict era is to balance National Security and the Human Security of the people in the conflict affected areas. Even though the government justifies the limitations on lands on the ground of national security and national interest, there is a considerable counter-argument that the concept of national security should be in-line with the prerequisite of post-conflict requirement for reconciliation. Affected people are not happy with the solutions given by the GoSL and they demand the return of remaining military occupied lands. Further, this situation has turned into a more complicated issue, due to the involvement of various internal and external parties such as the UNHRC, the Tamil diaspora, Tamil political parties, various NGOs and land owners.

DEMANDING THE SAME LAND INSTEAD OF AN ALTERNATIVE

A few months after the conflict, many of the IDPs were able to settle in their original locations. They were assisted in numerous ways by the government and various humanitarian organisations by providing monthly food rations, resettlement allowances and assistance to build a new house instead of the old one which had been destroyed or damaged as the result of the conflict. Returnees who were not able to settle in their own original land due to it being occupied by the military, had to be settled in an alternative land provided by the GoSL or IDP centers. Some others had to stay with relatives or in rented houses.

Military land occupation was analysed with the theories derived from the Relative Deprivation Model. Some of the returnees were given their lands under the military land releasing programme. The rightful owners who were not able to settle in their original lands due to military land occupation, see others from the same communal context, enjoying their land facility. Affected land owners perceived that obtaining of their private lands is feasible. Military land occupation has created an unfavorable social position to the military land claimants when compared with the other people in their own society. Psychological condition of the military occupied land owners

has created a dispute regarding the military. Furthermore, their perceptions created a negative stereotype, while continuously demanding the same lands which were occupied by the Sri Lanka Armed Forces.

People who did not obtain their private lands from the military, perceived that the government has deprived their basic needs such as food, water and shelter. Before they left their own land, they had access to water, agricultural lands and they also had their own houses. While some of them are satisfied with their basic needs within the limits of the alternative lands and model villages, they feel that their families are insecure and need to satisfy their safety needs within their own communities. Furthermore, affected people perceived that, they would only be able to satisfy needs such as cultural security, freedom, identity and belongingness, if they have been provided with their own lands.

Returnees who had not received their own land, had to face numerous challenges to rebuild their livelihood needs and the economic security, especially for the female-headed households. Earlier, their small plot of land offered them various ways of sustenance in the form of a home garden, but now without a fertile land, they have to live below the poverty line, due to lack of employment opportunities in the area and scarcity of financial resources. For many people in the province, lands and properties are their identity, a means of generating a livelihood, as well as accumulating wealth which can be transferred to the next generation. Military land occupation has disturbed the traditional lives and customs of these inhabitants. It has especially had an impact on the traditional dowry system since they are not able to offer their daughters with house and land. Moreover, these plots of land represent their ancestral heritage, their emotional bonds and memories which have been blended with the environment. As such, the loss of traditional lands is synonymous with the loss of a significant part of their generation's history and memories.

Furthermore, military occupation of private lands has been justified with the concern of national security for the purpose of the public. But military has established some other internal welfare facilities such as holiday bungalows and gymnasiums which cannot be categorised as being for public purposes and national security concerns.

BARRIERS IN RELEASING MILITARY-OCCUPIED LANDS

With the constant claims by the people after the conflict, large portions of military occupied lands in the Northern Province have been released by the GoSL with the consent of the military forces in order to support national effort of reconciliation process. However, the GoSL still comes under heavy criticism for occupying private lands in the Northern Province.

Strategic Importance

Almost all of the remaining military occupied lands are strategically important when considering the national security of Sri Lanka. Therefore, it is vital that these lands remain with the military, in order to ensure the sustainability of the Jaffna Peninsula. The land held under Palaly Army Cantonment (PAC) deals with greater issues that focus on the security concern of the HSZ. The military establishments located in the circumference area of the Palaly Airport, need to remain in the same location as per their strategic deployment. Military deployments in Kankasanthurei (KKS) area such as the KKS harbour, oil tanks and air field are of paramount importance not only for military value, but also for their economic value. Areas such as Point Pedro (PPD) and Mullaitivu are situated in a very prominent strategic location and military presence and domination is of utmost importance to prevent possible reemergence of terrorism and other transnational threats.

Furthermore, the free movement of naval troops in the sea at PPD and Mullaitivu is very important to the national security. Downsizing the area allocated to the Navy, would affect the free movement of naval troops at sea and would increase illegal activities such as drug trafficking and illegal migration. Additionally, SFHQ Mullaitivu is co-located with various military establishments of sister services and are mutually connected. 59 Division Headquarters, other logistics establishments in the area and the location of the SFHQ are important in dominating the entire region since lateral and horizontal lines of communication run through these localities. Minimising the numbers of the security establishments within the province, would adversely affect the security and the strength of the security forces.

Furthermore, military has effective and efficient managers and adequate resources to encounter any crisis situation and they act as first respondents to disaster situations. Therefore, the presence of the military in the Northern Province is important in combating non-traditional security threats as well.

Financial Constraints

Other than the strategically important locations, a small portion of military establishments in Kilinochchi and Jaffna (Thellippali and Sandilippay) can be shifted to another location. During the conflict period, these military establishments have been developed with multiple infrastructure facilities consuming a large amount of government money. Relocation of a military establishment would, therefore, be a huge financial burden to the country.

Inadequate Availability of State Lands

Military establishment such as SFHQ or Divisional HQ require large plots of land for their logistics, operational and administrative functions. Hence, releasing of private lands is a decisive factor due to the unavailability of adequate state lands to relocate the military establishments in the Jaffna peninsula.

Complications in Perimeter Defence

Releasing of plots of land in different locations will create a lot of perpendicular edges, which would result in producing asymmetric shapes in the perimeter. It would, therefore, create difficulties in observation and would necessitate a lot of guard points to maintain mutual contact.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, this study recommends lands that are strategically and centrally important to national security should not be released to the land owners. The land owners must be apprised of the absolute requirement of the land for national security. These land owners should be compensated considering the economic and historical value of their lands. In addition, the livelihood opportunities of the land should be included for reparation for long-term military occupation and usage without rent.

In order to resolve this conflict, the following recommendations may help resolve some of the prolonged disputes over military occupation of land. First, land owners should be given due recognition and their sacrifice of emotional bonds and memories blended with the lands occupied by the military should be acknowledged during the armed conflict and its aftermath. Second, basic facilities such as drinking water, sanitary and electricity provided in alternative model villages need to be improved and continuously monitored by the respective governmental authorities. Thirdly, Sri Lanka military forces should cease all commercial activities conducted in acquired lands in Northern Province by dismantling the military run farms, public canteens, hotels and other commercial projects. Moreover, lands that have little strategic value should be released to their rightful owners. Additionally, it needs to be ensured that pledges on land returns are time bound and transparent to deter unnecessary delays in implementation and to strengthen public trust and confidence. Further, military should refrain from forming of dispersed camps concept and should restructure them as main bases within the state lands as much as possible. Finally, GoSL should establish short and long-term policy plans to enhance the livelihood and employment opportunities in the affected area and eliminate all secondary actors involved in the land issue to come to the resolution within the interest of the primary actors.

REFERENCES

Atapattu, S. (2019) *Interview with military commanders*. Interviewed by: Author [Personal Communication]. 21 February. 1430 hrs.

Colombo Page (2018), Sri Lanka Army had released over 69,000 acres of land in North and East since 2009 *Colombo page* [online]. Available from: http://www.colombopage.com/archive_18B/Dec17_1545067201CH.php [Accessed 20 March 2019].

David, E. (1999), Does Peacebuilding Build Peace? Liberal (Mis)steps in the Peace Process, *Security Dialogue* 30(1), p.25-41.

Fonseka, B. (2016), Under the Military's Shadow. Local Communities and Militarization on the Jaffna Peninsula [online]. Available from: https://rukiiiii.wordpress.com/2017/10/17/the-struggle-for-land-andreconciliationin-sri-lanka [Accessed 7 February 2020].

Fonseka, B. and Raheem, M. (2011), *Land in the Northern Province: Post-War Politics, Policy and Practices*. Colombo: Centre for Policy Alternatives.

Fuller, L. (2019), Ten years after end of war, Tamils still waiting to return home. *Al Jazeera* [online]. Available from: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/01/ten-years-war-tamils-waiting-return-home-190127190353787.html [Accessed 20 June 2019].

Galtung, J. (1969), Violence, Peace and Peace Research, *Journal of Peace Research*. Institute of Peace Research, Oslo. London: Sage Publications.

Human Rights Watch (2018), Why Can't We Go Home? Military Occupation of Land in Sri Lanka. Available from: https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/10/09/why-cantwe-go-home/military-occupation-land-sri-lanka [Accessed on 18 March 2019].

International Organization for Migration (2016), Land and Property Rights and Victims Reparation. Available from: https://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/shared/ mainsite/microsites/IDM/workshops/moving-to-safety-complex-crises-2012/ Land_Property_Rights_Victim_Reparations.pdf [Accessed on 05 January 2020].

Licklider, R. (1995), The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993, *American Political Science Review,* 89(3), pp. 681-690.

Mabikke, S. (2016), *Implications of Land Governance on Rural Development in Uganda: A Case study of Nakasongola District*. London: Lambert Publishers.

Raheem, M. (2013), Protracted Displacement, Urgent Solutions: Prospect for Durable Solutions for Protracted IDPs in Sri Lanka. *Centre for Policy Alternatives* [online], Available from: http://www.cpalanka.org/protracted-displacement-urgent-solutions-prospects-for-durablesolutions-for-protracted-idps-in-sri-lanka [Accessed 7 March 2019].

Stouffer B., Samuel A., Arthur A. and Leonard S. (1949), *The American Soldier: Combat and its Aftermath*. Vol. II. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Wehrmann, B. (2005), Land Conflicts: A Practical Guide to Dealing with Land Disputes. Research Gate [online]. Available from: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/42766163_Land_Conflicts_A_Practical_Guide_to_Dealing_with_Land_Disputes [Accessed 5 January 2020].

SRI LANKA AND THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE: A BALANCING ACT IN THE INDIAN OCEAN REGION

Dr. Anshu N. Chatterjee

ABSTRACT

Sri Lanka's salient position in Beijing's global ambitions is reflected in the availability of the Chinese resources for its economic and defence modernisation. The country's strategic proximity to China's commercial sea routes and its positive reception to the BRI provides Beijing with an opportunity to illustrate the promise of mutual benefits offered in its initiative. Meanwhile, Colombo's acceptance of China's investments relies on an economic strategy that seeks to modernise its infrastructure and naval operations that would secure the new economic growth sectors as a IOR state. As Beijing advances its geo-economic objectives across three continents, important questions emerge regarding the impact of the BRI on the existing political and economic arrangements. Sri Lanka offers an informative case study towards understanding the initiative's implementation, the resulting escalation of rivalries in the IOR, and national responses in the new setting. The ripple effects of the BRI developments present new dilemmas and weighs heavily on state decisions for a country that finds itself in the center of great power rivalry.

Keywords: The BRI, Great Power Rivalry, Debt-Diplomacy, Balancing India and China

INTRODUCTION

Sri Lanka's salient position in Beijing's global commercial and strategic ambitions is apparent in the Belt and Road Initiative's (BRI's) rapid implementation in the country utilising Chinese development aid and defence agreements. Sri Lanka's strategic proximity to China's sea routes and its positive reception to the BRI related-developments provides Beijing with an opportunity for illustrating the promise of mutual benefits offered in the BRI (The Economist, 2020). Initiated in 2013, China's BRI seeks to advance the country's global economic framework that produced its remarkable growth in the previous two decades, a framework that experienced a slowdown after 2007 due to structural issues in emerging markets (Blanchard and Flint, 2017). The People's Republic of China's (PRC's) plan of investing in a global transit system, including land and sea routes, is designed to overcome the structural barriers and revive the high levels of economic growth. The coordinated expansion of a defence infrastructure ensures the security of Beijing's economic objectives (Clarke, 2018). As PRC advances its geo-economic objectives across three continents, important questions emerge regarding the impact of the

BRI on the commercial and defence ties in countries that lie on its path. Sri Lanka's openness to the BRI related-developments offers an informative case study towards understanding the initiative's implementation at the local level, the resulting escalation of rivalries in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), and national responses in the new setting.

Colombo's acceptance of China's investments and the promise of benign growth reflects its economic policy centered upon the expanding commercial trade network at its maritime door. In order to develop its ports, as well as its transit systems, to take advantage of the new commercial opportunities, the state requires necessary financing to modernise its infrastructure and naval operations that would secure the new economic growth sectors. Yet, the shift in the global power structures along with the availability of aid from China produces new external pressures as the BRI disrupts existing political and economic arrangements in host countries such as Sri Lanka. The ripple effects of the BRI developments present new dilemmas for a country that is still in the process of reconciliation in the post-war period and now finds itself in the center of great power rivalry, which not only presents opportunities but also weighs on state decisions.

THE DYNAMICS OF SINO-SRI LANKA ALLIANCE

Sri Lanka lies in the path of two-thirds of the world's oil and over half of its commercial traffic. The extensive blue water depth capacity of its Colombo Port also enhances its strategic and commercial position. Subsequently, Beijing's targeted efforts to secure influence with the island's authorities and its commercial sector since the 1990s has paid off with the Colombo's easy acceptance of the BRI plans. China's current investment in the country amounts to US$11 billion, of which US$8 billion is associated with the BRI (Foizee, 2020).

Analysts often point to China's widespread presence in Sri Lanka's affairs as an example of a "debt diplomacy," which forces a country to give up its sovereignty for the lender country financing its debt (Moramudali, 2018). Yet, the Sino-Sri Lankan relationship is more complex than just debt diplomacy. Beijing's security and economic aid during the relentless and costly Liberation Tigers Tamil Eelam (LTTE) insurgency that evolved into a prolonged violent conflict stretching over three decades 1983–2009), produced a foundation for Sino-Sri Lankan alliance in the 1990s (Hashim, 2010, p. 207). This bilateral relationship also expanded through the 1990s when Sri Lanka needed aid due to the emergence of the Asian crisis that threatened to reduce Sri Lanka's exports and remittances. The threat of reduced revenues produced new stresses upon the state at the time of growing national defence requirements. Meanwhile, India's botched attempt at peacekeeping and negotiating between Colombo and the LTTE produced a determination among Sri Lankan authorities to seek out a counterweight to India's influence (Destradi, 2012). Moreover, Western countries' ban on arms sales to countries accused of

human rights violations, as Sri Lanka had been over its dealing with the LTTE insurgency, removed them as a countervailing option increasing Sri Lanka's reliance on China for defence aid. In the final phase of the insurgency in 2007, China is credited with having tipped the war against the LTTE by providing US$36 million worth of ammunition and ordnance sales to the state. China also gifted the country six F7 jet fighters (Page, 2009).

After the insurgency ended in 2009, Sri Lanka's significance to China and other countries seeking to expand their influence in the IOR became increasingly apparent. China remained a crucial ally to Sri Lanka in the United Nations Security Council; it blocked efforts to reprimand Sri Lanka for human rights violations in the final years of the war (Destradi, 2012). India, in 2012, along with Russia, joined China in backing Colombo in the United Nations Human Rights Commission's efforts to investigate the state of violence at the end of the war. Subsequently, confronted by a weak economy, represented by growing interest payments that amounted to approximately 30 percent of the government expenses (World Bank, 2020), Colombo saw China's BRI funds as an opportunity to address investment shortages in order to participate in the growing commercial trade in the IOR.

SRI LANKA'S MARITIME DEVELOPMENTS

The island's proximity to the busy sea lines of communication (SLOCs) provides Sri Lanka with an opportunity to grow its blue economy. This opportunity is a double-edged sword as increased traffic in its sea lanes produces a need for furthering its security in its economic exclusion zones, which have seen a rise in illicit activities associated with drug transportation and threats to its fisheries. Sri Lanka also seeks to address maritime security gaps that became visible during the LTTE insurgency when the radical group successfully used small boats to transport arms and launch attacks of Sri Lanka Navy. Soon after President Xi Jinping publicised China's BRI objectives, Colombo announced its maritime strategy 2025, which included plans to tap into the resources made available by China's investments. China's previous presence at Sri Lanka's ports as a development and defence partner made Sri Lanka an ideal candidate for mutual growth objectives and an essential node in the BRI.

China's presence in Sri Lanka is prominent at two of Sri Lanka's largest ports, Colombo and Hambantota. In 2014, the two countries reached an agreement that would convert the Colombo Port into a smart city at the cost of US$1.4 billion, to be financed by the Chinese (Rossi, 2019). The contract for this development went to China Communication Construction Company (CCCC) and China Harbour Engineering Company (CHEC), both Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs). According to the agreement, China would control the expanded areas that would be added by reclamation. China Merchant Port Harbour Limited's (CMPHL) 99-year lease and 85 percent stake in the South Container Terminal at Port in Colombo, renovated with Chinese funding in 2013–2014, exemplifies the type of

agreements that emerged in exchange for China's investment (Chowdhary, 2015). Several observers highlight that these agreements potentially provide China with the strategic location and a site for docking People's Liberation Army—Navy ships, although both Colombo and Beijing have denied the these ports are being used for military purposes, especially after Chinese submarines made dock visits in 2014 (Singh, 2015; Pattanaik, 2019).

The more controversial decision illustrating Beijing's prominence in Sri Lanka is the 2016 transference of Hambantota's port authority for 99-years to CMPHL in exchange for US$ 1.12 billion to help service Colombo's US$ 66 billion national debt in 2016 (Moramudali, 2018). China's pre-existing presence at the port since 2007 allowed the two countries to transfer authority to China without extensive and transparent negotiations. In 2007, the CHEC had constructed the port for Colombo financed through loans from the Export-Import (EXIM) Bank of China. In 2009, the state also borrowed another US$190 million from EXIM for the construction of Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport (also by CHEC) near Hambantota (Wignaraja et al., 2020). At the time, the project promised to generate jobs in President Mahinda Rajapaksa's home constituency and divert port traffic from Colombo. Although Hambantota's intended commercial feasibility has yet to pan out for Sri Lanka, its proximity to major SLOCs and India, presents strategic and surveillance possibilities for China. After gaining authority over the management of Hambantota in 2017, China has invested more towards increasing the port's operational capacity and built a fueling depot managed by the China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation.

Not surprisingly, the transfer of Hambantota Port's authority to a Chinese SOE did not go unnoticed by domestic constituencies and the political opposition. It also produced criticism regarding the benefits of the BRI-related programmes for local economies (Al Jazeera, 2017; Daily Mirror, 2017). The lease also ratcheted up pressure from India and Sri Lanka's other development partners, who are concerned about China's expanding prominence. Furthermore, Colombo's external engagements reflect attempts to balance China's influence that takes into consideration the growing rivalries in the IOR, pressures from Sri Lanka's existing development and economic partners, and its democratic responsibilities.

COMPELLING EXTERNAL AND DOMESTIC FORCES

In 2013, the Mahinda Rajapaksa administration, often considered favorable towards China due to close ties established towards the end of LTTE insurgency, illustrated its willingness to open the country to the Belt and Road proposal to bolster the country's infrastructure. In the 2015 election, however, the administration lost the election to Maithripala Sirisena, who then became responsible for overseeing BRI's implementation and addressing the accompanying financial, domestic, and external pressures that called for maintaining sovereignty and balancing previous economic and strategic relations.

Upon coming to power, the Sirisena administration immediately sought to address the issues associated with the BRI agreements. In 2015, the state halted the US$ 1.4 billion Colombo Port City project to renegotiate the terms, a move produced by pressures from the citizens concerned about sovereignty and rising state debt. The project's reinstatement in 2016 and the leasing of additional 110 hectares of reclaimed land to CCCC reflected the dire economic pressures confronting the Sri Lankan government and China's considerable influence exerted through its dominant presence in the infrastructural projects and as an important source of defence-related acquisitions (Reuters, 2016). The matters came to head in 2016, when the state handed 80 percent stake in the Hambantota Port to CMPHL for 99 years and leased out another 15,000 acres of the surrounding land for Chinese economic zones due to an upcoming debt payment. Violent protests broke out in the country led by Buddhist organisations and the left-oriented Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (People's Liberation Front) trade unions associated with workers at the ports (Al Jazeera, 2017; Daily Mirror, 2017). The protestors demanded the state reconsider its decisions, although the port at the time was considered a white elephant that had yet to prove its economic feasibility (Marlow, 2018).

Although the domestic protests did not produce a significant reversal in the BRI policy or the lease of Hambantota, Colombo's economic and defence agreements since 2016 indicate state's shift towards balancing China's influence. An increasing number of questions regarding the debt and economic policy combined with the rising of new global rivalries compel the state towards a different approach. The country's adoption of the liberal economic model since the 1980s pegged its economic growth to export markets and tourism revenues, which exert pressures on continuing trade relations, especially in the context of deficit with China. Meanwhile, both India and the United States, two of Sri Lanka's most significant trade partners, continue to express their apprehensions regarding China's increasing presence in the country (Blanchard and Flint, 2017, p. 234). Colombo's management of ties with these two countries illustrate the state's attempts at countering China's clout.

The Sri Lanka-U.S. bilateral engagement began in the 1950s mainly through the U.S. Agency for International Development and Trade. That engagement deepened in the late 1990s through security cooperation when the United States designated the LTTE as a terrorist organisation and initiated intelligence sharing that assisted Sri Lanka in containing the insurgency. Washington's actions are often linked to the increasing need to contain terrorism globally as well as respond to the rising presence of China in the region. The U.S. declaration of LTTE as a terrorist organisation in 1998 also reduced the latter's external financing sources and its ability to acquire arms. In the post-2001 period, the United States also initiated defence-associated support to Sri Lanka by providing non-deadly systems. Since then, Sri Lanka-U.S. ties have transitioned from almost negligible into a constructive alliance. After the devastating 2004 tsunami, U.S. humanitarian assistance included an economic package and rescue efforts by the U.S. Navy and Marines that were well-received.

Two important variables continue to promote bilateral ties between Sri Lanka and the United States. First, Sri Lanka's economy relies heavily on garment exports to developed economies, such as the United States, Japan, and Germany, which are also a source of development aid. Despite expanding commercial relations with China, Sri Lanka's largest single export market is the United States, accounting for roughly 24 percent of the country's overseas sales (OEC, 2020). While China is Sri Lanka's largest trade partner, that relationship has produced a deficit favoring China. More recently, United States and Sri Lanka have also signed a few defence agreements and are increasing their naval cooperation (Ramchandran, 2019). Washington's recognition of Colombo's needs that influence its China policy promoted better ties in the past decade.

Increased cooperation between the United States and Sri Lanka is most visible in Sri Lanka's maritime modernisation efforts in the past decade. The modernisation is necessary due to its increasing need for maritime security contextualised by IOR trade expansion and a growing rivalry in the region. The USS Nimitz's visit to Sri Lanka during the Galle Dialogue in 2016 as the first U.S. naval carrier to visit in 32 years initiated a new era of naval cooperation between the two countries. The United States also granted US$39 million to boost Sri Lanka's maritime security, donated a cutter, and is aiding the formation of the Sri Lankan marine corps (Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, 2020). Consequently, Sri Lankan navy increased its presence in joint exercises involving the United States and other defence partners, such as India at Malabar, which indicated Sri Lanka's willingness to cooperate in efforts to counter China's growing influence in the IOR. More importantly, the United States and Sri Lanka also renewed and expanded the Acquisition and Cross Service Agreement (ACSA) in 2017, a move that stirred controversy among domestic groups critical of external pressures. Though the return of the pro-China Rajapaksa government in 2019 may be viewed as a problem for the efforts of the United States to bolster its relations with Sri Lanka, it is important to note that the original ACSA in 2007 was approved of by the same Rajapaksa administration. After returning to power in 2019, the Rajapaksa administration also unexpectedly sought to renegotiate the Hambantota lease with Beijing to appease the domestic groups critical of its growing reliance on China (Lo, 2019). Some political factions in Sri Lanka also look towards the United States and its allies to counter China's clout (Ayres, 2019).

Sri Lanka's recent bilateral agreements with India also illustrate the significance of the external actors in decision-making. It is important to note that along with India's proximity, which casts a shadow on its diplomatic and developmental decision making, India is one of the islands' largest trading partners. It is the source of 70 percent of the cargo at Colombo port and has provided estimated US$ 2.5 billion in development assistance over the years (Chazan, 2017). Since the initiation of the BRI projects, Colombo has sought to ease India's apprehensions regarding China's growing footprint in Sri Lanka through several statements and decisions.

New Delhi's threat perceptions, influenced by the disputed territories with China in India's north, shape its concerns of the BRI that runs close to its borders and in the case of Azad Kashmir, through it (Chakma, 2019). Although Azad Kashmir has been held by Pakistan since 1948, India continues to claim it as an occupied territory. After the British departed in 1947, China claimed parts of Kashmir and the state of Arunanchal Pradesh in India's northeast. The two countries dealt with the dispute through diplomacy until 1962, when a war between them resulted in a loss of territory for India. The BRI-related developments in the proximity of the disputed border regions have heightened tensions and triggered deadly skirmishes between China and India (2017 and 2020). Both China and India seek to develop and increase their security infrastructure near the disputed areas. India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi's refusal to attend the BRI summit in June 2019 is an indicator of the lack of agreement between the two countries on the BRI.

New Delhi's responses to China's aggressive actions in the north includes increasing accommodation of its neighbors in the IOR and, more specifically, Colombo's requirements. After China announced its BRI plans in South Asia in 2013, India adopted a "Neighborhood First" policy to address what it sees as an attempt of encirclement of India by China. In 2015, Modi announced New Delhi's Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) project, which sought to develop India's maritime infrastructure. Additionally, the state recently shifted its attention and resources from its historically strong mainland naval ports, its eastern, southern, and western commands respectively, to the more strategically located islands of Andaman and Nicobar (ANI) for better surveillance and defence capabilities. In 2018, Sri Lanka also participated in the 10th biennial MILAN exercises with the 11 other countries in the vicinity of these islands (Chakma, 2019). The regularisation of the Indo Sri Lanka bilateral maritime exercise series, SLINEX also indicates increasing coordination and cooperation. Prime Minister Modi's two visits to Colombo in the past five years and a promise of development aid worth half a billion dollars sent a signal of future positive prospects between the two countries. In response to New Delhi's overtures, both Sirisena and Gotabaya Rajapaksa, upon coming to power in 2015 and 2019 respectively, visited India soon after their election. Most recently, Sri Lanka announced it would prioritise India's interests during strategic decision-making (PTI, 2020).

Colombo's pragmatic responses designed to balance its allies and respond to its domestic protestors also led to the selection of Japan and India as preferred developers for the upgrading of the blue-water port at Trincomalee. Japan's historical relationship with the country as a key development partner and an important source of commercial revenues could not be ignored when it made an offer to aid port developments. Although the decision was delayed when Rajapaksa's Sri Lanka People's Freedom Alliance won the election in 2019, Japanese presence remains apparent in the upgrading of Trincomalee.

CONCLUSION

China's narrative of mutual benefits embedded in the BRI's design to accomplish global economic and related security goals has produced widespread acceptance of the initiative in several countries located on its planned land and sea routes. For those willing to participate in the initiative, Beijing promises development and defence aid with apparently flexible terms to support the economic and security agendas of governments in power. Yet, the BRI is a commercial and a military venture that advances China's ability to influence emerging markets and to boost its security arrangements at the global level. The use of China's SOEs and accompanying security apparatus for implementing the BRI projects provides Beijing with extensive surveillance and influence across the BRI's path. The implementation of the BRI produces new and important economic and security imperatives for the countries on its path as well as other powers that are engaged with these countries. Furthermore, the resulting integration of markets will no doubt influence future global relations as well. Not surprisingly, the BRI's expansion has resulted in a cautious reaction among other global and competing regional powers that view the initiative as displacing their existing commercial and security arrangements. Countering moves, or rearranging of ties, because of the BRI becomes necessary for countries, which are producing new rivalries in the IOR while intensifying existing ones, such as the one between India and China.

Colombo's participation in the BRI project illustrates the complexity that surrounds the invitation of the BRI for developing economies as they attempt to take advantage of China's offer and accommodate others at the same time. No doubt, Sri Lanka requires new resources for advancing its economy under market-led framework that it adopted in the 1980s and 1990s. As a prospective middle income country and an emerging market, Sri Lanka seeks investments, or grants, for increasing its commercial infrastructure, energy supplies, and related defence technologies that allow it to take advantage of growing use of the SLOCs located in its EEZs. Simultaneously, external and internal pressures require that Colombo balances its global relationships and also respond to the demands for transparency and sovereignty from its constituencies.

REFERENCES

Al Jazeera (2017). 'Protest over Hambantota port deal turns violent', *AI Jazeera* [online]. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/01/protest-hambantota-port-deal-turns-violent-170107080155843.html (Accessed: 26 August 2020).

Ayres, A. (2019), 'The Geopolitical Consequences of the Sri Lankan Election', *Council on Foreign Relations*, blog post 20 November 2019. Available at: https://www.cfr.org/blog/geopolitical-consequences-sri-lankan-election (Accessed: 12 August 2020).

Blanchard, JMF and Flint, C. (2017), 'The Geopolitics of China's Maritime Silk Road Initiative', *Geopolitics*, vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 223–245, doi: 10.1080/14650045.2017.1291503.

Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs (2020), U.S. relations with Sri Lanka: Bilateral relations factsheet, *U.S. Department of State*, 27 July, https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-sri-lanka/ (Accessed 24 September 2020).

Chakma, B. (2019), 'The BRI and India's Neighbourhood', *Strategic Analysis*, vol. 43, no. 3, pp. 183–186, doi: 10.1080/09700161.2019.1607030.

Clarke, M. (2018), 'The Belt and Road Initiative: Exploring Beijing's Motivations and Challenges for its New Silk Road', *Strategic Analysis*, vol. 42, no. 2, pp. 84–102. doi: 10.1080/09700161.2018.1439326.

Chizan, ,Y. (2017), 'India and China's Tug of War over Sri Lanka', *The Diplomat*. Available at: https://thediplomat.com/2017/05/india-and-chinas-tug-of-war-over-sri-lanka/ (Accessed: 26 August 2020).

Daily Mirror Online (2017), 'Port workers protest over Hambantota Port deal' *The Daily Mirror*, 6 January. Available at: http://www.dailymirror.lk/breaking_news/Port-workers-protest-over-Hambantota-Port-deal/108-121800 (Accessed: 26 August 2020).

Destradi, S. (2012), 'India and Sri Lanka's Civil War', *Asian Survey*, vol. 52, no. 3, pp. 595–616, doi: 10.1525/as.2012.52.3.595.

Foizee, B. (2020), 'Chinese influence never left Sri Lanka,' *Asia Times*. Available at: https://asiatimes.com/2020/02/chinese-influence-never-left-sri-lanka/ (Accessed: 12 August 2020).

Hashim, A. (2012) *When Counterinsurgency Wins*, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania.

Marlow, I. (2018), 'China's $1 Billion White Elephant', *Bloomberg*. Available at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-04-17/china-s-1-billion-white-elephant-the-port-ships-don-t-use (Accessed: 27 August 2020).

Moramudali, U. (2018), 'The Hambantota Port Deal: Myths and Realities,' *The Diplomat*. Available at: https://thediplomat.com/2020/01/the-hambantota-port-deal-myths-and-realities/ (Accessed: 12 August 2020).

OEC (2020), *Sri Lanka (LKA) Exports, Imports, and Trade Partners (2020)*. Available at: https://oec.world/en/profile/country/lka (Accessed: 27 August 2020).

Page, J. (2009), 'Port in a storm: how Chinese billions funded Army's battle to break Tigers', *The Times*, London (UK), May 2.

Pattanaik, S. (2019), 'India's Policy Response to China's Investment and Aid to Nepal, Sri Lanka and Maldives: Challenges and Prospects', Strategic Analysis, 43:3, 240-259, DOI: 10.1080/09700161.2019.1616372.

PTI (2020), 'Sri Lanka: Will have 'India first' policy, China port deal a mistake', *The Times of India*. Available at: https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/south-asia/will-have-india-first-policy-china-port-deal-a-mistake-lanka/articleshow/77754433.cms (Accessed: 26 August 2020).

Ramachandran, S. (2019), 'Sri Lankans Up in Arms Over US Military Pacts'. *The Diplomat*. Available at: https://thediplomat.com/2019/08/sri-lankans-up-in-arms-over-us-military-pacts/ (Accessed: 4 November 2020).

Reuters (2016). China's CCCC to resume Sri Lanka post project after 1 year suspension, *Reuters* (online) Available at reuters.com/article/sri-lanka-china-portcity-idUKL3N16N4H3.

Rossi, M. (2019), 'Next Hambantota? Welcome to the Chinese Funded U.S$1.4 Billion Port City Colombo in Sri Lanka'. *South China Morning Post*. Available at: https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopolitics/article/3009731/next-hambantota-welcome-chinese-funded-us14-billion-port-city (Accessed: 26 August 2020).

Singh, A. (2015), 'China's "Maritime Bases" in the IOR: A Chronicle of Dominance Foretold', *Strategic Analysis*, vol. 39, no. 3, pp. 293–297. doi: 10.1080/09700161.2015.1022320.

The Economist (2020), 'China wants to put itself back at the centre of the world', *The Economist*, 6 February. Available at: https://www.economist.com/special-report/2020/02/06/china-wants-to-put-itself-back-at-the-centre-of-the-world (Accessed: 19 August 2020).

Wignaraja, G., Panditaratne, D., Kannangara, P, and Hundlani, D. (2020), *Chinese investment in the BRI in Sri Lanka*, Chatham House, London.

World Bank (2020), 'Interest payments (% of expense) - Sri Lanka', Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/GC.XPN.INTP.ZS?locations=LK (Accessed: 26 August 2020).

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE USE OF FORCE IN MARITIME LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS*

Commodore Kanchana Banagoda

ABSTRACT

Most coastal states intend to use and control their own sea areas as stated in the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention. In that regard, the distinction between, 'sovereignty' and 'sovereign rights' of states become very important as it defines the framework for accomplishments. On the contrary, many prohibited activities i.e. illegal fishing, narco-transport, gun-running, human trafficking and smuggling occurs when a state is realised to be ineffective. To prevent these illegal activities, actions must be conducted by the relevant agents of coastal state, engaged in Maritime Law Enforcement (MLE) operations. Police and security forces are normally used for such enforcement purposes and they are mandated to serve and protect the communities and people. In such operations, 'force' may be applied for compliance purposes as the perpetrators rarely subject themselves to law. In many instances' loss of life, serious injury and considerable damage to vessels have been reported during the conduct of MLE operations as briefly explained in the four case studies. Subsequently, the rationale paved way for what is known as the 'Saiga Principles' which are 'Unavoidableness', 'Reasonableness' and 'Necessity'. These may be considered in the articulation of Rules of Engagement (ROE) of a state agency. In practice, these principles must be considered in MLE operations to ensure safety of both life and property. Further, the overall adherence to the 'Saiga Principles' would offer a higher credence to the overall conduct of the MLE operation, the agency and the coastal state concerned.

Keywords: Maritime Law Enforcement, Saiga Principles, Use of Force

INTRODUCTION

'Use of Force' is inherent to human nature and this natural instinct of man has been demonstrated at various degrees, from maintaining order within his own clan to the extent of violent execution of force against enemy parties. Thus force has always entailed submission by the opponent by bending the will of a group or community for one's own advantage. This was observed in numerous confrontations that occurred amongst communities, states and even alliances. Having experienced the

* The author wishes to express his sincere gratitude to Professor Robin Warner, Head, Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security, University of Wollongong for his guidance and input.

destruction of the two World Wars, numerous calls were made to regulate the use of force in general. The preamble to the UN Charter emphasises the importance of international peace and security, stipulates certain conditions for the use of force in the global system (The Charter of the United Nations, 1945). Similarly, 'coercion' may be applied by Law Enforcement (LE) agencies of the state in times of need, to shape the human behaviour and thereby preventing harm to the society (Lersch, 2008, p.282). In fact, "use of force and firearms", "arrest and detention', 'search and seizure" are recognised as fundamental law enforcement powers (International Rules and Standards for Policing- ICRC, 2015, p.34). Such application of force by state agents would be considered normal, for the possible indocile behaviour of the perpetrators they are after. As Klockars stated in 1985, "No police anywhere has ever existed, nor is it possible to conceive of a genuine police ever existing, that does not claim a right to compel other people forcibly to do something. If it did not claim such a right, it would not be a police" (Lersch, 2008, p.283). In contrast, the use of force if exceeded beyond justification, might affect the normativeness of legitimacy (Gerber and Jackson, 2016, p.79). Therefore, it is better to know the importance and the correct method of use of force, in the contemporary setting.

The vast ocean space of over 70% of the globe is considered woefully under protected which needs regulation and control constantly (Urbina, 2019, p.xiv). It is well-known that boarding is being conducted for checking purposes, yet, could be dangerous when done at sea, since such boarding may not always be obliged by the receiving party. Therefore, the use of force in the maritime environment by agents of state, is not uncommon to compel 'obedience' by subjects. This helps maintain the legal status of affairs in the ocean. After all, a prime function of the law is said "to regulate the consequences of illegality" (Berman, 2006, p9-10).

Therefore, it is required to examine the scope of the use of force in the context of law enforcement (LE) operations in the maritime domain. This article examines the relevant aspects of international law that applies in Maritime Law Enforcement (MLE) operations. Then, a few of the prominent cases in which the use of force has been examined by national/international tribunals regarding MLE were discussed to bring out current and salient principles of application that are accepted in the global context.

THE LEGAL CONTEXT

There are different systems of law i.e. international and national. Both are considered parallel, complementary, equally correct and legitimate in implementing maritime law (Kelsen, 1959, p.627). The use of force at sea has been observed in naval battles during general war situations as well as in MLE operations, in times other than war. MLE may include actions that include investigation and prosecution in implementing all applicable laws of the state on the conduct or consequences of

a subject, under and over national and international waters (McLaughlin, 2016, p.465). These would normally be governed by the customary international law if no legislation to that effect is available, whereas, warfare at sea would be considered under the International Human Rights Law (IHL) (Moore, 2016, p.27). Besides, national legislations which have duly incorporated Customary International Law would empower LE officials to act in such a way to "exercise police powers, power of arrest and detention" in exercising sovereign rights during which a defiant may be compelled to surrender, as a result of the use force (UNODC Resource Book, 2017). What is more, such use of force is generally defined as "Physical action, including the use of firearms, which may threaten or cause harm, including lethal harm to a person, damage their property, or restrict their movement" (The Caribbean Human Rights and Use of Force Model Policy, 2018, p.8). It could be seen that the notion of the use of force has been embedded practically in international law as well as the national law systems. The national legal framework is to ensure the actual applicability of international law within the domestic system, in conformity, a member state would align its national laws for the fulfilment of international obligations. After all, it is the international law that governs the relationship between entities with legal capacities, thus setting a common standard.

Law remains the foundation in enforcement where a system of established behaviour is to be adhered to by subjects: this may be equally applied in the maritime environment. The United Nations Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS) provides different prescriptive jurisdictions for states in their capacities of flag, port and coastal status (Shearer, 1986, p.320). There are maritime applications under UNCLOS which has been strengthened by other International Conventions i.e. fisheries, customs, immigration, suppression of violence at sea, narcotics and security in common interest where use of force is permissible (Moore, 2016, p.28-29). Clearly, the law is expected to "define (and define properly) the very limited number of situations in which the use of force is permissible; to regulate and control the use of force even when it is permissible; to determine when force that has been used was not permissible; and to regulate the consequences of resort to force, both permissible and impermissible" (Berman, 2006, p.10). Ultimately, the responsibility of maintaining peace and security through law and order would be vested upon the state, therefore, law enforcement operations would be inevitably conducted for its best interests.

Accordingly, coastal states can exercise enforcement jurisdiction, thus empowering its officials as prescribed in Article 224 of Part XII of the UNCLOS that is dedicated to the "Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment"'. However, the UNCLOS remains silent on the way or steps a coastal state might take in the use of force against delinquent vessels. At the same time, in the Article 225 of LOSC, it is specifically stated that the safety of navigation and risk of pollution of the marine environment shall be averted (Shearer, 1986, p.342). Yet, at the outset in its preamble, the UNCLOS, 1982 promotes the "peaceful uses of the seas and oceans"

and allows member states with the execution part to their best of ability, thereby stressing upon the effect in the broadest terms.

Domestic (National) laws are meant for the appropriate empowerment of authorised officials/agents of the state in following the due process of discharge of their LE duties. Owing to this, credence would be higher when no customary international law is breached in the functional aspects as sanctioned by the domestic laws.

PROTECTION OF LIFE

All such possible protective measures have been instilled by law for the possibility of authorised officials' potential usage of firearms and weapons, which is considered lethal (UNODC Resource Book on the Use of Force and Firearms in Law Enforcement, 2017, p.20). Almost all international LE instruments have iterated the 'safety of life' as an outcome of aforesaid principles, in the potential use of force at sea (Moore, 2016, p.30-34). Consequently, having offered the 'functional immunity', the state must render guidance and bear the responsibility for the acts of its authorised officials/agents. In 1964, the then USSR was faulted by USA as 'excessive' for directing fire on an American vessel named 'Sister Katinge' (O'connell, 1975, p.67). Apart from this, State officials engaged in LE operations on land are additionally advised on 'precaution', 'non-discrimination' and 'accountability' in their discharge of duties (UNODC Resource Book on the Use of Force and Firearms in Law Enforcement, 2017, p.16). These additions seem to have connections to human rights and developed from the application of customary international law principles. After all, the right of life of any person is upheld universally — through MLE, it is only intended to prevent wrongful actions through the control of perpetrators' behaviour. The principles developed through passage of time could be applied in the Rules of Engagement (ROE) which are devised in Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for State agencies which are involved in MLE operations.

THE CASE OF THE SAILING VESSEL 'I'M ALONE'

Having the sanctions of the state to use force alone has not made affairs easy for authorised officials engaged in MLE operations. The case of the sailing vessel *I'm Alone* (1929) where the United States Coast Guard (USCG) was involved in the MLE activities is one such instance (Shearer, 1986, p.341). On 22nd March 1929, during a period of prohibition, this Canadian flagged schooner type vessel was returning from Belize with contraband liquor, when she was intercepted in the Gulf of Mexico by *USCGC Wolcott*. A hot pursuit was initiated as the vessel disobeyed orders to stop. The schooner later sank due to the firing of *USCGC Dexter*, which too had joined in the hot pursuit. One member of the sailing vessel was reported dead during the incident and the remaining seven were rescued and imprisoned in the USA. During the arbitration, it was noted that the Government of USA had

the right of hot pursuit, the use of necessary and reasonable force for boarding, searching, seizing and bringing the suspected vessel into port (UN Reports of International Arbitral Awards, 1933 and 1935). If the sinking of the vessel *I'm Alone* occurred incidental to aforesaid action, the actions of USCG was pronounced to be entirely blameless. However, the use force for the intentional sinking of *I'm Alone*, it was held, could not be justifiable for which compensation was ordered. It was known for the sailing vessel's attempt to outrun and out manoeuvre its pursuers for two days, which was stopped as a result of the firing by *USCGC Dexter*. it was held that the principle of necessity of the application of proportionate force had been violated by the USCG Officials.

THE CASE OF THE FISHING TRAWLER 'RED CRUSADER'

A similar MLE incident made history which occurred on 29th May 1961, in the North Atlantic sea area off the Faroe Island. The Danish frigate *HMDS Niels Ebbesen* opened fire on the Scottish trawler *Red Crusader*, which had been fleeing with the fish catch and an unarmed Danish boarding party. The skipper of the fishing trawler had decided to escape even after being arrested for an alleged fishing offense, within the EEZ of Denmark (Mclaughlin, 2018, p.91). The captain of the Danish frigate had escalated in the application of force to stop the fleeing trawler, by opening fire using 20 mm and 40 mm non explosive rounds. The *Red Crusader* had continued her escape to Aberdeen, Scotland, in spite of having sustained damages to her bow, masts and antenna. Before that, the skipper of the *Red Crusader* had allowed the Danish boarding party to disembark, after the intervention of the Royal Navy frigate *HMS Troubridge*. Luckily, no personnel were reported to have been injured during the incident. *HMDS Niels Ebbesen* had continued the pursuit of the trawler until it reached the territorial waters of the UK. During the arbitration, it was noted that the *Red Crusader* was duly arrested for a fishery violation by *HMDS Niels Ebbesen*. Afterwards, the skipper of the fishing trawler had fled to evade detention, with an unarmed Danish boarding party. The Commanding Officer of *HMDS Niels Ebbesen* was found to have exceeded the legitimate use of armed force for firing without an appropriate warning in the way of a solid gunshot. The coercive action is believed to have continued with the direct firing at the *Red Crusader*, thereby creating danger to human life on board (UN Reports of International Arbitral Awards, 1962). It was opined that other means should have been used to stop the fleeing vessel rather than firing upon at first. In this instance, it appears that principles of unavoidability and reasonableness were not fulfilled in the conduct of said MLE operation (Moore, 2016, p.35). Practically, such defiant manoeuvers may be quite challenging for a ship's captain in the execution of his duties. However, it was concluded that the resentment caused by evasion of arrest, abducting the boarding party and non-compliance to orders does not permit violent action in the conduct of MLE operations.

THE CASE OF THE FISHING TRAWLER 'GOLFSTRIM'

There had been incidents of use of force that had been purely handled by national legislations. On 22nd June 1968, the Argentinian destroyer *ARA Santa Cruz* fired upon the Soviet fishing vessel *Golfstrim*, when it defied the orders to stop her evasive movement (O'connell, 1975, p.67). When the order was given, she was found illegally fishing within the newly proclaimed 200-mile territorial/ patrimonial sea with another Russian fishing vessel Pavlov. The Soviet fishing vessel *Golfstrim* suffered multiple holes in the hull and the destruction of four cabins after receiving five rounds of explosive shells, however, no personnel were found injured. Subsequently, both ships were arrested, detained, investigated and released after the due payment of the prescribed fine to the Argentinian Courts by the Soviet shipping agency (Pons, 1977, p.119). Initially, the Russian authorities had documented a protest through its diplomatic channels on the illegality of the action taken by Argentinian authorities. Eventually, both nations had accepted the court verdict, therefore, the situation had not escalated any further.

It is evident from the three cases discussed above that some form of 'force' has to be used in the execution of the MLE operations as it is very difficult to combat crime and apprehend the perpetrators at sea. None of the skippers nor the crew have submitted themselves to be questioned or arrested by the authorities. Naturally, this could be for the likelihood of detention as well as the confiscation of the catch/ goods which tempts them to flee, by using all available means. Therefore, authorised agents of the State are much likely to use some form of force to imply submission.

THE CASE OF THE 'MV SAIGA'

On 28th November 1997, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) delivered its judgement on the prompt release of the St. Vincent and the Grenadines flagged oil tanker *MV Saiga* and its crew from the arrest made by Guinea. The case concerned the arrest of the bunkering vessel *MV SAIGA* off the coast of West Africa by the Guinean officials and was the first judgment made within a duration of less than a month. Much later, a landmark decision was made by the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in its second case of MV Saiga 2 in 1999 with regards to the use of force in MLE operation. In that, the ITLOS pronounced the existence of three basic principles that will regulate the use of force in stopping a private vessel. The principles identified were 'unavoidability', 'reasonableness' and 'necessity' which are to be met in the use of force during MLE operations (Tondini, 2017, p.253). Therefore, these 'Saiga Principles' are now being widely accepted as basic considerations in arriving on the appropriateness of the decision of the use of force.

The earlier cases decided by international courts and tribunals had paved way in the judicial process by the ITLOS in deciding the *MV Saiga* case 2 which are considered to be classical and a landmark decision on the use of force, thus, creating namesake principles (Moore, 2016, p.28). The *MV Saiga* was an oil tanker flying the flag of St. Vincent and the Grenadines. It was owned, charted, and managed by Cyprus, Switzerland and Scotland entities respectively. During the period of concern, it was serving as a bunkering vessel that supplied fuel to fishing vessels and other vessels off the coast of Guinea in West Africa. On 28th October 1997, *MV Saiga 2* was arrested by a Guinean customs patrol boat in the high seas after a hot pursuit which began from the Guinean EEZ. In the progress of the arrest, *MV Saiga 2* was fired upon with live ammunition and as a result, two crew members were reported to have severely injured. The arrested vessel was taken to the port of Conakry in Guinea, where the ship and its crew other than injured were detained. During the arbitration of the second case of ITLOS, it was revealed that the Guinean officials had not effectively commenced the hot pursuit, neither given necessary auditory and visual signals to stop (International Tribunal for Law of the Sea - case no 2, 1999). It was noted that the Guinean officials had fired live ammunition at *MV Saiga* without a warning, when the tanker did not heed to their radio calls to stop. The tanker had been fully laden with its oil cargo and moving at a slow speed of 10 knots into which a boarding may have easily been done. Subsequent to the boarding where no resistance was experienced from the crew, Guinean officials were reported to have fired live ammunition arbitrarily at the decks and at the engine to stop it. The intentional discharge of firearms had resulted in causing severe injuries to two crew members and damaged the radio room and the engine room. Such use of excessive force and endangering human life by Guinean officials were pronounced to have violated rights of St Vincent and the Grenadines and hence compensation was awarded. Accordingly, what is now known as the 'Saiga Principles' came into being and resultantly 'Unavoidableness', 'Reasonableness' and 'Necessity' being upheld as vital principles to be considered in the use of force in MLE. In this case, it was found that all above principles have been violated by Guinean officials.

UNAVOIDABLENESS

As per the first principle, force may be used as there is no possible alternatives in the attainment of defensible interests. In fact, the availability of other less extreme means may remain ineffective in the achievement of the lawful objective at sea. In 1994, there had been an attempt of ramming by an illegal trawler when the Norwegian coast guard vessel attempted cutting the trawl wire as an alternative method of LE in the fishery protection zone of Svalbard (Skram, 2016, p.296). Similarly, use of force may be considered necessary in extreme situations where there is a protential risk of life to the authorised official whose duty is to protect/ enforce laws of their state. This is supposed to answer the question, whether it is the

lawful for the use of force (Tondini, 2017, p.262). Conditions of implementation are broadly explained in the UN guidelines for Law Enforcement Officials of 1990 as well as the Caribbean Human Rights and Use of Force Model Policy of 2017.

REASONABLENESS

Reasonableness is the second principle. It desires the action to stem from reason and sound judgement. Actually, every effort must be made to exclude the use of firearms, if used, it should be objectively intended, and no exceeding force must be applied. Each use of the weapon must precede careful assessments of the situation, the maximum permissible force and minimum requirement of force in the attainment of the objective. This as a decision cycle is required to be repeated for each use, after considering the results of the immediately preceding operation? (UNODC Resource Book on the Use of Force and Firearms in Law Enforcement, 2017, p.78-79). This is supposed to answer the question of means and methods of use of force (Tondini, 2017, p.262-263). In fact, the limiting condition is well expressed in the UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials of 1979, which may be used as a guideline by others.

NECESSITY

Necessity being the third principle goes in tandem with proportionality. The use of force must be undertaken 'with restraint', 'absolutely necessary' and 'strictly proportionate' in achieving the intended objective (Tondini, 2017, p.264). There must be a delicate and a graduated balance of the force applied to the resistance offered in response to the MLE situations. It is emphasised to inquire the seriousness of the offence committed, to that end, benefits achieved must outweigh the harm caused through the use of force. This will answer the question why force was used and is mentioned in the Article 3 of the UN Code of Conduct for LE Officials of 1979.

CONCLUSION

The ultimate responsibility of maintaining peace and security in its territory through law and order is vested upon the state. Agents of state, in their tour of duty may use force to compel 'obedience' by perpetrators in preventing harm to the society. Such applications may not be uncommon in the maritime environment, but in there, the applicable legal regimes might vary in forms of Flag State, Coastal State and Port State. Excessive use of force has been denounced and the importance of human life is stressed in almost all legal instruments.

Boarding is conducted at sea for checking purposes, yet, could be dangerous when the receiving party is not acting obeisantly. Also, it is not so easy to regulate the consequences of illegality at sea, due to the inherent nature of the environment. This was clearly observed in the cited cases in which the use of force had been examined by national/international tribunals regarding MLE. Therefore, it is found that that the knowledge of current and salient principles of application is important for compliance purposes.

The 'Saiga Principles' remain noteworthy in the global interpretation of use of force, as LOSC does not directly address this aspect, which can only be decided relying on the customary international law and the decided cases. These principles had been subsequently applied in the ITLOS case number 19 involving MV Virginia (Panama versus Guinea-Bissau) and found that state action taken had been legitimate (Moore, 2016, p.30). Much prominence is now given to the safety of personnel on board and to the ship they travel. Moreover, the credence upon the whole effort of MLE would be preserved through the establishment of 'Saiga Principles', thereby, creating standards for all stakeholders. Sovereign rights of the State in MLE operations could be exercised through the validation of such widely accepted principles.

In the functional aspects, 'Unavoidableness', 'Reasonableness' and 'Necessity' could be applied for adjudicatory purposes as well as in the formulation of the Rules of Engagement (ROE) for MLE operations. In the conduct of MLE, a force is reckoned to be used in controlling the behaviour of perpetrators, by the agents of state. In these scenarios, the actual use of force or else the display of intent may be done for compliance purposes without which, defiance would be most probable. Perpetrators may use all means and methods to evade arrest, however, the burden of the conduct of duty is directly vested on the state, through its agent. Force is meant to be used as the last resort and it is vital to ensure that life is not endangered in so far as practicable. In no way the resentment caused by evasion of arrest and non-compliance to orders should permit the agent of the state to resort to the undue use of force, or as a as punitive measure, during MLE operations. In essence, the 'Saiga Principles' are expected to preserve human life and property in a highly dangerous and dynamic environment under which the MLE operations are executed at sea.

REFERENCES

Berman, F., (2006). The UN Charter and the Use of Force. 10th ed. Singapore *Yearbook of International Law and Contributors*, pp. 9-17.

Gerber, M. M. & Jackson, J. (2017). Justifying violence: legitimacy, ideology and public support for police Use of Force. *Psychology, Crime & Law*, pp.1-17.

International Rules and Standards for Policing. The International committee of the Red Cross. 2015.

International Tribunal for Law of the Sea. (1999) M/V Saiga "NO 2" Case (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea)

Kelsen, H.,(1959). Sovereignty and International Law. *Georgetown Law Journal*, 48(4). pp.267- 640

Lersch, K. M., Bazley, T., Mieczkowski, T. & Childs, K. (2008). Police Use of Force and neighbourhood characteristics: an examination of structural disadvantage, crime, and resistance. *Policing and Society*, 18, pp. 282-300.

Mclaughlin, R. (2016). Authorizations for maritime Law Enforcement Operations. *International Review of the Red Cros*s, 98, pp.465-490.

Mclaughlin, R. (2018). Revisiting the red Crusader Incident. *Australian Year Book of International* Law, 35, pp.91-121.

Moore, C. (2016). The Use of Force. In: Warner, R. & Kaye, S. (eds.) *Routledge Handbook of Maritime Regulation and Enforcement*. New York: Routledge, pp.27-40.

O'connell, D.P. (1975). *The Influence of Law on Sea Power*, Manchester University Press.

Pons, J. E. (1977). Fishery Law Enforcement. *North Carolina Journal of International Law & Commercial Regulations*, 2(2), pp.119-130.

Shearer, I. A. (1986). Problems of Jurisdiction and Law Enforcement against delinquent vessels. *International & Comparative Law Quarterly,* 35 (2), pp.320-343.

Skram, A.I & Grade, J.G. (2016). The Role of Coast Guards in Conflict Management: The Norwegian Experience. In: bekkevold, J. I. Till, G. (eds.) *International Order at Sea: What It Is. How It Is Challenged. How It Is maintained*. London: Springer.

The Caribbean Human Rights and Use of Force Model Policy. Kingston: The Independent Commission of Investigations of Jamaica and the United Nations. 2018.

Tondini, M. 2017. The Use of Force in the course of Maritime Law Enforcement Operations. *Journal on the Use of Force and International Law,* 4(2), pp.253-272.

United Nations, The Charter of the United Nations. (1945). *UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials*, adopted by General Assembly resolution 34/169.1979.

United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, 1990.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (2017).*Resource Book on the Use of Force and Firearms in Law Enforcement*, United Nations, New York.

Urbina, I. 2019. *The Outlaw Ocean*, London: Bodley Head.

ASCENDENCY OF CHINA AND CHANGING GLOBAL GEOPOLITICS: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Professor Gamini Keerawella

ABSTRACT

Prior to the advent of modern capitalism, China was a leading trading nation and the world's technological power. The decline of pre-modern China was directly linked to the Western colonial conquest of the East and the imposition of new global trade patterns linked with the 'Modern World System'. The infiltration into the Chinese economy remained one of the key motives of British imperialism in the 18th century. The establishment of the Peoples' Republic of China in 1949 marked a definite rupture of her dependency relationship with the global world system. The dynamic economic growth of China with market-economy reforms after 1978 was made possible due to the economic and social reforms set in motion since 1949. The continuous progress witnessed by China from the 1980s has made her a global power at the beginning of the new Millennium. Parallel to the ascendancy of China as a global power, a steady shift in her global role and her strategic thinking was visible. In the post-Cold War global context, the United States, as the sole superpower, was compelled to take serious note of the rise of China as an emerging global power. President Obama's cautious approach could not deter Chinese political and economic advances at the expense of US interests. The escalation of trade war between China and U.S. under the Trump administration resulted in the imposing of tariffs on each other's trading goods and services. The key front in the geo-political rivalry between China and the United States is the disruptive technologies. The significance of digital geopolitics and technology war between China and the United States must be viewed in the context of the evolving Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR). By the time of the outbreak of COVID-19 pandemic, the fronts of geo-political competition between the United States and China are more or less defined. Are these powers entangled in a Thucydides' Trap' in which a rising power challenges a ruling one? The peace and stability of the emerging post-COVID-19 world order would depend not only on the reactions of the established global power but also on that of the rest of the world to the rise of China and how China manages these key challenges and other responses.

Keywords: China's Ascendancy, Geopolitics, Global Rivalry

INTRODUCTION

The ascendancy of China to a great power status is perhaps the most striking feature of the changed distribution of economic and political power in global politics at the dawn of the 21st century. By placing the ascendency of China in a broad historical

and political context, this paper analyses the new interaction of China as a global power in rapidly changing post-Cold War global politics. As a point of departure to the understanding of the fall and rise of China, the paper traces the role of China in the pre-modern global system. The collapse of centrality of China in the pre-modern world systems is a direct consequence of the establishment of the modern world system and accompanied colonialism. Hence, the paper traces the evolution of the modern world system and the relegation of China to its periphery. Finally, it traces the rupture of dependency relationship after the Chinese Revolution in 1949 and subsequent resurgence of China as an emerging global power and its implications for changing global geo-politics.

CHINA IN THE PRE-MODERN GLOBAL ORDER

In order to trace the political and historical significance of the ascendancy of China since 1949, it is necessary to place it against the backdrop of the colonial domination of China in the 19th and the early 20th centuries. In a round table discussion at the Yale University in 2018 on 'China 2049 - New Era or New Threat', Aleh Tsyvinski observed that China's rise as a global economic power can be viewed as "China returning to its historical position following the 'century of humiliation' – a period between 1839 and 1949 when the country was subjected to interventions and invasion by Western powers and Japan" (Cummings, 2018). Before becoming prey to Western colonial machinations, China was a commercial and technological powerhouse. The downward trajectory of historical development was gradually reversed after the establishment of the Peoples Republic of China in 1949.

The Middle Kingdom was a world power and a global center of civilization well before the era of modern Capitalism. Prior to the arrival of the modern world system, there were three cultural zones in Asia, each of which functioned as its own world – the Chinese character zone in East Asia, the Nagari script zone in South Asia and the Arab alphabet zone in West Asia. Each zone functioned on socio-cultural and political dynamics of its own and interacted with each other through a number of modes. This broad civilizational connectivity and dialogue between the three zones in Asia gave credentials to the construct of the 'Orient'. In the flourishing long distance trade between Asia and Europe before the rise of the West, Asia enjoyed a huge trade surplus. In their path-breaking studies K. N. Chaudhary and Janet Abu-Lughod traced (Chaudhary, 1985; Abu-Lughod, 1991) how India, China and West Asia accumulated huge trade surplus vis-à-vis Europe. Based mostly on its low cost cotton textile production and export, India had a massive balance of trade surplus with Europe and some with West Asia. Consequently, India accumulated massive amounts of silver and some gold from the West. However, West Asia had a balance of trade surplus with Europe. West Asia covered its balance

of trade deficits with South, Southeast and East Asia with the re-export of bullion derived from its balance of trade surplus with Europe. China had a balance of trade surplus with everybody based on its unrivalled manufacturing efficiency and export of silks and porcelain and other ceramics (Chaudhary, 1985). China was not only the leading trading nation but also a world technological power between 1100-1800. As John Hobson (2006) pointed out, its innovations in the production of paper, book printing, firearms and tools made it a manufacturing powerhouse during this period. Seven centuries before the Britain's textile revolution in the 18th century, China was the world's leader in technical innovation in manufacturing textile (Petras, 2012).

COLONIAL INFILTRATION AND THE DECLINE OF CHINA

The decline of pre-modern China was directly linked to the colonial conquest of the East by Western colonial powers and the imposition of new global trade patterns linked with the 'Modern World System' (MWS). In the process of establishing MWS, the age-old long-distance Eurasian trade was remodeled to serve the interests of rising 'nation states' in Western Europe and imposed unequal trade by employing military force and intimidation. At first, Western colonial powers acquired and monopolised the Indian Ocean seaborne trade and attempted to divert land-based intercontinental trade to oceanic routes. Subsequently, they infiltrated into Asian economies through the instruments of colonial domination.

The infiltration into the Chinese economy remained one of the key motives of British imperialism in the 18th century. There was great demand for Chinese tea, silk and porcelain in the British market, but there was no demand for British goods in the self-sufficient Chinese society. The British did not have the required silver to trade with China. In order to resolve the problem of payment, the East India Company, the vessel of British imperialism of the day, practiced a system of barter based on Indian opium. Consequently, the sheer increase in opium addicts in China became a serious social issue. When China attempted to address this menace by banning opium in the port city of Canton, Britain reacted with military force and declared war against China – resulting in the First Opium War in 1839. After military victory, the British forced China to enter the Treaty of Nanjing in 1842 in which Hong Kong was ceded and trading rights in the port cities of Canton and Shanghai were snatched, in addition to a large indemnity to the British. After the British, other Western colonial powers also followed suit and demanded similar privileges through the Treaty of Wangxia by the United States in July and the Treaty of Huangpu by France in October 1844.

When the Second Opium War broke out in 1856, the Western Colonial powers were ready to impose their authority on China more forcefully. In 1860 British-French joint forces invaded Beijing, driving the reigning Chinese emperor out of the capital (Pletcher, 2019). The vandalism of the famous Summer Palace by British troops in October 1860 was just another example of Colonial looting.

After 1860, the disintegration of the Chinese state was accelerated on the face of continuous Western imperial pressure, despite some attempts to reform. The growing antipathy of the Chinese people against the Western and the Japanese intervention in China was manifested in the Boxer Uprising in 1900. A joint international force that included American troops subdued the uprising and China was forced to pay more than US$300 million in reparations under the Boxer Protocol in 1901 (History, 2009). As a result of continuous political turmoil, the Qing Dynasty lost much of its influence in the provinces by 1911 and local warlords came forward to fill the political vacuum. In this context, republic political ideology gained currency among some sections of Chinese educated middle class. The ideological basis for the republican movement was the 'Three Principles of the People' presented by Sun Yat-sen, i.e., nationalism, democracy, and socialism. The Xinhai Revolution of 1911 resulted in overthrowing the Qing Dynasty and establishing a Republic of China on February 12, 1912. Sun Yat-sen set up a provisional government in Nanjing with the support of Yuan Shikai, the Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Army, who took over the capital and forced the emperor to abdicate the throne. The uneasy alliance between Yuan Shikai and Sun Yat-sen was short lived. The establishment of the Republic of China in 1912 neither brought political stability nor ended the Western colonial domination. Instead, it ushered in a new phase of political turmoil, conflict among warring warlords and military occupation of imperial powers. Along with Western Colonial powers, Japan also entered the colonial prey in China in the 20th century. The Versailles Peace Treaty after the First World War recognised the Japanese claims to former German rights in the Shandong peninsula of China.

In the first half of the 20th century, Japan entered China more ferociously by invading Manchuria in 1931 and installing a puppet government in 1932. The Japanese launched major attacks on Beijing, Shanghai and Nanking in 1937. The atrocities committed by the invading Japanese army in and around Nanjing during a six-week period in December 1937 and January 1938, known as the Nanjing Massacre, were an infamous manifestation of the cruelty of Japanese colonialism in China. By the time of the outbreak of World War II, Japan was occupying much of the eastern part of China.

THE CHINESE REVOLUTION AND RUPTURE OF THE DEPENDENCY RELATIONSHIP

The establishment of the Peoples' Republic of China in 1949 following the victory of the Chinese Communist Revolution marked a definite rupture of its dependency relationship with the global world system to which China was forcefully integrated during the preceding century. After years of national humiliation, the Chinese people recovered their pride and national dignity in 1949. The modern Chinese state took its present character and shape as a result of the Chinese Communist revolution. The new state was established on a set ideology, which was the basis for its institutional apparatus and the organisation of human and physical base. It is this state that works as the motor of social and economic reforms and the engine of growth. It abolished the extraterritorial privileges, which were snatched by Western powers in the past and put to end the unequal trade pattern with the global centers of the world system. The economic and social reforms, launched after 1949, paved the way for the gradual ascendency of modern China. The agrarian reforms changed the old forms of relations of agrarian production as well as production forces, providing lands, infrastructure and technical assistance to hundreds of millions of landless peasants. The state investment and public enterprise helped to develop infrastructure such as road networks, canals and bridges that laid down the base of industrial production and modern economy. As James Petras (2018) noted, "China's sustained growth in its manufacturing sector was a result of highly concentrated public investments, high profits, technological innovations and a protected domestic market". The dynamic economic growth of China with market-economy reforms after 1978 was made possible due to the economic and social reforms set in motion since 1949. The four modernisations launched systematically after 1978 has a long history, going back to Mao days. During the years of the 'Great Leap Forward', Mao Zedong urged that modernisation of industry, agriculture, science and technology was to be completed in 1972. Once again in January 1963, Zhou Enlai referred to four modernizations, comprising agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology and urged professionals in the sciences to realise them. As such, economic modernisation after 1978 was not a sudden departure from the past. It must not be forgotten that the sustained growth in the manufacturing sector with pro-market reforms was a result of highly concentrated public investments, technological innovations and dynamic export strategy where Chinese state played a key role.

One of the key objectives of China's foreign policy in the 1950s and the 1960s was building solidarity with the 'new states' in the Afro-Asian world. Within the limited openings China had at the time in international politics, China identified itself with the anti-colonial struggles in the context of decolonisation, offering them moral and political support. At the Asia-African Conference held in Bandung in 1955, Zhou

Enlai called for increased cooperation between the countries of Asia and Africa. The modus operandi of Zhou Enlai at Bandung earned him much recognition among the delegates. In the 1960s and 1970s, China was in the forefront of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). However, by the end of 1970s, the ideological factor in international affairs receded in the changed national and global context. The new turn in its foreign policy that was propelled by economic considerations of rapid economic transformation and growth and a restructured global role became apparent after 1978.

ASCENDENCY OF CHINA AS A GLOBAL POWER

The continuous progress witnessed by China in many spheres from 1980s and resultant spectacular GDP growth has made it a global power at the beginning of the new Millennium, with powerful trading, financial and investment networks covering the entire world. China's entry into the World Trade Organisation in 2001 helped it cement its status as the world's factory and largest trader. China has surpassed the United States as the number one destination for foreign investment and the exporter of information technology products in 2018. Accordingly, China is the world's third-largest trading power.

Parallel to the ascendancy of China as a global power, a steady shift in its global role and its strategic thinking as to its maritime domains has also taken place. In 2004, President Hu Jintao articulated the 'new historic mission' for the PLAN, underscoring the mission of the Navy in providing strategic support to maintain China's national interests. Consequent to redefining the role of the PLAN, naval modernisation progressed rapidly covering all aspects of naval missions. *The '2010 Ocean Development Report*', the first comprehensive document on China's maritime activities published by the State Oceanic Administration of China, indicated that enhancing maritime power is China's historic task for the 21st century. The report specifically mentions 'protecting' authority over 'relevant waters', developing the maritime economy, and strengthening ocean and land management (MacDonald, 2013, p.10).

The port construction projects undertaken by China in the Indian Ocean littoral is perhaps the most talked about aspect of the Chinese Naval Diplomacy. When China faced the issue of reinvesting the capital generated by external trade surplus, it turned to her traditional allies in the Indian Ocean region and used its capital strength to lure them to embark on port construction projects with Chinese loans.

The new global leadership role that China came forward to play is manifested in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure

Investment Bank (AIIB). In October 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping unveiled the two components of the infrastructure project under the One Belt-One Road: the Silk Road Economic Belt and the Maritime Silk Road at the informal leadership meeting of Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). It was rephrased as the 'Belt and Road Initiative' in 2016. The declared objectives of BRI are mainly three-fold: (1) find a way for global economic growth in the post-financial crisis era, (2) realise global rebalancing and (3) create a new model for regional cooperation in the 21st century. It is very pertinent to quote Wang Yiwei (2016, p.16) to highlight the Chinese perception on BRI: "The Belt and Road Initiative shoulders the responsibility of realizing the Chinese Dream. After the Chinese dream of realizing the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation was proposed, a viable path and a road map were needed. The Belt and Road Initiative has undertaken this task of great significance."

Simultaneously, China initiated the establishment of an International Financial Institution, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). *The Economist* (2014) observed that "China's decision to fund a new multilateral bank rather than give more to existing ones reflects its exasperation with the glacial pace of global economic governance reform. The same motivation lies behind the New Development Bank established by the BRICS".

The foreign policy direction of China under President Xi Jinping is determined by the political, economic and strategic requirements of China as ascending global power. The convergence of domestic and global compulsions is manifested in the three main components of the present Chinese foreign policy: i) the socialism with Chinese characteristics; ii) the community of shared future for mankind; and iii) the Belt and Road initiative. According to Xi Jinping, "socialism with Chinese characteristic consists of a path, theory and system. The 18th National Congress expounded on the scientific meaning of the path, theory and system of socialism with Chinese characteristics, and the relationships between the three. All three serve the great cause of building Chinese socialism" (Xi, 2014, p.9). After the Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2019, Xinhua reported that "[T]he world is now undergoing profound changes unseen in a century. Building a community with a shared future for mankind, which was proposed by China, is a grand trend. It is also the right choice to ensure the harmonious co-existence of countries in the Asia-Pacific region as well as around the whole world" (Commentary, 2019). Furthermore, China admitted that globalisation is an irreversible process and China is on the correct side of history. Hence, China wanted to promote inclusive globalisation. The BRI is presented as a proposal for a new world order.

The metamorphosis of China into a global power coincided with the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR). It must be remembered that the technological advances

brought forward by the earlier industrial revolutions contributed to establishing the technological and economic supremacy of the West over the 'rest'. In highlighting the political implications of the Industrial Revolution, Marx once said: "The cheap prices of its commodities are the heavy artillery with which it batters down all Chinese walls" (Marx, 1965, p.53). The mercantile capital, industrial capital and corporate capital that propelled the First, Second and Third Industrial Revolutions were mainly West-based. On all these occasions, China became a dire casualty of the industrial take off of the West. When it comes to the 4IR, China does not want to see the repetition of the same history. Therefore, China is determined not to be left behind from this epochal historical development. Identified as 'disruptive technologies', this new generation of emerging technologies are presently having a profound impact on the way people live, work, do business and communicate with each other. China released its 'New Generation Plan' in 2017, outlining its strategy to create a technological infrastructure capable of leading 4IR by 2030. Unlike earlier occasions, China is better positioned today to proceed with 4IR as an emerging global power.

CHANGING GLOBAL GEOPOLITICS AND CHINA-US RELATIONS

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States became the sole superpower in global politics. The voluntary dissolution of the Soviet Union that resulted in ending the Cold War was interpreted as an ideological victory for Liberal Democracy and the 'end of history', claiming that the 'great competition of the 20th century' between Democracy and Socialism was over. Consequently, the hegemony of the United States as the single superpower became a fixture in the post-Cold War world order. However, the United States was compelled to take serious note of the meteoric rise of China as an emerging global power. In October 2000, the Bill Clinton administration signed the U.S.-China Relations Act, granting China permanent trade relations status with the United States, paving the way for it to join the World Trade Organization. By recognising Beijing as an emerging power, US Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick initiated strategic dialogue with China in 2005. Nevertheless, China has also been viewed as an emerging challenge to the geopolitical hegemony of the United States. The Summer Olympics in Beijing in 2008, the high-profile military parade in 2009, and the Shanghai World Expo in 2010 heralded that a revisionist global power was on the way. As China's speedy advances in manufacturing output, power generation and real GDP growth sent shock waves to the US powerhouses, responding to the ascendency of China has become a major US foreign policy concern.

The Obama administration pursued a cautious policy in containing the strategic and economic implications of rising China. In November 2009, US President Barrack

Obama became the first US President to visit China during the first year in office. At the beginning of his administration, US-China relations were progressing on a positive note and President Obama stated, "The relationship between the United States and China is the most important bilateral relationship of the 21st century" (Lee, 2016). The US approach towards China under the Obama Administration was manifested in the foreign policy framework presented as the 'return to the Asia-Pacific'. This was then rephrased as a 'strategic pivot' and later strategic 're-balancing'. The US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton first presented this policy line at the ASEAN Regional Forum held in Hanoi in July 2010. In her essay to the *Foreign Policy* journal, Hillary Clinton identified the new approach as the 'pivot towards Asia', emphasising the role of trade and enhanced security commitment to the Asia Pacific region, ostensibly to balance China's emergence with an alliance network. As a main tool of 'strategic re-balance', in November 2015, President Obama presented the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a set of new terms for trade and business investments linking the United States and 11 other Pacific Rim nations excluding China. The Obama Administration wanted to base its strategy of rebalancing the Asia Pacific on four pillars: i) the deployment of 60% of its navy and air force in the Asia-Pacific region, ii) the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) that excluded China, iii) the 'smart power diplomacy', taking advantage of China's disputes with its neighbours to drive a wedge among them and iv), continuing US contact with China. The US came forward to back ASEAN countries that were worried about China's advances in and claims to the South China Sea. At the same time, the Obama administration wanted to be engaged with China to push it to maintain sanctions on Iran and to control greenhouse gases in setting the stage for the Paris Agreement on climate change.

President Obama's cautious approach could not deter the Chinese political and economic advances, which the US believed to have taken place at the expense of their interests. China recovered swiftly after the Global Financial crisis (2007-2008) while US and other powers were still reeling from the setback. The general perception of US policymakers was that China was relentlessly pursuing its strategic interests with scant concern for rule-based international order. They argued that, when the US was preoccupied with its wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as being in the thick of a domestic economic recession, China came forward to occupy the space opened by the relative decline of US power. There is a long list of accusations on the part of the United States against China, including discriminatory trade barriers, forced technology transfer, government-sponsored cyber-enabled economic espionage, militarisation of outposts in the South China Sea and suppression of human rights and religious freedom in the country. In turn, China was of the view that the United States pursues a policy of containment against China and resuscitates Cold War politics to deny China its legitimate economic and strategic interests as a global player. The budding US-China Cold War entered into

a new phase with five Chinese hackers indicted for theft of trade technology from several U.S. companies in 2014. In retaliation China ended cooperation with the China-US Cyber security-working group (U.S. Relations with China 1949 -2020, n.d.). By the end of the Obama administration, the trust deficit between the United States and China was fast widening.

TRADE WAR BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA

The economic and strategic implications of the ascendency of China for the United States figured large in the 2016 US presidential election campaign. Donald Trump asserted that the primary cause for the loss of American manufacturing jobs and intellectual property is the past US-China trade trajectory. In order to 'make America great again' and to bring back manufacturing jobs from China to America, he further promised to slash the US trade deficit with China, through taxes while instituting more trade cases against China. Deviating from longstanding US bipartisan consensus on China policy, soon after Donald Trump assumed office, the Obama administration's TPP was discarded. All in all, President Trump adopted an increasingly zero-sum, unilateralist and 'America first' approach that paved the way for an open trade war between the United States and China.

President Trump initially hoped to strike a deal with China to reduce the US-China trade gap. Within just three months of assuming office, President Trump had a face-to-face talk with Chinese President Xi Jinping on 6th April 2017 at Mar-a-Largo, Palm Beach Florida. As a first step, both leaders agreed to a 100-day action plan to resolve trade differences, aimed at reducing the US trade deficit with China and boosting US exports to China. Within a month, China agreed to slightly open its economy to U.S. firms and services in exchange for U.S. recognition of China's BRI and greater Chinese access to bilateral trade. (Reuters, 2017). However, it did not resolve as the US insisted on more concessions and Beijing rebuffed American pressure. The 100-day action plan lapsed in July 2017, without making a breakthrough in the trade tension. The Trump administration later declared that the agreement was dead and the trade war escalated. The Trump administration was confident that as long as the US economy was doing well, they could win the trade war with China and force China to change its behaviour. As Simon Lester pointed out, this confidence was unfounded due to three reasons. First, "while so far as China has focused on equivalent tariff retaliation, it can retaliate with more than just tariffs. China could retaliate US companies operating in China in a variety of ways" (Lester, 2018, p.55). Second, "the US tariffs hurt Americans as much as they hurt Chinese producers" (Lester, 2018, p.55). Third, as much as the Trump administration would like China to back down, politically speaking, it would be very difficult for China to do so. Public demand for unilateral concession from

China, which would make China look weak if it agreed to them, are difficult to accept (Lester, 2018, p.55).

After abandoning the TPP, the US lacked any credible multi-lateral trade response to counter China's economic influence in resurgent Asia. The Trump administration counted on bilateral talks with countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam instead of multilateral trade deals such as the TPP.

It has been estimated that the trade war with China would cost the US economy US$ 316 billion by the end of 2020. China also felt economic strain as a result of the trade war. In October 2018, the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund warned that America's trade war with China could cost the global economy around US$ 700 billion by 2020 – a loss equivalent to the size of Switzerland's entire economy (*New York Times*, 2019).

US-CHINA TECHNOLOGY COMPETITION

A key factor in US global hegemony, military supremacy and economic strength is its lead and domination in hi-tech industrial sectors. During the first phase of the digital revolution, US tech giants such as Facebook, Amazon, Apple, Microsoft, and Google came forward to define the outcome. Along with its economic and technological advances, Chinese state-backed tech giants such as Alibaba, Baidu and Tencent also entered the scene with the progressing of the digital revolution. In this context, as Darren Lim writes, technology became a prominent vector in US-China relations for two reasons: first, "China's spectacular economic rise has positioned Chinese industry to be a major player in the invention and utilization of new technologies, the master of which will influence dynamics of great power politics for decades"; second, "the deep level of existing interdependence between the US and China leaves both sides vulnerable to strategic manoeuvring by the other, such that competitive dynamics of move and counter move could persist for a lengthy period of time" (Lim, 2019, p.9). Beijing interprets the US trade sanctions as an attempt to use its technological pre-eminence to block Chinese advances. As a result, China is making concerted attempts to reduce its dependency on US information technology.

The significance of digital geopolitics and technology war between China and the United States must be viewed in the context of the evolving Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR). The new generation of 'disruptive technologies' is on the cusp of a paradigm shift in the global industrial rubric in the 21st Century and the hierarchy of nations will depend on their ability to deploy emerging disruptive technologies in the coming decades. As Robert Manning pointed out, "the convergence and

synergy of artificial intelligence and Big Data, robotics, biotech, 3D printing, advance manufacturing, new materials, the Internet of Things, nano-engineering and nano-manufacturing all merge the digital with the physical economy. The second era of digital revolution will be substantially more transformational than the rise of the Internet and app economy that started in the 1990s." (2019, p.14).

With the emergence of digital economy, Big Data and the Internet of Things became a critical factor in social and economic life. Exponential growth of global data flow from 2005 to 2014 highlighted the importance of new technologies in handling Big Data. In 2015, Beijing embarked on a 'Made in China 2025' plan to realise its aim of high-tech manufacturing. As a result, China's investments have grown rapidly in the field of disruptive technologies after 2015. At present, the US IT giants, namely Google, Facebook, Amazon and Microsoft maintain the dominance in digital Big Data. The rise of state-backed Chinese IT firms is considered a severe challenge to US dominance in the sphere of digital Big Data.

The advent of 5G technology and the US-China competition to build 5G infrastructure further accentuated the US-China rivalry. Both powers believe that those who rule the 5G technology rules the world because 5G will support next-generation digital applications that permit ultra-fast, low-latency and high-throughput communications with first-mover advantage. In line with the 'Made in China 2025' plan, Huawei and ZTE are in the forefront of acquiring new technologies and building 5G network infrastructures. In August 2018, the Trump Administration banned the US government use of Huawei and ZTE technology as part of the Defense Authorization Act, accusing China of stealing US technology and espionage and labelling these Chinese tech giants as potential threats to national security. Nine months after US blacklisting and restricting access to American technology, Huawei developed its own alternative to Android and Apple controlled iOS. Chinese policymakers interpret US efforts to prevent the flow of critical technologies on the operations of Huawei and other Chinese companies as part of a strategy of containment designed to slow China's rise as a science and technology power (Segal, 2019, p.1).

The race to acquire advanced Artificial Intelligence (AI) is another key front in the on-going technology war between China and the United States. After Google developed a machine-learning system in March 2016 that uses algorithms and reinforcement learning to train on massive data sets and predict outcomes, the Obama administration released a national strategy consisting of three reports on preparing for a future with AI. In July 2017, President Xi Jinping unveiled China's 'New Generation Plan', outlining its strategy to become a global leader in the field of AI by 2030. It recognises that "the exclusive control of a technology has the potential to open up a 'first-mover-advantage', which allows a Nation to make, and

consolidate, gains before competitors can catch up (Pecotic. 2019, p.1). A number of National Engineering Laboratories have been established and academic, military and commercial research efforts are channelled towards the same goal of acquiring technological superiority. In 2017, Baidu established its own laboratory "devoted to brain-inspired intelligence technology, which aims to simulate the exact function of the brain. The hope is to achieve human-level AI through imitation" (Pecotic. 2019, p.1). In this context, by using open-source computing software, Alibaba is determined to develop its own data centre chips. Chinese chipset startups, Cambricon Technologies, Horizon Robotics and Suiyuan Technology entered the market with required funding (Rayome, 2020). On February 11th, 2018, President Trump signed Executive Order 13859 announcing the US AI Initiative. Following that, American Artificial Intelligence Initiative: Year One Annual Report, prepared by the Office of Science and Technology of the White House, was presented in February 2020. The Report stated:

> The United States is the global leader in AI research, development, and adoption. Continued American leadership in AI will ensure that the United States reaps the benefits of these advancements in a manner consistent with our Nation's values, policies, and priorities. Maintaining American leadership in AI requires a multipronged strategy to drive advancement and adoption of AI while also upholding civil rights, civil liberties, privacy, and other American values, and protecting our technology advantage (White House, 2020, p.1).

However, the US Administration did not provide any new funding to support measures outlined in the AI Initiative. Similarly, as the escalating China-US trade war hurt the investor confidence in China, investment in AI in China also dropped in 2019. The COVID-19 pandemic exploded at this juncture.

CHINA IN POST-COVID-19 WORLD ORDER

By the time of the outbreak of COVID-19 pandemic in January 2020, the post-Cold War global politics was in flux and the fronts of geopolitical competition between the United States and China were more or less defined. The true impact of the global pandemic on global geo-politics is yet to be seen. Henry Kissinger (2020), in his article to *Wall Street Journal* titled 'The Coronavirus Pandemic Will Forever Alter the World Order', writes that "We live in an epochal period. The historic challenge for leaders is to manage the crisis while building the future. Failure could set the world on fire".

The first COVID-19 patient was found in Wuhan city in Hubei Province in December 2019, within a few days it became a provincial viral epidemic and within a month

a national epidemic. The Chinese government mobilised all the possible state structures to pursue a vigorous policy to contain the spread of the pandemic and took effective steps to strictly lockdown more than 56 million people. The Chinese Communist Party and the state structures played a leading role in controlling the pandemic. The total of infected people in China up to September 2020 is 89,987, while the reported death toll was 4,728 (Coronavirus Resource Center, 2020).

China's manufacturing capacity declined unprecedentedly during the COVID-19 period and its impact on China's global supply chains was substantial. During the pandemic, China employed some of its AI and Big Data tools in arresting the virus, which included contact tracing, and diagnostic tool and drones to enforce social distancing (Reyome, 2020). China's economic standstill in the first quarter of 2020 and travel restrictions that prevented Chinese workers from returning to BRI work sites have delayed Chinese infrastructure projects abroad. But Beijing's main concern is the damage the disruption of China's global supply chains would cause to its economic growth.

By the time China successfully came out of the pandemic, COVID-19 was still in full swing in the West, particularly the United States. Due to the lax attitude of US administration, the pandemic engulfed many parts of the United States at a monsoon speed. The impact of the pandemic in the United States is unprecedented and it has brought deep havoc to every aspect of social, economic, and political life.

In the face of the common challenge posed by the pandemic, it was expected that the first and the second largest economies of the world would collaborate with each other to arrest the global spread of the virus and save the world from the economic fallout of the COVID-19 pandemic. This did not happen due to the security dilemma syndrome of both powers, emanating from their geo-political considerations. At the beginning of the pandemic, President Trump labelled it a 'Chinese virus'. As Paul Haenle (2020, p.1) pointed out, "Beijing's lack of transparency about the true extent of the outbreak, due to political imperatives and economic concerns, fueled suspicion from the outset". Even after the outbreak of the global pandemic, the US administration under President Trump seems to be counting on tariff and sanctions rather than building a broad coalition to counter China's economic influence and mobilising multilateral institutions to check alleged Chinese malpractices. In March 2020, the US administration closed its borders to travellers from many EU countries including Italy in the wake of the rising tide of the pandemic in Europe. During the same month, Beijing announced that it was sending medical teams and supplies to Italy. The geopolitical symbolism of these moves reflected the wind of change in global politics. It manifested China's readiness to emerge from the global crisis with a renewed status to shoulder responsibilities as a global player. In early July 2020, the Trump Administration pulled the US out of the World Health

Organisation (WHO), claiming that the WHO is in need of reform and it is heavily influenced by China. Later, "the Trump Administration has said it will not work with an international cooperative effort to develop and distribute a COVID-19 vaccine because it does not want to be constrained by multi-lateral groups like the World Health Organization" (*Island*, 2020).

The early recovery of China from the pandemic while its adversaries are still grappling with the crisis should not be a reason for China to be complacent. China could not return to the pre-pandemic manufacturing levels due to a number of factors of which China has little control over. The US tariffs and embargo also affect Chinese economic activities worldwide. In August 2020, the Trump administration blacklisted 24 Chinese companies for helping China build islands in the South China Sea. "The newly listed firms, including the China Communications Construction Company (CCCC) and the China Electronics Technology Group Corporation, are big contractors in the Belt and Road initiative, which engage in building bridges, dams and digital infrastructure around the world" (Washington Post, 2020). The China Communications Construction Company also undertakes the US$ 1.4 billion Colombo Port City project. It is reported that construction work on the Colombo Port City will continue unaffected despite the US blacklisting of Chinese construction companies.

The pandemic is not over and it is still flaming, hence, its future direction is uncertain. The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on global geopolitics should be viewed in conjunction with the changes brought forward by the disruptive technologies associated with 4IR. In the short run, there can be a high degree of uncertainty and volatility. In his written interview with *Global Times*, Michael D. Swain observed:

> It is possible that the virus might stimulate greater levels of Sino-US cooperation in some respects, in particular regarding preparations for future pandemics and other transnational security threats, both at the national and subnational levels. But I don't think the COVID-19 virus will fundamentally change the course of US-China relations toward deeper levels of competition overall. This competition is deeply rooted in the structural power shift underway between a rising China and a US that remains wedded to the idea that it must retain some level of predominance in many areas, as well as in the ideological rivalry between the two countries (Swain, 2020).

THE "THUCYDIDES TRAP" AND FUTURE SCENARIOS

The fundamental geopolitical concern in the present context is whether the US China geopolitical rivalry would lead to an all-out military confrontation. In the rapidly changing global geopolitical context, are China and the United States heading towards a war? Graham T. Allison, former Director of the Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, argued that both states are trapped in a deadly pattern of structural stress that results when a rising power challenges a ruling one – 'Thucydides' Trap'. According to Allison,

The defining question about global order for this generation is whether China and the United States can escape the Thucydides's Trap. The Greek historian's metaphor reminds us of the dangers when a rising power rivals a ruling power—as Athens challenged Sparta in ancient Greece, or as Germany did Britain a century ago (Allison, 2015).

He pointed out that these conditions have occurred sixteen times over the past 500 years. War broke out in twelve of them. He further argued:

The rise of a 5,000-year-old civilization with 1.3 billion people is not a problem to be fixed. It is a condition—a chronic condition that will have to be managed over a generation. Success will require not just a new slogan, more frequent summits of presidents, and additional meetings of departmental working groups. Managing this relationship without war will demand sustained attention, week by week, at the highest level in both countries (Allison, 2015).

The Chinese view in this regard is quite different. During the visit to the US in 2015, Chinese president Xi Jingping said: "there is no such thing as the so-called "Thucydides' Trap" in the world. But should major countries time and again make strategic miscalculations, they might create such traps for themselves" (As quoted in Gautam, 2018). He further emphasised the need to foster a new model of great power relations based on mutual cooperation, respect and dialogue between the US and China (Gautam, 2018). If we do not consider the changed historical contexts when we draw historical parallels, we tend to arrive at erroneous predictions. International connectivity and multiple levels of cross-border collaboration are so intense that there are many dynamics working against going for all-out war. It must be noted that probabilities presented on the basis of historical evidence are conditioned by a variety of contemporary variables. Athens and Sparta in the 5th century were not nuclear weapon states and did not possess the capabilities of 'Mutually Assured Destruction' (MAD).

CONCLUSION

The rise of China to a global power status has so far been peaceful. China asserts that the ideology behind BRI is the Ancient Silk Road, which did not lead to any plunder or aggressive territorial expansion. Is China pursuing the same path for global leadership? It is important to note, however, that the nature of aggression and territorial acquisition has also changed in the present context. In the past, any attempt to shift existing distribution of global power resulted in wars and periods of political tension, 'the Thucydides Trap'. It is not mandatory to repeat history. What would be the response of the rest of the world to the rise of China? In the past, the rise of the 'West' signified the fall of the 'Rest'. Now, the rise of the 'Rest' does not necessarily mean fall of the West. The peace and stability of the emerging post-COVID-19 world order depends not only on the reactions of the established global power but also on that of the rest of the world to the rise of China and how China manages these key challenges and other responses.

After 71 years of the establishment of the PRC, China today stands on a crucial historic juncture in its post-colonial history. The future direction of China depends on three critical factors: (1) the role of the Chinese state, (2) the role of the economically powerful 'new rich' that emerged with the economic liberalisation process and (3) how China handles the issue of democracy. The fundamental concern related to the ascendancy of China is whether it ushers in a new world system based on a community with a shared future for mankind, marking the end of the world order that came into being with the economic, political and ideological supremacy of the West or whether China would displace the West by establishing its own dominance in the world. History will answer this question.

REFERENCES

Abu-Lughod, J. L. (1991), *Before European Hegemony: The World System A.D. 1250-1350*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Allison, G. T. (2015), The Thucydides' Trap: Are the US and China Headed for War. *The Atlantic* 24 September 2015. www.theatlantic.com>international>archive.2015/09 (Accessed 06 October 2020).

Baran, Paul A. (1978), *The Political Economy of Growth*. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.

BBC (2020) *A quick guide to the US-China trade war*. Available from: https://www.bbc.com/news/business-45899310 [Accessed 26th August 2020].

Chaudhary, K. N. (1985) *Trade and Civilization in the Indian Ocean: An Economic History from the Rise of Islam to 1750*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

"Commentary: Building a community with hared future for mankind key to maintaining peace, prosperity in Asia-Pacific". Asia & Pacific. 02-06-2019.

Cummings, M. (2018) Yale Experts Consider Consequences of China's Rise as Global Power. *Yale News*, 6 Nov. 2018.

DW (2020) Coronavirus pandemic further strains US-China relations. (2020), dw.com [online]. Available from: https://www.dw.com/en/coronavirus-pandemic-further-strains-us-china-relations/a-53650763 [Accessed 26 August 2020].

Dollar, D. and Hass, R. and Bader, J. A. (2019) *Order from Chaos – Assessing U.S. China relations 2 years into the Trump Presidency*. Brookings, 15 January 2019.

Frank, A. G. & Gills, B. K., (1992) *The Five Thousand-Year World System in Theory and Praxis*. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/313175270 [08 October 2019 Accessed].

Gautam, Pamir (2018) US, China and the 'Thucydides Trap,' *China Daily*, 15.08.2018, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201808/15/WS5b7397bca310add14f385e37.html [Accessed October 25,2020]

Haiyong, S. (2019) U.S.-China Tech War-Impacts and Prospects. *China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies*, 5(2), pp.197-202.

Haenle, P. (2020) "What the Coronavirus Means for China's Foreign Policy". Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 11 March 2020, 1-3.

Hass, R and Denmark, A. (2020). More Pain than Gain: How the U.S.-China Trade War Hurt America. Available from: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/08/07/more-pain-than-gain-how-the-us-china-trade-war-hurt-america/ [Accessed 26 August 2020]

Hessler, P. (2020). How China Controlled the Coronavirus – Teaching and learning in Sinchuan during the pandemic. *The New Yorker*, August 17, 2020.

Hobson, J. M. (2006). *The Eastern Origins of Western Civilization*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

John Hopkins (2020) Coronavirus Research Centre, Johns Hopkins University. Available from: https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html [Accessed 05 October 2020].

Kissinger, H. (2020). The Coronavirus Pandemic Will Forever Alter the World Order, *Wall Street Journal*, 3 April 2020.

Lester, S. (2018). Digging in for a Long Fight. *Global Asia*, 13(3), pp. 54-55.

Lim, D. (2019). The US, China and 'Technology War'. *Global Asia*, 14(1), pp. 8-13.

Luxemburg, R. (1951). *The Accumulation of Capital*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Manning, R. A. (2019). Techno-Nationalism vs the 4th Industrial Revolution. *Global Asia,* 14(1), pp. 14-21.

Marx, K. & Engels, F. (1965). *Manifesto of the Communist Party*. Moscow: Progress Publishers.

Munasinghe, D. (2019). My Way or the Huawei: Global Battle for 5G Dominance and Its Impact on Sri Lanka. *Talking Economics Digest*.

Pecotic, Adrian (2019) Whoever Predicts the Future Will Win the AI Arms Race. *Foreign Affairs*, 5 March 2019.

Petras, J., (2018), China: Rise, Fall and Re-Emergence as a Global Power. *Global Research*, No.12. www.globalresearch.ca>china-rice-fall-and-re-emerge [Accessed 12 October 2019]

Pletcher, K. (2019), Opium Wars, *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 5 Sept. 2019, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Opium-Wars [Accessed 08 August 2019].

Rayome, A. De N. (2020), The US, China and the AI arms race: Cutting through the hype, July 8, 2020. c/net [Online]. Available from https://www.cnet.com/news/the-us-china-and-the-ai-arms-race-cutting-through-the-hype/, [Accessed 25 August 2020].

Segal, A. (2019) Seizing Core Technologies: China Responds to U.S. Technology Competition. *WITA*. 06.01.2019.

Shengli, L. and Lv H. (2018), Why Are China and the U.S. Not Destined to Fall into the "Thucydides' Trap". *China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies*, 4(4), pp. 495–514.

The Economist. (2014), Why China Is Creating a New 'World Bank' for Asia, 11 Nov. 2014.

U.S. Relations with China 1949 -2020. https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-relations-china [Accessed 27 August 2020].

Wallerstein, I. (1974), The Modern World-System: *Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century*. New York: Academic Press.

White House. (2019) https://www. whitehouse.gov>NSS-Final-12-182017-0905 [Accessed. 17 May 2020]

White House. (2020), The Office of Science and Technology, American Artificial Intelligence Initiative: *Year One Annual Report*. February 2020. p.1-18.

Xi, J. (2014), *The Governance of China*. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press.

Yiwei, W. (2016), *The Belt and Road Initiative: What Will China Offer the World in its Rise*. Beijing: New World Press.

QATAR AND THE CRISIS IN THE MIDDLE EAST: CHANGING STRATEGIC ALLIANCES

Commander Junaid Tariq PN

ABSTRACT

Being one of the richest regions in the world due to its oil and gas resources, the Middle East (ME) has assisted countries of this region to prosper in all spheres of life socially, politically and economically. This region also has another strength, where they share the same religion, culture and language and have a long history of tribal relations. Since countries of this region provide energy resources for most of the industrial needs worldwide, all major powers of the world have their vested interest in the region. While these interests favoured some countries of the region, it has proved detrimental for some others in the recent past like Syria, Iraq and Yemen. The recent crisis in the ME between Qatar and the "quartet" (Saudi Arabia UAE, Egypt and Bahrain) has cracked the cohesion of the region. New blocs have emerged in the region with different alliances. Major powers of the world have only focused on their interest and have not taken any keen interest in the reconciliation process. Rather this division favoured many countries and they have cashed the situation to their advantage. The situation is still fluid and there are developments with every passing day.

Keywords: Gulf Cooperation Council, Arab Spring, Arabian Peninsula, Muslim Brotherhood

GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL (GCC) AND ITS IMPORTANCE

Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was formed in the year 1981 with six member states: Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, United Arab Emirates and Oman. GCC countries share the same language, culture, religion and resources. This organisation took initiatives for development of the region by focusing in sectors of agriculture, tourism, industrial development etc. Today cracks are being detected in the closely-bonded Arabian Peninsula, formation of blocs is being witnessed, war zones are shifting from one country to the other and the tensions are continuously rising.

Arabian Peninsula is the most prominent region on the resource map of the world. Almost 50% of the world's oil resources are located in this region making it the energy hub of the world. In today's interwoven world, if problems of this regions are not contained and resolved, effects could be disastrous.

ESTRANGEMENT IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA: ITS GENESIS

Conflict started with the Arab Spring in 2010, when Qatar and the other GCC countries took opposite banks. Saudi Arabia considers Iran a threat to the region and this stance is strongly backed by the USA and Israel, whereas Qatar adopts a different policy. The present crisis came to the surface when in a speech, the Qatari Emir spoke about the tense relations with the present US government but also described Hamas as the legitimate representative of Palestinian people. In addition, he mentioned Iran as an important and credible regional power that has a definite role to play in ensuring security and stability of the region (Ulrichsen, 2017). Since then, the relationship equation of the Middle East (ME) got unbalanced and the cracks widened. Involvement of extra regional players such as the USA, Russia and Turkey as well as some fundamentalist organisations are adding further complexity to the problem.

The Middle East is presently turning into a hub of multiple blocs. Each bloc is operating in line with its interests and complete disregard to regional stability, unity and cohesion that is the prime building block of international peace and stability. Some historical allies are switching sides and new alliances are shaping in the region. All these new developments are raising the political as well the military temperature of the region.

DIGGING AND UNDERSTANDING THE FACTS

The crisis in ME is just like the tip of the iceberg. It has far reaching effects not only in the region but the overall world. Although, ME is embroiled with numerous problems, the recent tussle between Qatar and quartet has caused a major divide in the region.

Qatar's prominence in contrast to her size is attached with multiple strings. Qatar possesses the world's third largest natural gas reserves and it has used the resources to magnify her image globally. Qatar has developed strategic ties with world powers. Today, UK is heavily reliant upon LNG imports from Qatar, and in 2009 Qatar signed a 25 year agreement with China National Offshore Oil Cooperation and Petro China (Ulrichsen, 2014). Since, Qatar has secured energy needs of several countries, this ensures Qatar's security in addition to elevating Qatar's stature in the region. Qatar further balances her relations in the international arena by being a close ally of the US as it houses the largest USAF Base Al-Udeid on its territory.

KSA and Qatar are the richest and founding countries of GCC, but have a long and twisted history of relations. Smaller geography and limited international clout, instilled a security concern for Qatar and thus Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani believed that Qatar could find security only by transforming itself from a Saudi appendage

to a rival of Saudi Arabia (Fisher, 2017). Another underlying factor for tensions between KSA and Qatar lies in the bloodless coup in Qatar, which brought Hamad bin Khalifa to power. The severing of diplomatic ties with Qatar in June 2017 is not the first instance but ambassadors of KSA, Bahrain, UAE and Egypt had been called back earlier in year 2014 as well. This time there are more countries like Chad, Maldives, Mauritania, Senegal and Yemen that have joined the Saudi bloc and thus magnitude of the situation has further increased.

POLITICAL IMPACT OF THE QATAR CRISIS ON THE REGION

Although three years have already passed, the crisis is still in place. Qatar is poised to stay out of the Saudi influence in regional and global matters. The quartet perhaps assumed that Qatar would take a step back, rethink and re-evaluate her foreign policy, but leveraging on her sound economic and diplomatic strength, Qatar has successfully managed to look after her citizens and national interests. Qatar has shown her diplomatic strength by improving her relations with Turkey and Iran, forming another bloc and thereby showing a resolve to withstand pressure from the quartet. There are some important aspects that help understand the political impact of this crisis on the region:

a. Arab Spring

Arab Spring started in 2011 in the form of demonstrations, protests and social media movements. All of these were focused against the ruling monarchs in countries like Yemen, Syria, Egypt, Libya and Tunisia. These protests were initially peaceful but later turned violent upon meeting armed resistance from governments, and subsequently, took the shape of civil war in countries like Syria and Libya, whereas the countries under the rule of wealthy monarchs remained largely unaffected. Main cause of the Arab Spring was biased and unjustified distribution of wealth and power in society. Countries where rulers are greatly connected to the leadership like Oman or the masses are reaping the benefits of economic benefits like in Qatar, did not feel threatened. This Arab Spring not only brought changes at the domestic level, but pounded deep cracks in the GCC. Already strained relations between Qatar and rest of the GCC members further accentuated and took them to opposite banks. Third parties like the US and Israel appreciated and supported the cause of these movements.

b. Muslim Brotherhood

(1) Qatar crisis cannot be appreciated without developing an understanding of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), rather some of the writers mention it as locus of the current disagreement among the GCC countries. Some of the countries have

declared them as a terrorist organisation, whereas in some countries like Jordan and Tunisia its members are still active in the political circle.

(2) The relations between the MB and KSA can be traced back to Arab Cold War of 1950. Since MB fought against pan-Arabism advocated by Jamal Abdul Nasir, many members of MB fled Egypt and took refuge in KSA. Relations between KSA and MB deteriorated when King Fahd requested US to intervene in the Gulf War and demanded some radical political reforms. Thus, most of the MB members were expelled from KSA (Lacroix, 2017).

(3) In the same time of the Arab Cold War, many religious scholars belonging to MB like Abdul Baqi Saqr and Qaradawi left Egypt for Qatar. These MB exiles were accommodated in Qatar on the pretext that they would not interfere in domestic affairs of the country, clearly underlining what activities they are allowed to take part in and otherwise (Haykel, 2013). These religious scholars played a significant role in Qatari educational spheres and had a large audience due to their religious intellect (Roberts, 2017). Popularity of the Qatari monarchs among the masses did not give any room for MB to socially interact with the people. Qatar and MB continued to maintain harmony amongst themselves.

(4) In Egypt, MB again came into limelight in 2012, when Muhammad Morsi became the first democratically elected president. This angered not only the GCC bloc led by KSA and backed by UAE, but the Egyptian military and the secular activists. Eventually, a coup erupted against the democratically elected government of Muhammad Morsi (Khatib, 2014). Since, MB had dissimilar relations with the GCC countries, they became another bone of contention in the Arabian Peninsula.

c. Qatar – Iran Relations

(1) Before this blockade, Iran and Qatar have not enjoyed the best of relations. Hezbollah is seen as case in point where it is supported by one, and as a terrorist organisation by the other (Naylor, 2016). In addition, when a prominent Shia scholar, Sheikh Nimr Baqir, was executed in KSA, the Saudi Embassy was attacked by a mob in Tehran. Consequently, along with Saudi Arabia, Qatar also reduced diplomatic relations with Iran. Relations have not been pleasant between the two, but it appeared to be a major factor in the GCC dispute. Some of the demands to lift the blockade were related to Iran like, scaling down diplomatic ties, close the Iranian diplomatic mission in Qatar, expel members of Iran's Revolutionary Guard and cut off military and intelligence cooperation. Trade and commerce with Iran was also required to comply with US and international sanctions (Al Jazeera, 2017).

(2) Interestingly after the blockade, Iran popped up as a breath of fresh air for Qatar. Iran took advantage of the situation by supporting Qatar and opposing Saudi Arabia in order to enhance her long desired regional influence (Luciano Zaccara, 2019). Diplomatic relations between Qatar and Iran started to improve as of August 2017, and Qatar announced to send back the Ambassador to Iran and President Rouhani also called Emir of Qatar to reassure Iran's support (Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017). Iran's support became very evident when it not only provided air routes to Qatar Airways but also by sending airplanes with food and other items of immediate nature.

(3) Although, Iran-Qatar nexus has provided some breathing space for both the countries, in a way this relationship has increased the width of already existing crack between Qatar and quartet. It would not be wrong to say that Iran is definitely a beneficiary of the situation, and perhaps, it is a strategic miscalculation from KSA that has brought Iran back into the game where it was successfully sidelined by GCC. It would be premature to say how long this nexus would survive and how long the cracks in GCC would take to be filled up again.

(4) It is obvious that due to improving relations with Iran, Qatar would not only be condemned by the Quartet but also the western world, predominantly USA that considers Iran a threat to global peace. Recently, the withdrawal of US from the Iran nuclear deal and growing tension around Strait of Hormuz is a testimony to this. It is also a fact that perhaps the blockade had left no margin for Qatar, except to improve relations with Iran. This complex situation has put Qatar's diplomacy in a testing situation to balance relations with an ally like the US and a new friend Iran.

d. Political Dimension of Turkey-Qatar Relations

To understand the Turkish involvement, understanding of relations between Turkey and MB must be understood. When Turkey was a secular state, MB helped the Islamist movement in Turkey (Tanir, 2019). Turkey has since then maintained close ties with MB and supported their movements in many countries. Turkey also denounced the coup against Muhammad Morsi of MB. This ideological similarity brought Qatar and Turkey close and they shared the policy of supporting new emerging movements centered around political Islam (Roberts, 2018). Sharing these ideological similarities, Turkey was the first country to lend a brotherly hand to Qatar upon the declaration of the blockade by the quartet.

e. American Role in the Crisis

(1) The US being a superpower is naturally concerned with almost everything happening around the world. ME being the hub of energy of the world, it is

of concern to the US. US enjoys significant relations with GCC countries and enjoys significant influence in the region. The US military presence throughout the Arabian peninsula, like NAVCENT HQs in Bahrain, Naval Medical Research Unit Three in Egypt, Al-Asad Air Base in Iraq, Camp Arifjan and Camp Patriot in Kuwait, CENTCON forward HQ and Al-Udeid Air Base in Qatar and Al-Dhafra Air Base in UAE is evidence of this (Wallin, 2018). All this military presence secures US interests in the region, but also takes plea of protecting the region from external threat, predominantly Iran and other non-state actors (Martini et al., 2016).

(2) It is for sure in the US interest that this region remains stable and none of the other powers find place and reason to create any disturbance. Peculiarity of this region is such that no one country can be regarded as more important than the other. Saudi Arabia is the largest oil producer and arms buyer of the region, whereas Qatar and Bahrain house the CENTCOM HQs.

(3) When the blockade was declared by the quartet, the US initially supported the quartet when President Trump said in a news conference that these measures were "hard but necessary". (Young & Raghavan, 2017). Although, the deadlock between the Arab states remained as it was, the US attitude towards Qatar has changed and this happened because of an aggressive and well-funded Qatari campaign to rehabilitate its image and reputation as a reliable US partner (Lederman, 2018). Less than a year later, Emir of Qatar was invited to the White House by the US President and Qatar's efforts to curb the menace of terrorism were acknowledged.

(4) The efforts to tone down the Qatar crisis have not yielded any positive results; rather new alliances have emerged. US has acknowledged Qatar's efforts against terrorism, has sold arms to both Qatar and KSA, attacks on merchant shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, US withdrawal from Iran Nuclear Deal, Turkey buying S-400 missiles from Russia are adding complexity to the situation.

ECONOMIC OUTLOOK OF THE CRISIS

Qatar is blessed with huge amounts of petroleum reserves and this forms the backbone of its economy. It has the third largest gas reserves in the world after Iran and Russia (Baabood, 2017).

Qatar had deep rooted economic relations with GCC countries. 40% of Qatar's food supplies were routed through the only land border shared with KSA, and UAE meets one third of her gas requirements from Qatar via Dolphin Energy Pipeline (Kabbani, 2017). Ratio of Qatari exports and imports with the blockading countries is shown in the Figure – 1 below (Collins, 2013, p. 2):



Figure 1: Ratio of Qatari Imports and Exports with Quartet

Source: Observatory of Economic Complexity

When oil prices dropped, hydrocarbon dependent Qatari economy slipped into the first deficit budget in 2016, and thus Qatar realised the need to diversify her economic structure and the same can be seen from the Fig – 2 below. Although its economy still relies heavily on oil and gas, the percentage has gone down from 60.1% of GDP in 2011 to 48.2% of GDP in 2017 (QNB, 2018).



Figure 2: Diversification of Qatari Economy

Source: MDPS, Haver Analytics, QNB Economics

When the blockade was declared, its effects were felt across the economy and were visible in the local markets. There was acute shortage of domestic products, but Qatar in close liaison with Turkey and Iran established new trade routes and agreements and restored the situation within a short span of 48 hours (Oxford Business Group, n.d.).

Due to her enormous petroleum reserves, Qatar has always been an active economic partner of many countries. The blockade helped Qatar to move towards self-reliance and garner new economic partnerships. Many of the countries, mostly the gas importers, including UAE, continued normal business with Qatar and that is the prime reason why this blockade failed to achieve the anticipated results. Qatar's trade and integration with other countries, particularly Iran and Turkey has grown significantly, and these relations may prove to replace the old ties with GCC (Kabbani, 2017).

QATAR-TURKEY RELATIONS – A VIEW FROM THE ECONOMIC PRISM

Turkey had enjoyed good relations with GCC countries through mutual investments and projects. GCC and Turkey signed a Free Trade Agreement in 2008, and this brought in significant amounts of FDI to Turkey, particularly from KSA and UAE (Emirate247, 2008). The FDI inflow in Turkey from GCC countries and Turkish export to these countries is shown in the Figure – 3 and Figure– 4 below (Küçükaşcı, 2019, p.6-7).



Figure 3: FDI Inflow to Turkey by the GCC Countries

Source: Provisional data, Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey



Figure 4: Turkish Exports to GCC Countries (2000-2011)

Source: Foreign trade statistics, Turkish Statistical Institute

This mutually rewarding trade between the GCC and Turkey was seriously hampered by the 2013 coup in Egypt. Majority of GCC countries supported the coup, whereas Qatar and Turkey supported President Morsi. This brought Qatar and Turkey close and distanced them from the quartet. The change in the trade paradigm can also be seen from Figure 4 above. When the blockade was declared, Turkey immediately replenished the Qatari markets with food supplies and also promised to provide crucial construction material for ongoing FIFA 2022 world cup projects (The Peninsula, 2017). Turkish exports increased about 50% from 2016 to 2017, reaching US$ 750 million. As of 2018, the current bi-lateral trade between the two countries stands at US$ 1.5 billion that they intend to increase up to $5 billion in the coming years (Mogielnicki, 2018).

Qatar also responded strongly during the currency crisis in Turkey when the Turkish lira lost 35% of its value against the dollar by investing about US$15 billion in the Turkish economy (The Guardian, 2018).

Despite coming close to each other and a maintaining strategic alliance, the trade volume between the two is not significant. If the blockade continues, this alliance between Turkey and Qatar is likely to grow and strengthen but with certain caveats. Qatar has to strike a balance between US and Turkey who are not in good terms with each other right now; moreover, Turkey would not like to lose major trading partners in GCC at the cost of solely focusing on Qatar.

QATAR-IRAN ECONOMIC COOPERATION

The quartet had demanded Qatar to conduct trade with Iran under the ambit of international and US sanctions. But contrarily, relations improved in diplomatic and economic fronts. In fact, Iran was among the first respondents to practically reach for Qatar's assistance after blockade. Quartet closed air space for Qatar Airways but Iran provided new time slots to use Iranian air space. This not only benefited Qatar Airways to continue its flight operations but also benefited Iran in the form of substantial over flight charges (Zaccara, 2019).

The blockade also provided an opportunity for the Iranian business community to tap Qatari markets. Consequently, Iranian exports to Qatar rose sharply. Iran exported non-oil products such as food, agricultural products and bitumen worth US$139 million from April to October 2017, that was about 117.5% more than the previous year (Dudley, 2017).

Trend of Qatari imports from UAE, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain vis-à-vis from countries like India, Kuwait, Oman, Turkey and Iran can be seen from Figure – 5 and Figure-6 respectively (Zaccara, 2019, p. 8-9).



Figure 5: Trend of Qatari Imports from UAE, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain

Source: Estimates obtained from CEIC Insights data



Figure 6: Trend of Qatari Imports from other countries
Source: United Nations COMTRADE data

Although, there is a considerable increase in Iranian exports to Qatar, the volume in not significant when considered in relation to other countries like US, Japan, Germany and India. Iranian exports are mostly limited to perishable food items. Iranian businesses want Qatar investments in their production facilities, whereas Qataris are looking at establishing factories in their own land (Zaccara, 2019).

MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF QATAR CRISIS IN MIDDLE EAST

One of the core reasons for founding the GCC was mutual and collective defence of the member states. The perceived threats were from Iran and Israel. After the blockade, Iran took advantage of the intra-GCC rift and managed to strengthen and improve its relations with Qatar.

The contours of the present crisis are not limited to GCC countries only but has implications for the west as well, who are operating their forces from different locations in the region. Extra-regional military presence in the region can be visualised from the Figure – 7 below (Hackett, 2019).



Figure 7: Foreign Military Contingents in the Gulf Region

Source: Dispute in the Gulf: potential defence implications, International Institute for Strategic Studies.

QATAR CRISIS AND FOREIGN MILITARY IMPLICATIONS

The gas rich small state of Qatar is not only a major buyer of western military equipment but is also the nerve center for most of the air operations undertaken in the region by US and other western allies. The same holds true for other regional countries like KSA, UAE and Bahrain as well. The most significant foreign presence in Qatar is at Al-Udeid airbase, which is home to US Central Command's Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC) as well as air components of UK and France (Hackett, 2019). The arms imports in ME has swollen between 2012 and 2016. KSA and UAE increased their arms imports by 212% and 63% respectively, whereas Qatar increased arms imports by 245% (Salacanin, 2018).

Already on a military spending spree, Qatar has signed many military agreements after the blockade. Qatar signed a deal to purchase 24 Typhoon fighter jets from Britain, 12 Rafale fighter jets from France, 490 Armoured Infantry fighting vehicle from France, installation and maintenance of 'Patriot' air defence system from US, 7 naval vessels from Italy and 36 F-15 fighter jets from the US (Kandil, 2017).

QATAR – TURKEY MILITARY COOPERATION

Qatar and Turkey maintain cordial relations and have taken similar stances on several international issues like supporting MB as an organisation, opposition the coup against Egyptian President Muhammad Morsi and supporting rebel forces

in Syria against the Assad regime. A comprehensive agreement between both the governments on cooperation in military training, defence industry and deployment of Turkish armed forces in the territory of Qatar was signed in December 2014 (Paul Cochrane, 2016). These agreements resulted in the establishment of the first Turkish military base in Qatar in 2014, reciprocally Qatari forces can also be deployed in Turkey (Aras & Akpınar, 2017).

Soon after the blockade, Turkey's parliament authorised the deployment of about 3,000 Turkish troops in Qatar (Gurbuz, 2017). Although, Turkey has emphasised numerous times that Turkish presence in Qatar is not a threat to the GCC bloc, it cannot be ruled out that Turkey would definitely support the Qatari regime whenever requested or deemed appropriate by mutual consent.

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

Today, ME is a hotspot where numerous problems have brought economic, political and security challenges to the nations. Effects of these problems are quite evident where a common man is devoid of shelter in Syria and food in Yemen. Despite the presence of international organisations like the United Nations, regional organisation like Gulf Cooperation Council and religious and cultural organisation like Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, problems seem far from solutions and rather expanding geographically, politically and economically.

The use of a SWOT analysis helps to understand, analyse and recommend the way forward to ease the increasing tensions in the region.

STRENGTHS

The main stakeholders of the crisis are the state of Qatar and the quartet. Qatar is not alone as it has gained major support from Turkey and Iran. There are other countries like Oman, Jordan, Kuwait and even the US that are trying to remain neutral due to their own interests and are managing to have reasonable relations with both the sides.

a. Political Stability of Qatar

Unlike some Arab countries, Qatar did not feel threatened from any uprising like the Arab Spring. The reason lies in the economic well-being of its people and people-centric policies of the ruling monarchs. Qatar's rulers enjoy popular public support and thus enjoy a stable political structure in the country. Qatari government efficiently looked after the people during the crisis and this strengthened people's belief in their government.

b. Biggest per Capita Petroleum Reserves

Economically stable countries have lesser problems when compared to economically struggling countries. Qatar has invested its wealth in various sectors worldwide and the effects of this sound economy are enjoyed by the public as well. Qatar's enormous amount of wealth has thus assured her inner stability as well as outer security.

c. Realisation of Self-Sufficiency

After the blockade, Qatar has realised that dependence on any country for basic needs is a weakness. Qatar has achieved a relative degree of self-sufficiency in dairy and agriculture sectors. Although Qatar learnt the hard way, it has far-reaching benefits in the form of investments and job opportunities that support the national economy.

WEAKNESSES

Some of the identified weaknesses are as follows:

a. Possible Internal Disturbance due to Public Pressure

Qatar shares the same religion, language and culture with the quartet. If the governments remain disengaged, the population on both sides may force the governments resulting in some initial instability but that might contribute to solving the problems and bridge the gulf in the longer run.

b. Muslim Brotherhood

Muslim Brotherhood is assumed to be the root cause of the crisis. MB has a history and following in the Arab world. Democratic election of the then President Muhammad Morsi in Egypt, states the fact that MB enjoyed popular public support. Today, MB has been declared a terrorist organisation by many countries, but in countries like Turkey and Tunisia they have positions in the government. There might be some sleeper cells that may find some chance to attack the forces that crushed and disbanded their organisation.

OPPORTUNITIES

Qatar has been successful in garnering international support from many regional and extra-regional countries. Qatar effectively used the elements of her national power to subdue the allegations put forth by the quartet.

a. Improved Diplomatic Relations with Iran

The unexpected severing of ties by the quartet forced Qatar to look for alternate relations. Similarly, this blockade provided a window of opportunity to Iran as well to make herself more relevant in the Arab world. Coinciding interests have brought the two closer and despite certain differences both are standing by each other. Since there is no improvement in Qatar's relations with the quartet, relations with Iran can be safely forecasted to improve adding complexity in the fragile geopolitical situation.

b. Improved Diplomatic Relations between Qatar and Turkey

Relations between Turkey and UAE strained before the crisis over issues of UAE's support to Greek-Israel cooperation and visit to Armenian genocide site. Since UAE membered the quartet, Turkey joined Qatar to counter UAE on another front.

c. Recognition by the US

Though US initially sided with the quartet, active Qatari diplomacy along with some deals to buy expensive US military hardware changed the picture. President Trump has formally acknowledged that Qatar is making all requisite arrangements to curb terrorism around the globe. Winning US support is an achievement for Qatari diplomacy.

d. Economic Relations with Other Countries

Countries like China and UK have long term gas supply agreements with Qatar. Even UAE, till date, continues to acquire gas from Qatar through the Dolphin Pipeline. This means many of the world's countries are dependent upon Qatari resources. Dependence of countries on Qatari resources ensures security for Qatar.

e. World Powers' Tacit Support to the Triad

KSA and US are strategic allies. This new Qatari bloc has provided an avenue to other world powers to counterbalance American influence in the region. Relations of Turkey with the US are at the lowest ebb as evident from the removal of Turkey from the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program. However, Russia has offered SU-35 jets to Turkey as replacement of F-35 JSF. In this scenario, this triad has the leverage to enjoy support and assistance from other powers and thus can avoid any pressure from US as well.

THREATS

The present bloc's emergence in ME has certain threats as well, that make the situation more unpredictable. This unpredictability brings unknown fears of mistrust that can hamper long term partnerships and projects. Some of the identified threats are:

a. Religious Ideology

Shia and Sunni are two major sects of Islam. In many countries of the world like Pakistan, both the sects co-exist in harmony. People from both sects have learnt to tolerate each other's values and beliefs and this contributes to well-being of the society. Countries like Iran and KSA do not tolerate each other's ideology and continue to denounce each other, and this, in turn, has caused a major split in the Arabian Peninsula. Iran sees present Shia regime in Syria and Iraq as an increase in her sphere of influence and the same is seen as a threat by the Saudi regime. Qatar, although a Sunni Muslim country, due to the geopolitical scenario has come closer to Iran and away from the Sunni quartet. The ideological difference of Qatar and Iran is a threat to both the countries. In order to survive, both countries would have to keep the religious ideologies aside and concentrate on mutual interests.

b. Economic Relations between Qatar and Turkey

Qatar and Turkey have stood by each other in testing times. Turkey supplied essential food items and construction material for FIFA World Cup constructions, whereas Qatar supported the falling Turkish Lira. Trade volume between the two is not significant and this makes their economic cooperation, a weak preposition. Either one of them backing off would make the other vulnerable against the quartet.

c. Trust Deficit between Qatar and Iran

Iranian exports to Qatar have risen multiple times, but that are mainly limited to perishable items. Despite this increased trade activity, there has not been any agreement at the industrial level. Qatar is being cautious to engage in long term deals with Iran, and this may be because of ideological differences, not very pleasant history of relations or present engagement on opposite sites in numerous international issues. This again weakens the bloc formed by Qatar, Iran and Turkey.

d. Misalignment of Threat Perception in GCC

One of the core reasons for the formation of GCC was assurance of mutual security against common threats like Iran and Israel. Today, some of the GCC countries like Qatar, Oman and Kuwait do not recognise Iran as an immediate threat and believe in positive engagement. This misalignment of common threat weakens stance of the organisation.

e. Militarisation of the Region

West has been successful to showcase Iran as a threat. On this pretext, US is selling vast amounts military equipment to many countries. The Qatar crisis again suits western arms manufacturers, particularly in the US. Both parties, quartet and Qatar, are making considerable military deals to counter-balance each other. West is making money at the cost of heavy militarisation of the region. Any miscalculation can bring catastrophic results for the region.

f. Foreign Military Bases in the Region

Presence of foreign military is never a preferred option but keeping in view this crisis, presence of foreign military bases prove to be a factor of assured security and balance. Qatar feels secure due presence of US and Turkish military bases, whereas foreign forces' presence in Saudi Arabia, UAE and Bahrain also ensures their security against any misadventure from Qatar or predominantly from Iran.

g. Deteriorated Relations between Turkey and Quartet Members

Relations between Turkey and quartet are another factor that drags this crisis away from any solution. Relations between Turkey and quartet became sour when Turkey favoured Arab Spring and MB. Problem became more compounded when a Saudi journalist, Jamal Khashoggi, was killed in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. Today, Saudi Arabia and Turkey openly criticise each other.

CONCLUSION

This problem is rooted in the fact that KSA did not like and agree with the bloodless coup in Qatar, when Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani took over the rule from his father. Leveraging on considerable oil and gas reserves, Qatar improved global ties and economic relations with many countries and decided to step out of the Saudi shadow in ME. Qatar diversified its foreign policy to suit her interests. Qatar established relations with Iran and supported MB and Arab Springs as well. The same was not appreciated by the GCC members, particularly KSA and UAE.

The blockade imposed in 2017 was initially supported by US and was expected to bring devastating effects but Qatar's active diplomacy and vibrant economy quickly overshadowed the forecasted effects. Since then, the blockade has failed to generate any significant political, economic, diplomatic or military effect on Qatar.

There is another dimension of this rift i.e. new and relatively young leadership in Arabian Peninsula. Wealthy and powerful personalities like Muhammad bin Salman, Muhammad bin Zayed and Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani enjoy a lot of influence in their countries but perhaps they desire to project their power and influence across their borders as well.

It is evident that extra regional players are not taking any sides. US is contended with the arms deals secured from KSA and Qatar, whereas Turkey and Iran are happy to find some place in the Arabian affairs. Qatar crisis is far from solved and perhaps both sides have silently agreed to maintain the status quo. The blockade has failed to stop any movement of goods in and out of Qatar, but it has been successful to split the Arabian Peninsula.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Today Muslim world is mired with a lot of problems. Due to ruthless geo-political interests, economic interests and egoistic regimes, Muslims are suffering in many countries such as Syria, Yemen, Iraq, Afghanistan, Kashmir, Burma, China etc. Unfortunately, the OIC has failed to do anything for the security and well-being of the Muslim world. Therefore, OIC will have to turn itself into an active and dynamic organisation to address social, political and economic interests of the Muslim world. OIC must call upon a dedicated session to address the issues, where the opposing parties can discuss and reach a solution with input from other member states. OIC must be empowered as an organisation. If any member country is acting in contrast to the collective interest of other states or people, action like sanctions, blockade etc. must be taken after passing a resolution from the organisation.

In order to soften up the situation, quartet must lift the blockade and engage in negotiations with all the stakeholders. This would ease out the undue tension in the region and some head way may be made. Neutral GCC countries like Kuwait and Oman must play their role in this regard. Being a superpower and having close relations with ME states US must play a role to pacify the situation between the Arab nations. The only reason for US to interfere in the conflict is growing relations between Qatar, Iran and Turkey. US is not in good terms with both the allies of Qatar, and therefore, must help to find a political situation of the problem. Additionally, to deal with terrorism, the Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition was formed in 2015, but includes only Sunni majority countries. Shia countries may also be made part of the coalition in order to deal with terrorism in a wholesome fashion.

REFERENCES

Al Jazeera (2017) Arab states issue 13 demands to end Qatar-Gulf crisis. *Al Jazeera* [online]. Available from https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/06/arab-states-issue-list-demands-qatar-crisis-170623022133024.html [Accessed 12 April 2020].

Al Jazeera Center for Studies (2018). The Growing Arms Deals in the Gulf: Existential Need or Fear Politics?. *Al Jazeera* [online]. Available from http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/report/2018/01.html [Accessed 25 July 2019].

Aras, B. and Akpınar, P. (2017) Turkish Foreign Policy and the Qatar Crisis. *Istanbul Policy Centre* [online]. Available from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/319059837_Turkish_Foreign_Policy_and_the_Qatar_Crisis [Accessed 09 May 2020].

Baabood, A. (2017) Qatar's Resilience Strategy and Implications for State–Society Relations. Instituto Affari Internazionali [online]. Available from https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iaiwp1736.pdf [Accessed 12 April 2020].

Cochrane, P. (2016). Revealed: Secret details of Turkey's new military pact with Qatar. *Middle East Eye* [online]. Available from https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/revealed-secret-details-turkeys-new-military-pact-qatar [Accessed 26 May 2020].

Collins, G. (2018, January 22). Anti-Qatar Embargo Grinds Toward Strategic Failure. *Rice University's Baker Institute for Public Policy Issue Brief* [online]. Available from https://www.bakerinstitute.org/media/files/files/7299ac91/bi-brief-012218-ces-qatarembargo.pdf [Accessed 17 August 2020].

Dudley, D. (2017). How Qatar Is Being Pushed into the Arms of Iran by Saudi Arabia and Its Allies. *Forbes* [online]. Available from https://www.forbes.com/sites/dominicdudley/2017/11/27/qatar-pushed-into-arms-of-iran-by-saudi/?sh=ada7f8f7c4fe [Accessed 26 May 2020].

Emirate247 (2008). GCC-Turkey deal to boost trade relations [online]. Available from https://www.emirates247.com/eb247/news/region/gcc-turkey-deal-to-boost-trade-relations-2008-09-04-1.177576 [Accessed 19 July 2020].

Fisher, M. (2017). How the Saudi-Qatar Rivalry, Now Combusting, Reshaped the Middle East. *New York Times* [online]. Available from https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/13/world/middleeast/how-the-saudi-qatar-rivalry-now-combusting-reshaped-the-middle-east.html [Accessed 19 September 2020].

Gurbuz, M. (2017). Turkey and the Gulf Crisis: Erdogan's Most Difficult Game. *Arab Center Washington DC* [online]. Available from http://arabcenterdc.org/policy_analyses/turkey-gulf-crisis/ [Accessed 04 February 2020].

Hackett, J. (2017). Dispute in the Gulf: Potential defence implications. *International Institute for Strategic Studies* [online]. Available from https://www.iiss.org/blogs/military-balance/2017/07/gulf-dispute-implications [Accessed 19 September 2020].

Haykel, B. (2013). 'Qatar's foreign policy', *NOREF,* 2. Available from http://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/159898/2sec79531a408 [Accessed 20 April 2019].

Iranian Government (2020). Tehran ready to cement ties with Qatar. *Iranian President's Official Website* [online]. Available from http://www.president.ir/fa/100495/printable [Accessed 12 October 2020].

Kabbani, N. (2017). The high cost of high stakes: Economic implications of the 2017 Gulf crisis. *Brookings* [online]. Available from https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2017/06/15/the-high-cost-of-high-stakes-economic-implications-of-the-2017-gulf-crisis/ [Accessed 07 August 2019].

Kandil, A.M. (2017) Qatar's military deals since rift. *Egypt Today* [online].Available from https://www.egypttoday.com/Article/1/36529/Qatar%E2%80%99s-military-deals-since-rift [Accessed 25 August 2019].

Khatib, L. (2014). Qatar and the Recalibration of Power in the Gulf. *Carnegie Middle East Center* [online]. Available from https://carnegieendowment.org/files/qatar_recalibration.pdf [Accessed 27 July 2019].

Küçükaşcı, E. S. (2019). Entente Cordiale: Exploring Turkey–Qatar Relations. *TNT World Research Centre* [online]. Available from https://researchcentre.trtworld.com/images/files/discussion_papers/Turkey-Qatar-relations.pdf [Accessed 14 July 2020].

Lacroix, S. (2017). 'Saudi Arabia's Muslim Brotherhood predicament'. *Middle East Political Science* 2 (1). Available from https://www.pomeps.org/soudi-arabia-muslim-brotherhood-predicaments [Accessed 25 April 2019].

Lederman, J. (2018). Trump extols Qatar on anti-terror, reversing past critique. *AP* [online]. Available from https://www.apnews.com/7dec03bc5b8148278a9f4dd42b3adba0 [Accessed 08 August 2020].

Martini, J., Wasser, B., Kaye, D. D., Egel, D., and Ogletree, C. (2016). *The Outlook for Arab Gulf Cooperation*. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation. Available from https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1400/RR1429/RAND_RR1429.pdf [Accessed 11 September 2019].

Mogielnicki, R. (2018). 'The new economics of Qatar-Turkey relations'. *MEI* [online]. Available from http://www.mei.edu/publications/new-economic-qatar-turkey-relations [Accessed 30 April 2019].

Naylor, H. (2016). In Jab at Iran, Gulf Arab States Declare Hezbollah a Terrorist Group. *Washington Post* [online]. Available from https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/saudi-led-bloc-declares-iran-backed-hezbollah-terror-group/2016/03/02/7f660092-e06f-11e5-9c36-e1902f6b6571_story.html?utm_term=.e2dad6de47f8 [Accessed 17 August 2019].

Oxford Business Group (n. d.). Qatar's economy thrives despite blockade [online]. Available from https://oxfordbusinessgroup.com/overview/right-be-optimistic-economic-strength-and-potential-have-been-reaffirmed-short-lived-impact-blockade [Accessed 20 June 2020].

Qatar Tribune (2019). Despite blockade, Qatar remains an economic force. Qatar Tribune [online]. Available from https://www.qatar-tribune.com/news-details/id/165648 [Accessed 20 July 2019].

QNB (2018). Qatar Economic Insight [online]. Available from https://www.qnb.com/sites/qnb/ qnbqatar/document/en/enQatarInsight092018 [Accessed 19 July 2020].

Roberts, D. A. (2018) Qatar, Turkey, and the Politics and Perils of Reciprocity. *Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington* [online]. Available from https://agsiw.org/qatar-turkey-and-the-politics-and-perils-of-reciprocity/ [Accessed 29 April 2019].

Roberts, D. A. (2017) Qatar, the Ikhwan, and transnational relations in the Gulf. *Middle East Political Science* [online]. Available from https://pomeps.org/qatar-the-ikhwan-and-transnational-relations-in-the-gulf [Accessed 23 May 2019].

Tanir, I. (2019). Turkey becomes biggest Muslim Brotherhood backer in the world. *Ahval* [online]. Available from https://ahvalnews.com/muslim-brotherhood/turkey-becomes-biggest-muslim-brotherhood-backer-world [Accessed 12 May 2020].

Tehran Ready to Cement Ties with Qatar'/Iran Willing to Help Muslim Countries of Region Deepen Relations (2017). Available from http://www.president.ir/fa/100495/printable [Accessed 20 April 2019].

The Peninsula (2017). Qatar receives 3000 tonnes of food products from Turkey through Hamad Port. *The Peninsula* [online]. Available from http://www.thepeninsulaqatar.com/article/05/07/2017/qatar-receives-3000-tonnes-of-food-from-turkey/[Accessed 20 May 2019].

The Guardian. (2018).Turkish lira rallies as Qatar invests $15bn, but markets slide - as it happened. *The Guardian* [online]. Available from https://www.theguardian.com/business/live/2018/aug/15/turkish-lira-crisis-turkey-raises-tariffs-onus-goods-business-erdogan-markets-live?page=with:block- 5b7444b1e4b030c7c692f601#block-5b7444b1e4b030-c7c692f601 [Accessed 25 July 2019].

Ulrichsen, K. C. (2017). What's going on with Qatar? Qatar Crisis. *POMEPS Briefings 31*. Available from https://pomeps.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/POMEPS_GCC_Qatar-Crisis.pdf [Accessed 22 June 2019].

Ulrichsen, K. C. (2014). Qatar and the Arab Spring: Policy Drivers and Regional Implications. *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace* [online]. Available from https://carnegieendowment.org/2014/09/24/qatar-and-arab-spring-policy-drivers-and-regional-implications-pub-56723 [Accessed 10 April 2020].

Wallin, M. (2018). U.S. Military Bases and Facilities in the Middle East. *American Security Project* [online]. Available from https://www.americansecurityproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Ref-0213-US-Military-Bases-and-Facilities-Middle-East.pdf [Accessed 17 August 2019].

Young, K. D. and Raghavan, S. (2017). Trump seems to undercut Tillerson's remarks on Qatar. *Washington Post* [online]. Available from https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/arab-countries-place-dozens-on-new-qatar-terror-list-deepening-dispute/2017/06/09/fd727fab-e750-4fdd-ac23-26256e8e0493_story.html [Accessed 07 June 2020].

Zaccara, L. (2019). Iran and the Intra-GCC Crisis: Risks and Opportunities. *Instituto Affari Internazionali* [online]. Available from https://www.iai.it/en/pubblicazioni/iran-and-intra-gcc-crisis-risks-and-opportunities [Accessed 19 July 2020].

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Major Haritha Pagodaarachchi commenced his military career from General Sir John Kotelawala Defence University (KDU) on 23 September 2007 by joining the 25th Intake and was commissioned in 2009. He graduated from KDU in the discipline of Electrical and Electronic Engineering in 2011. He has held numerous appointments in the field of signal and performed various staff appointments in his military career. He is presently serving as the Brigade Major at 652 Infantry Brigade. He was awarded the 'Golden Pen Award' for the best research paper at the Defence Services Command and Staff College (DSCSC), Sri Lanka, in 2019.

Marianne Taflinger worked for twenty years as a managing editor in college and university publishing. In 2008, she earned a Master of Public Administration degree in International Management (International Development) from the Monterey (now Middlebury) Institute of International Studies. At the Defense Language Institute administered by the U.S. Army, she wrote and edited material designed to prepare deploying troops in all service branches with knowledge of countries' cultures and languages. One such product was the Tamil Cultural Orientation. She currently works as a Research Assistant for the Naval Postgraduate School in the Center for Homeland Defense and Security.

Wing Commander Chamara Weerathunge joined the Sri Lanka Air Force on 23rd September 1998 as an Officer Cadet of Intake 36 and was commissioned on 30th June 2000. He has held key appointments such as Commanding Officer-25 Regiment Wing, Commanding Officer-29 Regiment Wing and Staff Officer-Media at Ministry of Defence. He specialises in Managing Human Resources, and at present serves as a Staff Officer at the Directorate of Ground Operations, Sri Lanka Air Force Headquarters. He holds a Masters Degree in Human Resource Management, a Masters Degree in Conflict and Peace Studies from the University of Colombo and a Postgraduate Diploma in Defence Management from the University of Keleniya. He is also a graduate of the Defence Services Command and Staff College, Sri Lanka.

Dr. Anshu N. Chatterjee is a Senior Lecturer at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey. She teaches political economy and developments in South Asia. She is an expert on South Asia, Insurgencies, Public Sphere, and Civil Society. She received her Ph.D. from the University of California, Berkeley in 2003. Her current research examines the development of protest groups in relation to identity politics and state-society relations in disturbed regions in South Asia. Her past research includes globalisation and civil society, political parties, and the media. Dr Chatterjee has also worked as a journalist in India. She has many publications to her credit.

Commodore Kanchana Banagoda holds the appointment of the Director, Naval Training at the Naval Headquarters after Commanding SLNS Sayurala as his previous sea command. He holds Masters Degrees in Maritime Policy and in Human Resources Management and a Bachelors Degree in Management. He has served in all three spheres of command, staff and instructor appointments in different capacities, during the 30 years of his unblemished naval career. He is an alumnus of the Britannia Royal Naval College, Dartmouth, England, and the University of Wollongong, New South Wales, Australia. He is also an Associated Fellow of the Nautical Institute of UK.

Emeritus Professor Gamini Keerawella is an internationally renowned research scholar, the former Head and Professor in Modern History at the University of Peradeniya, Sri Lanka. He retired from the University in 2015 after 40 years of service. He earned his M.A. in 1992 and Ph.D. in 1998 from the University of Windsor and from the University of British Columbia, Canada, respectively. His doctoral thesis was on 'The Superpower Naval Rivalry the Indian Ocean'. Prof. Keerawella was a recipient of a number of prestigious fellowships: Fulbright Scholar-in-Resident Professorship tenable in the College of the Holy Cross, Worcester, USA (2013-2014), Japan Foundation Fellowship at the Institute of Developing Economies in Tokyo, Japan (2003-04), Scholar-in-Residence, Centre for Theory, Baroda, India (2007), Senior Fulbright Fellowship tenable at the University of California-Berkeley, USA (1991-93), Senior Visiting Research Fellow at the University of Western Australia, Perth (1991). He has over 40 publications to his credit. He also served as the Secretary, Ministry of Ethnic

Affairs and National Integration and Mineral Resources Development (2001-2002), the Founder Director of the National Integration Unit (1997-2000) and Advisor to the President on Ethnic Affairs (2002-2005). He was the Deputy Chief of Mission and later the Charge d'Affaires of the Embassy of Sri Lanka, Washington D.C., USA (October 2015 to November 2017). Presently he serves as the Executive Director of the Regional Centre for Strategic Studies (RCSS).

Commander Junaid Tariq commenced his naval career from Pakistan Naval Academy on 14th January 2002 by joining the Course 2001-B. He was subsequently commissioned in Ops branch in January 2004. He graduated from the National University of Science and Technology in the discipline of Electronics Engineering. He did Long 'C' from PNS BAHADUR. The officer joined Pakistan Naval Aviation and is a qualified pilot on TH-300C, Alouette-III and Z9EC ASW helicopters with more than 1200 hours. The officer also followed the Flight Safety Officer Course from Pakistan and USA. He is a graduate of the Pakistan Navy War College and earned a MSc in War Studies (Maritime) from the National Defence University, Pakistan. He is also an alumnus of the Defence Services Command and Staff College, Sri Lanka.

CORE VALUES OF DSCSC

Learning Organization: DSCSC identifies itself as a catalyst for learning which seeks expansion of knowledge through realizing the full potential of its personnel. It is expected to uphold excellence in staff roles through dynamism, integrity, devotion, and the ability to learn from both mistakes and accomplishments.

Honour: DSCSC expects that all its members will strive to preserve self-respect, honesty and honour in all their deeds. Members are encouraged to put honour to the test by upholding the honour of the College.

Respect: DSCSC values mutual respect and recognizes uncompromising commitment in the achievement of mutual respect by fulfilling official obligations.

Decorum: DSCSC propagates itself as a pre-eminent defence establishment which upholds rules of decorum which is a fundamental core value of the services. Therefore, the College strives to maintain the highest, yet simple and practical standards in military decorum encompassing ethics, customs and traditions.

Excellence: DSCSC strives for excellence in all its endeavours at all levels which will ultimately contribute to the overall accomplishment of the College's objectives.

Innovation: DSCSC believes in pursuing new creative ideas leading to meaningful innovations by its members in conformity with the principles of high standards.

Punctuality: DSCSC holds punctuality as the bedrock of College's core values.

Professionalism: DSCSC holds professionalism in high esteem and fosters highest standards in professionalism within the establishment.

Mission Command: DSCSC encourages mission command at all levels and recognizes its value as a tool for problem solving and optimizing efficiency. Mission Command facilitates commanders at all levels to exercise their initiative.

Pristine Environment: DSCSC subscribes to serene surroundings of the College providing a conducive learning environment for its officers.

DRIVING TENET-Common Sense: Common Sense permeates the ideals of the Core Values of the DSCSC and it is a testament to the solid foundation the DSCSC inculcates on its officers.

Published by
Defence Services Command and Staff College
Sapugaskanda, Makola South 11640,
Sri Lanka
Tel: +94-112964218 / +94-112963792
Fax: +94-112962151
Email: dscscsl@gmail.com/dscsc@army.lk